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ABSTRACT 
The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate 
the explicit philosophy of mathematics in the work of 
Henri Poincarl. In particular, I argue that there is 
a well-founded doctrine which grounds both Poincar{'s 
negative thesis, which is based on constructivist 
sentiments, and his positive thesis, via which he retains 
a classical conception of the mathematical continuum. 
The doctrine which does so is one which is founded on 
the Kantian theory of synthetic apriori int~ition. 
I begin, therefore, by outlining Kant's theory of the 
synthetic apriori, especially as it applies to mathematics. 
Then, in the main body of the thesis, I explain how the 
various central aspects of Poincar~'s philosophy of 
mathematics - e.g., his theory of induction; his theory 
of the continuum; his views on impredicativitYi his 
theory of meaning - must, in general, be seen as an 
adaptation of Kant's position. My conclusion is that 
not only is there a well-founded philosophical core to 
Poincar~'s philosophy, but also that such a core pro-
vides a viable alternative in contemporary debates in 
the philosophy of mathematics. That is, Poincar~'s 
theory, which is secured by his doctrine of apriori 
intuitions, and which describes a position in between 
the two extremes of an "anti-realist" strict constructiv-
ism and a "realist" axiomatic set theory, may indeed be 
true. 
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" this disinterested pursuit of 
truth for its own beauty is also 
wholesome, and can make men better." 
(Poincar~, (1908)) 
"Now the majority of men do not like thinking, and 
this is perhaps a good thing, since instinct guides 
them, and very often better than reason would guide 
a pure intelligence, at least whenever they are 
pursuing an end that is immediate and always the 
same. But instinct is routine, and if it were not 
fertilized by thought, it would advance no further 
with man than with the bee or the ant. It is 
necessary, therefore, to think for those who do not 
like thinking, and as they are many, each one of 
our thoughts must be as useful in as many circum-
stances as possible." 
(Poincar~, (1908)) 
"But all this is ancient history. Mr. Russell has 
realized the danger and is going to reconsider the 
matter. He is going to change everything, and we 
must understand clearly that he is preparing not 
only to introduce new principles which permit of 
operations formerly prohibited, but also to prohibit 
operations which he formerly considered legitimate. 
He is not content with adoring what he once burnt, 
but he is going to burn what he once adored, which 
is more serious. He is not adding a new wing to 
the building, but sapping its foundations." 
(Poincare', (1906)) 
INTRODUCTION 
Jules Henri Poincar~ (1854-1912), the Gauss of modern 
mathematics, was a "universal" mathematician whose contrib-
utions were seminal in the development of contemporary pure 
mathematics, in mathematical physics, and in the philosophical 
foundations of mathematics. The first two claims, concern-
ing his influence in the technical areas, are uncontestable. 
Poincart was the greatest practitioner of mathematics of 
his time, and he is rightly credited for this. In contrast, 
his contribution to the philosophy of mathematics is, in 
general, profoundly underestimated. His thoughts are regarded 
as idiosyncratic and based upon a misunderstanding of the 
logicist tradition which he criticised. This interpretation 
is not, however, entirely unfounded, for at first glance, 
his writings seem glib, not very deep, and at times based 
on an indeed polemical reaction to the work of Russell, 
Zeillmelo, Peano and Couturat. His papers are often based 
on speeches he was requested to give to the scientific 
community, and sometimes, even, to a general audience. This 
results in writings which are often conversational in tone, 
the intent being to amuse as well as to inform. Reading 
them now, therefore, they may on occasion appear glib and 
even sarcastic. However, it is important not to allow the 
manner in which he expresses himself to obscure the depth 
and philosophical import which we may gain from his ideas. 
Since his philosophical work was always quite clearly 
2 
secondary to his work in mathematics itself, he never 
attempted to expound his ideas in a structured, systematic 
presentation. However, this does not mean that there is 
no general philosophical foundation which properly character-
ises the insights he had into the foundations of his work. 
It just means we must try a little harder to interpret his 
comments in terms of the whole of his philosophy, and thus 
to be cautious in what views we attribute to him. 
Unfortunately, sufficient care is not always taken when 
presenting his views; and interpretations which are in my 
view not entirely fair, are sometimes implied. For instance, 
in the context of a brief survey of the emergence of the 
concept of impredicativity, Kneale and Kneale (1962) comment 
,/ 
on Poincare's view that there is a relation between the 
set-theoretic paradoxes and the attempt to treat infinities 
as completed wholes. Poincar~ did hold such a view; but 
this was not the full extent of his view. Kneale and Kneale 
,/ 
go on to cite a short passage by Poincare to support their 
1 · 1 calm. However, this passage, on its own, is misleading; 
,/ 
and Poincare follows a similar passage on the previous page 
with an explanation of his view: "I must explain myself 
Later, they again comment that 
Poincar{ suggested that the paradoxes 
of the theory of sets were due to the 
fundamental mistake of assuming actually 
1 See Kneale and Kneale, (1962), pp.655-656. 
" 2 Poincare, (1906b), p.194. 
3 
infinite aggregates. He did not explain 
in detail why ... 3 
In Chapter 4, Section 5, and in Chapter 6, I discuss 
Poincarl's theory of impredic~tivity. 
Chihara, in his book Ontology and the Vicious-Circle 
Principle, is fairer to Poincar{, and devotes a chapter 
to discussing his views in their philosophical context. 
However, he also seems to have a rather superficial grasp 
of Poincar~'s theory of the relation between the belief in 
actual infinity and the contradictions. 4 In addition, he 
concludes that Poincar~ is a "nominalist" with regard to 
mathematics, citing Poincar~'s remarks that the continuum 
is a mere "system of symbols", and that mathematics can 
"give to the physicist only a convenient language".5 This, 
in my view, is a very rash pronouncement. In view of Poin-
/ 
care's theory of the apriori geometric foundations of the 
mathematical theory of the continuum (which is the subject 
of Chapter 5), it seems clear that his remarks on the con-
tinuum being ~ "a system of symbols" is not entirely 
meant in a straightforward sense. And the "language" the 
3 Kneale and Kneale, (1962), pp.672-673. 
4 See p .140. In contrast we may cite Heinzmann, (1985), "Entre 
Intuition et Analyse" for a very detailed and scholarly account 
(though not always philosophically deep in its explanation) of 
the development of the concept of predicativity in Poincar~. 
5 Chihara, p.154-155. 
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mathematician provides for the scientist has - contra-
Chihara - not to do with the fact that physical laws are 
expressed in terms of mathematical symbols and notation. 
Rather, it is a consequence of the strong Kantian nature of 
. / POlncare's philosophy: mathematics expresses what is 
necessarily common to all thinking beings; and the best 
science can do, insofar as discovering true relations, is 
to discover mathematical relations which survive the in-
evitable changes in background theory and conventions. 6 
There is no "only" in POincart's view of the language which 
mathematics provides for science; the use of the term 
("only") not being "misleading" (as Chihara claims), but 
surely intended as an irony. 
Perhaps most surprising of all the (mis)interpretations 
of Poincar~'s philosophy, is a claim made by Parsons 7 that 
Poincar~ is an intuitionist, but not a Kantian, because he 
seems "quite uninfluenced" by Kant's notion of pure intuition. 
This is particularly astonishing in view of the calibre, in 
general, of Parsons' scholarship. I devote Chapter 4 to an 
/ 
argument that Poincare, indeed, had a very strong theory of 
"pure intuition", and it is in terms of this theory that we 
must make sense of his very general claims against logicism 
and set theory. 
6 See Giedymin, (1982), for a very good account of the Kantian element 
of Poincare's "conven.tionalism". 
7 In his, (1964), p .108, note 6. 
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There is no doubt that it is not easy to make sense 
of POincart,s remarks 8 , which are often, at first blush, 
paradoxical and even trite. For example, he appears both 
to condone and oppose the formalisation of mathematics. He 
devotes pages to extolling the virtues of the "new" precise 
methods, e.g., those which are involved in the rigorisation 
of the concepts of continuity and limit. Yet never far from 
such praise is a corresponding criticism of formal methods. 
His fear appears to be that the benefits of exactness were 
being bought at the cost of purging our mathematical 
concepts of all intuitive content. ./ Poincare wants both pre-
cision and intuition to be a part of mathematics "proper". 
From his own experience he knows that "creative intuition" 
is hardly a formal matter. The relation between our formal 
characterisations and our intuitive concepts was a tension 
which he sought to resolve. 
There are also prima facie difficulties in coming to 
grips with his views on set theory. Although he was one of 
the first mathematicians to employ Cantor's theory of sets, 
and thus one of the first to reap the benefits of the theory, 
he explicitly rejected its fundamental theorem in its standard 
interpretation - that of a proof of the existence of an un-
countable set. And there is an apparent outrageous incon-
sistency in his attitude towards the continuum. Time and 
8 "I know very well there are disappointments, that the thinker does 
not always find the serenity he should, and even that some scientists 
have thoroughly bad tempers." (Poincare', (1908), p.24.) 
6 
again he stresses that all infinity is potential, that 
"there is no actual infinity"; that ineliminably impred-
icative specifications must be rejected; and so, the 
greatest cardinal is ~. And yet he wishes to retain a 
classical notion of continuity and the continuum, as he 
does not hesitate to employ, in his proofs, variables which 
range over all the points on the line. Indeed, the notion 
of continuity is one of the most central to his thinking, 
and his greatest theoretical achievements in the develop-
ment of "analysis situs" occurred when he considered what 
happens if certain parameters are allowed to vary continu-
ously. It seems all the points on the line exist, but 
there is no cardinal number of all the points on the line. 
The diversity and global nature of Poincar~'s thinking 
is depicted in the diverse schools of thought, the found-
ations to which he contributed. For instance, his theory 
of meaning - the criterion of verifiability in principle -
became foundational in intuitionism. This theory is the 
subject of Chapter 7. Whereas his theory of impredicativity 
and vicious circles, the subject of Chapter 6, led to the 
development of predicative set theory and predicative 
analysis (as for instance is found in Feferman, (1964), 
and, more recently, in S. Shapiro, (1985)). Chapter 5 
/ 
consists in an examination of Poincare's theory of the 
continuum; the ~roper interpretation of the continuum 
being an open philosophical matter to this day (and, 
perhaps, for a very long time). / Poincare's contributions 
also led to a critical reassessment of metamathematics, 
7 
in general. In Chapter 4 I discuss how, in . ;' POJ.ncare's 
view, intuitions are epistemologically prior to any 
significant formal structure; and in Chapter 3 I focus, 
. ;' 
with a view to the same end, on POJ.ncare's theory of 
induction. The question of the apriority of mathematics 
(and not only its synthetic apriori character) also stands 
in need of a defence. However, in view of the fact that 
. ;' POJ.ncare did not himself explicitly address the topic of 
a modern type of empiricist challenge, I have included 
a defence of the apriori as an appendix. 
My project in this thesis has been to determine whether 
there is a general philosophical core which underpins 
/ 
Poincare's scattered, diverse, yet often profoundly in-
sightful remarks. Is there a foundation which makes even 
his apparently paradoxical views cohere? My answer is 
an unqualified ~. Poincar~'s philosophy is coherent; 
the fundamental key to an appropriate understanding of 
his philosophy on the whole is not to underestimate the 
legacy of Kant in his views. P · ;' d oJ.ncare a opts Kant's view 
that mathematics is synthetic apriori. (He adapts it, too, 
for on his account, contrary to Kant, geometry is not 
synthetic apriori; in fact it is conventional.) His 
philosophical position can, on the whole, be described as 
line 0- Kanti an II • Chapter 2 is a brief introduction to 
Poincar~'s theory of the synthetic apriori. The main body 
of this thesis can, in general, be seen as a description 
/ 
of the way in which Poincare adapts the Kantian thesis, 
with a view to defending Kant from the "Leibnizian" 
8 
impulses of the time: i.e., Russell, Zermelo, Peano, etc .. 
Our first task will thus be to examine Kant's position; 
to this Chapter 1 is devoted. Throughout, it will be 
important to bear in mind that from the point of view of 
one of the very greatest practicioners of classical mathem-
atics since Gauss, one can see Poincar~'s philosophical 
work as possibly being motivated by a desire to steer a 
middle course between the "Scylla" of triviality and the 
"Charybdis" of contradiction; in fact, to steer a middle 
course between strict constructivism and set theory. 
CHAPTER ONE 
KANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS 
(1) The Basic Distinctions 
(2) The Synthetic Apriori 
(3) The Synthetic Apriori Instantiated: Geometry 
(4) The Synthetic Apriori Instantiated: Arithmetic 
(5) The Foundations of the Theory of the Synthetic 
Apriori 
(6) How the Theory Works: Geometry Revisited 
(7) A Precarious Analogy 
(8) The Key to the Synthetic Aspect of the Science 
of Number: Induction 
In order to properly describe and fairly appraise 
Poincar~'s philosophy of mathematics, we must first clarify 
what he thinks, and why he espouses certain Kantian themes 
but not others. He explicitly rejects Kant's thesis that 
Euclidean geometry is synthetic apriori. And he even 
rejects the more minimal Kantian thesis that the three-
dimensionality of space is a synthetic apriori matter. 
However, he follows Kant in asserting that the theorems 
of ~ mathematics have a synthetic apriori status. 
What does Kant mean by saying that mathematics is 
"synthetic apriori,,?l 
all analytic truths. 
First, mathematical truths are not 
./ Both Kant and Poincare maintain 
that some mathematical principles are analytic, e.g., 
"a=a" or, more interestingly, "equals added to (or sub-
tracted from) equals provide equal results".2 But bona 
1 For instance, "All n1athematical ·ud ements, without exce tion, are 
sx,I"Jthetic .. ~ In addition, mathematical propositions, strictly 
so called, are always judgements apriori, not empirical, ... " (B P .14) 
and " .•. bodies of apriori synthetic knowledge can be derived 
(Pure mathematics is a brilliant example of such knowledge ... )" 
(B p.55). (References to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason will be 
given by prefixing the page number with the appropriate edition, 
i.e. "A" for 1781 and "B" for 1787.) 
'" 2 See B pp.204-205 and Poincare, (1894a), p.3. 
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fide mathematical judgements must be synthetic (according 
to the above reference). And second, despite the 
non-analytic character of our mathematical judgements, 
the knowledge gained from them is not empirical - it is 
not obtained from experience - but is apriori. The 
invention of the notion of apriori forms of experience 
enables Kant to conjoin synthetic with apriori, and hence, 
to maintain this view. What the synthetic apriori consists 
in and from where it comes will be the main subject of 
this chapter. 
(1) The Basic Distinctions 
Preliminary to understanding Kant's philosophy, there 
are two general claims: one in the theory of meaning, 
and one in epistemology. The first claim is that there 
is a well-defined distinction in our language between 
analytic and synthetic statements (judgements, propositions). 
Our understanding of the content of our propositions is 
such that there are two exclusive classes: the analytic 
and the synthetic. Now this distinction may be explicated 
(or fail to be explicated) in various ways. Kant himself 
wavers between the view that these are types of judgements 
(8 p.lO), and that these are types of propositions (B p.56). 
Most likely, he felt the distinction could be applied to 
propositions as a result of its application to judgements, 
which seems to be primary. For Kant, the distinction 
amounts to the existence of a "containment" relation among 
concepts. 
11 
Either the predicate 8 belongs to the concept 
A, as something which is (covertly) contained 
in this concept A; or 8 lies outside the 
concept A although it does [in virtue of our 
judgementi indeed stand in connection with it. 
In the one case I entitle the judgement analytic, 
in the other synthetic. (8 p.lO) 
Hence analytic truths are those which, in thinking the 
subject (of the sentence being judged) we cannot help but 
think the predicate. The predicate, thus, gives us no 
new information about the subject, for it is already 
"contained in" the concept of the subject. 
There is no doubt that Kant believed that this relation 
among concepts existed and was well-defined. But this 
claim, since it presupposes determinacy of meaning - the 
objectivity of our linguistic conventions -
is widely contested in most discussions in modern 
philosophy of language. Perhaps the boundary between 
analytic and synthetic is not as straightforward as Kant 
thought; or perhaps Kant's metaphor of "containment" is 
not desirable. Whatever way the distinction is made, 
however - e.g., that the negation of an analytic statement, 
when appropriate definitions are substituted, produces a 
contradiction - it is necessary for an understanding of 
Kant. 
The other major distinction which underlies Kant's 
philosophy is between pure and empirical, or apriori and 
aposteriori knowledge. Whereas analyticity/syntheticity 
12 
is a linguistic distinction concerning the content of 
our statements (or judgements), the apriori/aposteriori 
distinction is epistemological, and concerns how we can 
come to know the truth of, and how we can justify making, 
our assertions. So all statements are either analytic or 
synthetic; and all knowledge is either apriori (pure) or 
aposteriori (empirical). Apriori knowledge is that which 
is knowable without consulting the world: it is "prior to" 
(in a figurative sense), or independent of, any particular 
experience or set of experiences. In contrast, aposteriori 
knowledge requires sense experience, or investigation into 
the world, before one can have good grounds for accepting 
it. One must be able to cite evidence (facts - usually 
other aposteriori pieces of information) in order to justify 
any knowledge which is aposteriori. The question "How 
do you know," is never adequately answered by "I just do 
know" when referring to knowledge which is thought to be 
aposteriori. 
As with the analytic/synthetic distinction, there are 
problems with the neatness of this dichotomy concerning 
ways of knowing, as was pointed out by the later Wittgen-
stein throughout On certainty.3 However, again, as with 
3 For instance, that the earth existed 100 years ago seems to be a 
piece of aposteriori knowledge. But anything we might be tempted 
to cite as evidence for the statement, itself has no grounding 
(what is the evidence for the evidence?), unless we presuppose the 
original statement is true. In order to believe any of the evidence 
that the world existed 100 years ago (e.g., history books, geological 
methods, parents), I must already believe it is true that the earth 
13 
the analytic/synthetic distinction we must accept the 
existence of the apriori/aposteriori distinction in 
order to have any chance at all of acquiring a genuine 
understanding of Kant's philosophy. Whether or not we 
possess a clear explication of the concepts, we know the 
distinction exists because we use it. And, in Wang's 
words, "To say tha t analytici ty Lor any distinction] is 
not sharp is quite different from saying it is not in-
telligible".4 
(2) The Synthetic Apriori 
Intuitively, analyticity is usually paired with apriori, 
syntheticity with aposteriori. We do not need to "look 
at the world" ':'0 know "The bachelor is unmarried" is true; 
for, since it is analytic that all bachelors are unmarried, 
it is true in every instance. Justifying it is referring 
to the language, not to the world or experience; so it 
is apriori because it is analytic. Conversely, we cannot 
justify the claim that "There are three people in the 
room next door" - a synthetic statement which informs us -
unless we go and look. We must participate in the extra-
linguistic, sensory world - someone must do something 
did not pop into existence ready made with its history books. 
"Does my telephone call to New York strengthen my conviction 
that the earth exists," (Wittgenstein, (li969), p.240.) The 
answer is it cannot: for in order to believe I have successfully 
phoned New York, I must already believe (implicitly, at least) 
the earth exists. 
4 Wang, (1974), p.278. 
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to act and/or perceive - in order to be in a position 
to justify this statement. Hence, it is aposteriori. 
Famously, Kant disrupts this tidy dichotomy by fusing 
synthetic with apriori. Certain statements about the 
nature of space and time, about substance, and about 
mathematics are said to be synthetic apriori. They are 
synthetic apriori because, although they are not analytic 
(i.e., no containment relation exists between subject and 
predicate), our knowledge of them does not depend upon 
sense experience for its justification. So they are 
apriori and synthetic. An example which Kant gives of a 
synthetic apriori item of knowledge (a synthetic statement, 
the truth of which is knowable apriori) is that space has 
three dimensions. We cannot conclude this inductively 
from observation alone. For in order for an experience 
to count as perception of a spatial entity (external to 
the perceiver), it must be perceived as three-dimensional 
(B p.38). There is no such thing as amassing evidence 
for the three-dimensionality of space; for in order to 
decide whether or not a perception is to count as evidence 
for or against the hypothesis, we must decide whether or 
not it is spatial. And the only method we have for 
deciding this, is to determine whether or not the percep-
tion stems from outside the body. But it is impossible 
to know whether something is external to the body without 
knowing whether it is three-dimensional. Hence, perception 
of three-dimensionality is necessary for a perception 
to count as an external object. 
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Yet it is not logically absurd to conceive of two-
dimensional (or any other dimensional) space, as in plane 
geometry, or analysis situs. So it is not analytic that 
space has three dimensions. We can conceive of alternate 
spaces, we just cannot conceive of ourselves (our bodies) 
living in (experiencing) them. We cannot imagine what 
experience of non-three-dimensional space would be like, 
since any perception we imagine is interpreted or seen 
from a three-dimensional point of view. 
This is an instance of what Kant calls the "form of 
experience" or, in particular, the "apriori form of per-
ception". Perceptions must have a certain form or character 
before they can be counted as perceptions, rather than 
mere imaginations of uninstantiated concepts. Kant argues 
that there must be some "screening off" faculty; other-
wise, for instance, how is it that we are able to distinguish 
sensations stemming from within the body and mental 
activity ("inner appearance") from perceptions of an 
external object ("outer appearance"), where the latter 
are supposed to be caused by something in the world, 
independent of the perceiver? (8 p.38). The objection 
that we are not always. able to distinguish veridical from 
non-veridical perception, is answered by pointing out 
that according to Kant this very distinction (veridical/ 
non-veridical) would be impossible without the apriori 
form of perception. There must in principle be some 
difference of which we can be aware, between an experience 
and the memory of the experience. How the distinction - even 
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if it is not always used accurately - is possible at all, 
is the question with which Kant is concerned. 
The form of all spatial and temporal intuition (or of 
all possible experience) is apriori - prior to sensations 
which are the matter of perception. Knowledge of the 
form of space and time is synthetic apriori; knowledge of 
particulars in space-time is synthetic aposteriori. Space 
and time are apriori forms of experience which take in 
and process the matter of our perceptions, e.g., by providing a 
structure which imposes an ordering relation on our exper-
iences. 
(3) The Synthetic Apriori Instantiated: Geometry 
Kant held that geometrical knowledge is synthetic 
apriori because it consists in synthetic judgements con-
cerning the apriori intuition of space. Since these 
judgements concern only that which is given apriori - i.e., 
they do not concern any accidental properties of actual, 
particular lines, points, triangles, etc. - the knowledge 
obtained from the judgements is apriori also. The 
statements concerned are synthetic because they are not 
analytic; and they are not analytic because they depend 
on something other than logic plus the containment relation 
among concepts .for their truth or proof. In order to 
justify a belief that, say, the angles of a,triarygJe add 
up to 180°, we prove it. And the proof requires an active 
contribution, which is synthetic in nature. 
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Geometric proofs have a constructive form: they depend 
upon the performability in principle of certain construc-
tions. For instance, line segments must be extendable; 
and we must be able to rotate figures or planes 180 0 
around a straight line. So, since the existence of 
indefinitely extendable lines is not satisfied in all 
spaces (e.g., a spatially closed surface with the topology 
of a sphereS), we require intuition to underwrite the 
existential assumptions, which are in turn necessary for 
the constructions to count as evidential steps. The con-
structions will not be evidential unless we have independent 
grounds for believing they are performable, i.e., that 
they are satisfiable in the space in question. In this 
way, the possibility of geometric proofs depends upon 
the satisfiability of certain constructions. Hence, it 
depends upon (geometric) space having certain properties, 
and remaining so over time. 
But since, for Kant, space just is what we are in 
principle able to perceive of the outer world (what we 
are able to perceive, apriori), the proofs depend on nothing 
other than the apriori form of (experiential) space. Our 
apriori intuition of space underwrites our proofs because 
it informs us that the necessary constructions are 
performable. Hence, that in virtue of which geometry is 
synthetic (construction, or existential assumptions) is 
5 Friedman discusses this point in his (1985), p.500. 
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something which is apriori. Geometric theorems are 
synthetic because of the constructive character of their 
proofs; yet they are apriori, because the existence of 
the necessary constructions is guaranteed by apriori 
information. In referring to properties of space given 
by the apriori forms of perception, we are going "outside" 
or "beyond" the geometrical concepts themselves. There is 
thus no relation of containment between the concepts and 
these properties. Yet in going beyond the concepts, our 
constructions do not go into that which can only be given 
empirically (in an aposteriori way). This is because we 
only go "beyond" the concepts by looking at what ~ add 
apriori to the concepts. 
We are not here concerned with analytic 
propositions, which can be produced by mere 
analysis of concepts ... , but with synthetic 
propositions ... For I must not restrict my 
attention to what I am actually thinking in 
my concept of a triangle (this is nothing 
more than the mere definition); I must pass 
beyond it to properties which are not con-
tained in this concept, but yet belong to 
it. (8 p.746) 
If we restrict our attention to the concept of triangle, 
we cannot do geometry. We also must employ properties of 
the embedding space, which inform us that we can bisect 
angles, extend line segements, etc. For Kant, the properties 
of the embedding space "belong to" the concept Cof triangle) 
by virtue of certain apriori judgements concerning space and 
time, by way of the apriori conditions of experience. 
The apriori form of- experience is imposed on (and hence 
"belongs to") - not contained in - our concepts, by re-
stricting the ways in which we can "pass beyond" the concepts. 
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(4) The Synthetic Apriori Instantiated: Arithmetic 
Mathematical reasoning lS reasoning via "construction", 
where some sort of new entity is considered or "synthesized" 
in the process. We have seen how, in the case of geometry, 
this consideration draws from our apriori spatial in-
tuition; it "goes beyond" the (mere) concepts in this 
way. How does "construction" fit into arithmetic or 
algebraic proofs? 
Kant was not as clear about arithmetic as he was about 
geometry. Hence, almost inevitably, when giving an example 
of a construction, he provides a geometric construction. 
He does, however, address the subject of arithmetic con-
struction. Computational truths, like "2+3~5", are 
synthetic because they are statements about constructions 
in time, the truth of which cannot be known merely by 
considering the concepts involved (two, three, plus, 
equals, and five) (8 pp.15-16). The containment relation 
is not satisfied here, because just thinking "two plus 
three" is not sufficient for thinking "five". In order 
to arrive at the concept "five", I must actively put the 
two and the three together by "successive synthesis in time" 
or counting. In the synthesis involved in the successive 
counting of units,6 we find the arithmetic analogue to 
geometric construction. And since counting both actually 
takes time, and conceptually requires the apriori intuition of 
6 See Korner, (1960), p.29. 
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t . 7 lme , the apriori form or intuition of time is involved 
at the very basis of arithmetic: in grounding our gener-
ating of integers, and hence, in everything we do with the 
integers. From counting we learn addition, and from 
addition we proceed to other methods of manipulating the 
integers. 
The apriori intuition of time (the form of all experience) 
is what enables us to learn the discipline of mathematics 
and to apply arithmetic and mathematics to the world. This 
is because the distinguishing characteristic of the integers 
is their successive nature. The claim is, we could not 
have learned about numbers without the apriori intuition 
of time. We could not have acquired the intuition of 
succession (to ground the concept of succession) were it 
not a form imposed by our minds upon experience. Further-
more, time is what enables us to apply our mathematics 
to the world, for it is what guarantees that our perceptual 
experience will be of a mathematical character (8 p.206). 
As well as for the integers, the distinguishing charac-
teristic of time is that it is successive: 
Time is nothing but the form of inner sense 
It cannot be a determination of outer 
appearances; it has to do neither with shape 
nor position, but with the relation of repre-
sentations in our inner state. And just because 
7 See Kant, (1770), p.62. 
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this inner intuition yields no shape, we 
endeavour to make up for this want by 
analogies. We represent the time-sequence 
by a line progressing to infinity, in which 
the manifold constitutes a series of one-
dimension only; and we can reason from 
the properties of this line to all the 
properties of time, with this one exception, 
that while the parts of the line are 
simultaneous the parts of time are always 
successive. (B pp.49-50) 
The parts of time are entirely successive, or ordered. 
Our knowledge of the parts of time occurs via the relations 
of the representations within this successive framework. 
We can only know parts of time by aposteriori means, for 
there is no possible experience of all of time - of 
the general concept of time, or indefinite succession. 
Hence the intuition of time in general must be apriori. 
Because our intuition of time is apriori, the fact that 
it is successive, or ordered, does not mean it must be 
composed of discrete parts. The parts of time we perceive 
do not make up the whole; on the contrary, our memories 
are carved out of the whole, which must then be intuited 
apriori. 
Space and time are quanta continua, because 
no part of them can be given save as enclosed 
between limits (points or instants), and 
therefore only in such a fashion that this 
part is itself again a space or a time . ... 
Points and instants are only limits, that is, 
mere positions which limit space and time .... 
neither space nor time can be constructed. 
Such magnitudes may also be called flowing, 
since the synthesis of productive imagination 
involved in [producing magnitudes] is a pro-
gression in time, and the continuity of time 
is ordinaril~ designated by the term flowing 
or flowing away. (B p.211- 2 12 .) 
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Space and time are continuous; hence we can only know 
parts of space and time by aposteriori means, as defined 
by the part enclosed between two end points of a repres-
entation. The continuity of time is compared to a "flowing" 
or the movement of a point - thus, it is clear that Kant's 
conception of continuity was not equivalent to mere 
density, and was not unsophisticated for his time. In 
addition, since we have an apriori intuition of time, we 
have an apriori intuition of a mathematically sophisticated 
model. 
That by which we express our apriori intuition of time 
the continuum - is also that which provides a pictorial 
model or geometric analogue of all the real numbers. 
Each real number, like Kant's points and instants, is a 
limit. Hence it is not absurd to hold that Kant's model 
of the intuition of time grounds our modern conception of 
number. 
Kant argues that the intuition of time must be apriori; 
otherwise, we could not have acquired our conception of 
number. For instance, we could not possibly learn the 
notion of indefinite succession by aposteriori means alone 
(by reference only to experience). We could not even 
learn the mere notion of succession by aposteriori means 
alone; for there is no possible perception of succession, 
since succession is merely a relation between perceptions. 
Hence it must be ~mposed, not acquired; and our under-
standing of the corresponding concept must be completely 
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aprlorl. If the order of our representations was not 
imposed by the mind, we could not perceive order at all. 
For without the apriori form of inner perception, our 
memory would not ~ ordered - the recollection of our 
experiences would be haphazard and chaotic, unrelated by 
position. Hence, we could not acquire the understanding 
of succession from the perception of order in the memory; 
for there would not be any order if the relation of 
succession (total order) was not impnsed on it. The 
apriori understanding of an object in general, via the 
conditions of thought, ensures that our perceptions are 
of discrete units or objects. In addition, the apriori 
intuition of time ensures that recollections of our 
perceptions are structured as well, by ordering our per-
ceptions as they are inscribed onto the memory. 
Hence, our concept of the domain of integers, or of all 
quantities which are either continuous or successively 
generated, must be grounded in the apriori intuition of 
the temporal form. For the very notionswe employ to 
describe our concepts of numerical domains would themselves 
be devoid of sense in the absence of the temporal form. 
Concepts like indefinite succession, continuity, etc., 
would be devoid of sense without the apriori intuition of 
time, for there is no possible aposteriori experience 
8 For the necessity of a possible experience to ground each concept, 
see next section, this chapter. 
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(intuition) to ground these concepts. Kant's requirement 
that there be an intuition (possible experience) corre-
sponding to every meaningful concept, will be discussed 
in the next section. 
(5) The Foundations of the Theory of the Synthetic Apriori 
Kant had strongly empiricist elements in his theory 
of meaning. Associated with every concept there must be 
an "intuition" (or an instance), and, according to Kant, 
we must be able to associate an intuition or instance 
with a concept if we can claim to understand the content 
or sense of the concept. 
Without sensibility no object would be given 
to us, without understanding no object would 
be thought. Thoughts without content are 
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. 
It is, therefore, just as necessary to make 
our concepts sensible, that is, to add the 
object to them in intuition, as to make our 
intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring 
them under concepts. (B p.75) 9 
Knowledge, then, requires both concept and intuition, or 
concept and "individual representation" 10 of an instance of 
the concept. Both aspects are necessary; and each has 
an apriori fOTm which can be described of them. We ha ve 
already mentioned Kant's description of the apriori form 
of intuition, i.e., space and time. The apriori form of 
understanding is complex in its divisions. ll The important 
9 See also B p.298. 
10 See Hintikka, (1973), e.g., p.44, and pp.207-210. 
11 See B p.76 passim. 
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point is that there is more than one type of rule of 
thought. Kant, here, diverges from the ordinary modern 
view that the way in which we think is constrained only 
by the "empty" rules of logic. In contrast, certain of 
Kant's rules of thought are not "empty" in the same way, 
but rather, participate in the content of our concepts. 
First there is "pure general logic" which is completely 
divorced from anything empirical, and is purely formal, 
and which mayor may not correspond to our notion of formal 
1 0 d 1 0 1 °bolOt 12 OglC an oglca POSSl l l y. Second, there is "applied 
general logic", which concerns the 
rules of the employment of understanding 
under the subjective empirical conditions 
Applied logic has therefore empirical 
principles, although it .•. refers to the 
employment of the understanding without 
regard to difference in the objects. (8 p.77) 
Insofar as pure general logic is pure, it concerns nothing 
empirical; insofar as it is general, it is only the mere 
"form of thought". Insofar as applied general logic is 
applied, it is empirical because it concerns the way in 
which we - in fact - think about empirical objects. However, 
insofar as it, too, is general, it concerns only the way 
we (in fact) think about empirical objects in general. 
That is, it tooo concerns the mere form of thought in that 
it has nothing to do with any particular differences of 
12 See 8 p.77 for description. 
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actual objects. General applied logic, then, is the study 
of the application of restrictions on our understanding of 
empirical objects in general. 
Kant sees three "stages" to knowledge, each of which is 
divided up into various sections, depending,- among other 
things, on whether the object or intuition concerned is 
pure or empirical (apriori or aposteriori). The first stage 
is perception, which is conditioned by the forms of space 
and time. The second stage is synthesis, where our per-
ceptions are gathered together in a certain way so as to 
produce clumps or sets of sense data, each of which is 
unified into an image. This synthesis is performed by what 
Kant calls the imagination. The third stage takes place 
in the understanding; and it is here where we judge (for 
the understanding is a "faculty of judgement" (8 p.94)) 
which concept corresponds to the clump of sense data 
(formed by the imagination). We also judge here whether 
different clumps are instances of the same concept (8 p.104). 
In addition to the unifying power of the imagination then, 
which both synthesizes (different perceptions of a thing 
over time) and unifies (perception into one image (A p.120)), 
the understanding also has a unifying power in that it can 
unify or judge different images as instances of a single 
concept. The rules of understanding are necessary in my 
judgement that, for example, a Granny Smith, a Golden 
Delicious, a McIntosh, a baked apple, are all instances of 
the con c e p t "a p pIe 'I. It is v i a the i mag ina t ion t hat I 
perceive each as one image, one object or unit. And it is via 
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the understanding that I can unify the images under one 
concept- i.e., that I can know that they are all apples. 
These three stages are necessary for all knowledge, 
whether the content concerned is pure or empirical. Hence, 
there are both apriori and aposteriori intuitions which 
correspond to different concepts, and there is both an 
apriori and an aposteriori synthesis (which depends on the 
type of intuition concerned). 
Kant's verificationist theory of meaning is at the root 
of his development of the synthetic apriori. "All concepts 
•.. , even such as are possible apriori, relate to empirical 
intuitions, that is, to the data for a possible experience." 
(8 p.298). Otherwise, the concept is empty, and has no 
meaning for us. Since knowledge is thought ~ intuition 
(8 p.lS7), knowing something requires that we pass beyond 
mere concepts. We can pass beyond mere concepts, or acquire 
evidence for a synthetic judgement, in two ways. In 
ordinary (aposteriori) synthetic jUdgements we refer to 
sense experience for our evidence. For example, appropriate 
evidence for "The cat is purring" would include my hearing 
the cat purr. However, with regard to apriori synthetic 
judgements we must "pass beyond the mere concepts" in an 
apriori way, that is, independently of sense experience. 
We can do this by referring to the apriori conditions, dis-
cussed above, for ~ possible experience; we can inform our 
concepts by inspecting how they are affected by the 
conditions for experience (of perception, synthesis and 
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judgement), and this is knowable apriori. 
Synthetic apriori judgements are thus 
possible when we relate the formal conditions 
of apriori intuition, the synthesis of 
imagination, and the necessary unity of this 
synthesis, in a transcendental apperception 
[in a unified consciousness (A p.lOJ), i.e., 
in a single conceptl to a possible empirical 
knowledge in general. We then assert that 
the conditions of the possibility of exper-
ience in general are likewise conditions of 
the possibility of the objects of experience, 
and that for this reason they have objective 
validity in a synthetic apriori judgement. 
(B p.197) 
Or, put more starkly: "Time and space, taken together, 
are the pure forms of all sensible intuition, and so are 
what make apriori synthetic propositions possible" (B p.56). 
(6) How the Theory Works: Geometry Revisited 
For example, geometry is synthetic apriori because 
space and time are involved in the construction of figures 
by guaranteeing the existence and performability of certain 
constructions. Although we do not draw conclusions about 
particular figures (hence, our actual sense experience 
does not inform our proofs, and this is why they are apriori), 
our employment of figures in proofs does cause us to go 
"beyond" the mere concepts. There is no relation of 
containment between the concepts of the figures and the 
inferences we make via our constructions. The figures or 
images we employ are arbitrary instances of concepts, like 
"triangle". Because we can consider an arbitrary instance 
of the concept, by -"drawing it in thought", we satisfy 
the first condition of knowledge: "that the representation 
through which the object is thought relates to actual or 
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possible experience" (B p.195). My mental image of a 
triangle is sufficient to guarantee the meaningfulness 
of the concept, for any possible experience of an actual 
triangle will conform to what is given in my mental image. 
This is because the latter draws only from the conditions 
for all experience, including experiences of triangles. 
Spatial and temporal intuition are employed in my 
mental image. Space, 01' "outer sense" guarantees the 
existence of, or the possibility of constructing, triangles; 
and time - "inner sense" - is the form of all possible 
experiences: images and events. The synthesis of the 
imagination is employed in my mental image in the act of 
drawing it in thought. And the rules of the understanding 
are employed when I judge that the mental image is an 
instance of the concept "triangle". 
Hence, via the form of experience, 01' experience in 
principle, geometry advances using pure intuitions. 
(7) A Precarious Analogy 
By "construction" in mathematics Kant intends a non-
empirical representation of a concept. Regarding numerical 
formulas involving small numbers, we construct 01' synthesize 
units to determine their truth 01' falsity. I construct 
in my mind three units, ~nd then successively add two more 
units to it, in verifying that "3+2=5 11 is true. However, 
construction of abstract units only suffices for a very 
small part of mathematics. We must also solve equations 
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involving large numbers, for which it is no longer 
practically possible via Itsuccessive synthesis" of units 
alone. And we must prove general results. Hence, we 
have more general procedures, the understanding and im-
plementation of which requires construction of concepts 
rather than units. 
To construct a concept means to exhibit 
apriori the intuition which corresponds to 
the concept .•. we therefore need a non-
empirical intuition. The latter mus~s 
intuition, be a single object, and yet none 
the less, as the construction of a concept (a 
universal representation), it must in its 
representation express universal validity 
for all possible intuitions which fall under 
the same concept. Thus I construct a triangle 
by representing the object which corresponds 
to this concept either by imagination alone 
in pure intuition, or in accordance therewith 
also on paper, in empirical intuition - in 
both cases comple~ely apriori, without having 
borrowed the pattern from any experience. 
The single figure which we draw is empirical, 
and yet it serves to express the concept, 
without impairing its universality. For in 
this empirical intuition we consider only the 
act whereby we construct the concept, and 
abstract from the many determinations [for 
instance the magnitude of the sides and of 
the angles], which are quite indifferent, as 
not altering the concept "triangle". (B pp.i-,-\\-i-<-I2) 
Because we consider an intuition (construction) and not 
only the concept, we combine the properties which are 
given by the concept of the object with the properties 
which it has ~ object. And because the intuition is of 
an arbitrary object, we combine the properties given in 
the concept with the properties which it has qua arbitrary 
object. The properties which a construction has ~ 
arbitrary object are those which are present in every con-
struction of the type of object. For example, every 
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construction of a triangle gives us angles which add up 
to 180 0 , as can be proved through considering an arbitrary 
(Euclidean) triangle. Because the point of the represent-
ation is to exhibit ~ the properties which are provided 
by every construction of the type of object, the intuition 
of the representation is an intuition which is general, 
not particular or actual; and hence pure, or apriori, and 
not empirical. We do not, for instance, measure the angles 
of the triangle we have constructed for the proof mentioned 
above. So the proof does not depend on any of the particular, 
"accidental" properties of the actual figure drawn on 
paper. If it did, it would not be a proof. Hence, the 
construction, as we employ it in a proof, is not empirical; 
and the figure actually drawn is merely a heuristic aid. 
Philosophy confines itself to universal 
concepts; mathematics can achieve nothing 
by concepts alone but hastens at once to 
intuition, in which it considers the concept 
in concreto, though not empirically, but only 
in an intuition which it presents apriori, 
that is, which it has constructed, and in 
which whatever follows from the universal 
conditions of the construction must be 
universally valid of the object of the con-
cept thus constructed. (B pp.743-744) 
In mathematics we infer things both from what is given in 
the concept and from what is given in the "construction" 
of the concept. Because we are constructing (lines, points, 
triangles), we are "guided throughout [our proofs] by 
intuition II (B p.745) and by the synthesis of the imagination, 
so our inferences are synthetic. But since the intuition 
which guides us is not empirical, the synthesis concerns 
an apriori image, and our inferences are synthetic apriori. 
32 
Conceptual analysis alone is inadequate for mathematics. 
We must refer to our intuitive understanding of an object 
or unit in our geometrical proofs. But since we refer 
only to ~ intuition, or perception of an arbitrary 
(ideal, apriori) object, this reference does not impugn 
the apriority of our inferences. We have seen, in section 
6, how the theory of construction of concepts applies to 
geometry. Space and time contribute to the conclusions 
we draw even though we only consider apriori, i.e. arbitrary, 
constructions. The transition from geometry to arithmetic 
and algebra is important, and requires careful analysis. 
To this end I will indulge in an extensive quote from Kant. 
But mathematics does not only construct 
magnitudes (guanta) as in geometry; it 
also constructs magnitude as such (guantitas), 
as in algebra. In this it abstracts com-
pletely from the properties of the object 
that is to be thought in terms of such a 
concept of magnitude. It then chooses a 
certain notation for all constructions of 
magnitude as such (numbers), that is, for 
addition, subtraction, extraction of roots, 
etc. Once it has adopted a notation for 
the general concept of magnitudes so far as 
their different relations are concerned, it 
exhibits in intuition, in accordance with 
certain universal rules, all the various 
operations through which the magnitudes are 
produced and modified. When, for instance, 
one magnitude is to be divided by another, 
their symbols are placed together, in accord-
ance with the sign for division, and similarly 
in the other processes; and thus in algebra 
by means of a symbolic construction, just 
as in geometry by means of an ostensive 
construction (the geometrical construction 
of the objects themselves), we succeed in 
arriving at results which discursive knowledge 
could never have reached by means of mere 
concepts. (B,p.745) 
However, the analogy is contrived. It seems that Kant is 
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trying too hard to draw a tight analogy, where it is not 
available. The conventions governing the choice of symbols 
via which we represent the numerals have nothing in any 
interesting way to do with the synthetic aspect of math~ 
ematics. Symbolic conventions are empty conventions. The 
subject matter of geometry is grounded in the apriori 
intuition of space (as well as of time). Hence, in 
representing its concepts we quite naturally employ space: 
we construct images on paper. However, the subject matter 
of arithmetic comes only from the apriori intuition of 
time. So there is no relation between arithmetic con-
struction and space. There is no link between any number 
concept and the symbolic notation by which we represent 
it. 
Kant locates the parallel in the wrong place. There 
is a parallel between geometry and the rest of pure math-
ematicsj it just does not lie in the way we represent 
either our arithmetic or our geometric concepts. Rather, 
the appropriate parallel lies in our ability in both 
domains to inform our concepts - of triangle, of number -
in an apriori way, via apriori intuition. Mathematical 
knowledge is only possible because of the existence of our 
apriori intuitions of space and of time, for without these 
our exact concepts would not be meaningful. 
All our knowledge relates, finally, to 
possible intuitions, for it is thrpugh them 
alone that a~ object is given ... LAnd] the 
only intuition that is given apriori is that 
of the mere form of appearances, space and 
time. (8 pp.747-748) 
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Both geometrical and number-theoretic statements have 
a content which is given by the "mere form of appearances". 
The disanalogy lies in the fact that while geometrical 
concepts are informed by our apriori intuition of both 
space and time, our arithmetic and algebraic concepts are 
informed only by our apriori intuition of time. The 
content of our number-theoretic statements is independent 
of spatial intuition. In this way, since the parallel seems 
12 to focus on the supposed "construction", it is not apt. 
(8) The Key to the Synthetic Aspect of the Science of 
Number: Induction 
The important aspect of construction in mathematics is 
the way the concepts can be informed, or "added to", by 
intuition in an apriori way. The performability of 
geometrical constructions is guaranteed by space and time; 
the performability of arithm~tic constructions is guaranteed 
only by time. However, mathematical definitions are exact: 
the commerce of mathematics is exact concepts and ideal 
objects. We cannot draw ideal objects anyway, so the 
spatial representation of even geometric concepts - drawings 
of triangle, lines, etc. - is not related in any important 
way to the "constructive" aspect of the proofs. (As axio-
matic geometry shows, the pictures are dispensable, since 
12 As perhaps, Kant himself realised. See B pp.762-763, where he 
emphasises the importance of the concepts attached· to the symbols; 
the symbols having a heuristic role. 
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they are merely heuristic aids to the proofs.) Hence, 
"construction" of mathematical concepts is a metaphor. The 
intention of this metaphor is to capture our ability to 
consider an arbitrary instance - unit, object - of a 
concept. And, since the concepts involved are (or ought to 
be) exact, this consideration of an arbitrary instance is 
mathematically informative, for through it we have access 
to the "ideal objects" of mathematics. 
Considering an arbitrary instance of a concept results 
in a "construction" which is ideal, because what we are 
thinking about, or quasi-perceiving "in the mind's eye", 
is an object which represents all and only the properties 
of all the elements in a domain. Consideration of an arbitr-
ary element of a domain is an essential part of any general 
proof (proof of a general result). In geometry, it is 
essential that our constructions be of arbitrary figures 
in order to be justified in drawing conclusions about all 
triangles, or all isosceles triangles. In arithmetic it 
is an essential part of proof by induction, where we 
consider an arbitrary element and its successor (or in 
multiple and transfinite inductions, stages of this pattern). 
Moreover, induction is necessary for any general proof 
concerning numbers. Hence, consideration of an arbitrary 
element of a given domain is a necessary part of any 
general mathematical proof. 
Constructing concepts in mathematics is considering 
arbitrary instances of concepts. In considering an 
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arbitrary triangle, we employ the apriori intuition of 
space. Because the "intuition" is non-empirical, the 
construction is apriori, and the object is arbitrary. For 
instance, by means of the apriori spatial intuition we 
know that we can draw a line from one angle to the opposite 
side of a triangle, which exactly bisects that angle - not 
approximately, but exactly. "We can draw" only means 
"there exists" in geometry (we cannot actually bisect an 
angle); so our apriori spatial intuition vindicates our 
making certain existential claims about space within a 
13 proof. 
Likewise, in arithmetic and algebra, considering an 
arbitrary object of a domain is the key to discovering 
or understanding general results. For instance, in ~n-
duction we must consider an arbitrary natural number, n. 
13 This coincides with Hintikka's view of the development of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction (see Hintikka, (1965b), "Are Logical 
Truths Analytic?"). He claims that prior to Kant, the analytic/ 
synthetic distinction was mainly directed towards geometrical proofs. 
An analytical "argument" was one in which no constructions were 
carried out; i.e., "no new lines, points, circles and the like 
were introduced during the argument" (ibid., p.153). If any such 
new entities were essentially employed-rn-arriving at the con-
clusion, the argument was considered to be synthetic. There seems 
to be a direct relation between this view of the distinction and 
Kant's arguments concerning why mathematical proofs, in contrast 
with philosophical arguments, are synthetic. Philosophical reason-
ing is analytic because it depends only on the concepts plus formal 
logic or the containment relation. Mathematical reasoning is 
synthetic because it relies upon how the concepts are informed by 
the rules governing the three stages of knowledge (discussed in 
section 5): it relies upon construction of concepts. 
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And this is informative in a way which "goes beyond" the 
mere concepts, because we employ the apriori intuition of 
time, since we must consider the relation between n and its 
successor, n+l. The inference 
from P(o) & Pen) ~ P(n+l) 
to \in pen) 
is synthetic, because we must employ our intuition regarding 
"succession" for the proof of Pen) -1 P(n+l). Since 
succession is a ltmode" of time (8 p .219), induction requires 
the intuition of time. Pace Frege, our concepts of P, of 
number, etc., are inadequate to result in the conclusion 
\/n(Pn) via the containment relation alone. Hence, every 
general (quantified) result, like \dx Vy (x+y:::y+x), is 
synthetic; for its proof requires induction, i.e., con-
sideration of an arbitrary numberical object together with 
the temporal properties which it has ~ representational 
unit. Induction is thus mathematical reasoning "~ 
excellence", for it is via induction that we obtain all 
general, all significant, mathematical results. 
POincar§'s explanation of the synthetic apriori character 
of mathematics relies heavily on his view that induction is 
synthetic apriori. After a brief introduction to his version 
of the theory of the synthetic apriori in general, we will 
begin our explication of Poincar~'s philosophy of mathematics, 
in Chapter 3, with an analysis of his conception that 
"arithmetic" or "iterative" intuition is the epistemological 
source of the principle of induction. 
CHAPTER TWO 
, 
INTRODUCTION TO POINCARE'S THEORY 
OF THE SYNTHETIC APRIORI 
(1) The Synthetic Apriori and Time 
(2) The Synthetic Apriori and Space 
/ When Poincare asserts that mathematics is so/nthetic 
apriori, he agrees with Kant that true mathematical 
propositions are not obtainable as theorems of logic 
alone even when supplemented by appropriate definitions 
of the non-logical vocabulary involved. / Indeed, Poincare's 
sense of a synthetic proposition is essentially that of 
Frege. Whereas Frege might have held that the entire 
corpus of mathematics (with the possible exception of 
geometry) is " analytic, Poincare held that it is synthetic 
in precisely Frege's sense; for it is not possible to 
provide a proof of certain key mathematical claims 
(even number theoretic ones) without "making use of truths 
which are not of a general logical nature, but belong to 
the sphere of some special sCience"l. (This is precisely 
how Frege characterises a synthetic proposition.) Like 
Kant, Poincar~maintained that mathematical knowledge 
is knowledge apriori. Where he differs from Kant is 
in exactly what he takes as synthetic apriori. For 
Kant the forms of perception of (Euclidean) space and 
time provide the content of geometrical and number 
theoretic truths (as well as grounding certain 
I Frege, (1884), p.4. 
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general statements concerning substance, cause and effect). 
In contrast, Poincar8"s notion of "synthetic apriori" is 
that which is 
imposed upon us with such a force that we 
could not conceive of the contrary proposition, 
nor could we build upon it a theoretical 
edifice. 2 
The key notion here is "build upon it a theoretical edifice". 
This is why, contra-Kant, geometrical truths are conventional. 
It is possible to erect alternative systems of the world 
(i.e. geometry plus physics), the purely geometric component 
of which is non-Euclidean. It is this fact, the inter-
pretability of experience on the basis of non-Euclidean 
geometry, which refutes the Kantian explicit claim concerning 
Euclidean geometry; but it is certainly not the mere existence 
of consistent non-Euclidean geometries which does so. If 
Kant had been right, the former fact could not obtain, 
whereas the latter, the existence of consistent non-Euclidean 
geometries would still have been possible. We can build 
alternate theoretical edifices incorporating rival geometric-
al systems, so no one particular pure geometry has synthetic 
apriori status. 
In contrast Poincar~ claims, the principle of mathematical 
induction is "a true synthetic apriori intuition" because 
we are unable to imagine a coherent non-standard arithmetic 
based on the negation of induction, in the same way that 
we construct a non-Euclidean geometry based on the negation 
of the parallel postulate. 
2 Poincar~ (1891), p.48. 
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Let us next try to get rid of this (the 
principle of induction], and while rejecting 
this proposition let us construct a false 
arithmetic analogous to non-Euclidean geometry. 
We shall not be able to do it. 3 
Why "we shall not be able to do it" is the subject of the 
next chapter. Essentially, Poincart is claiming that 
arithmetic is so foundational in our conceptual structure 
that it is a form of understanding. Unlike the geometric 
case, we can form no concept of an experience which would 
violate Peano arithmetic. Consequently, if the world does 
not "measure up" to one of our calculations, we say something 
went amiss in the observation, or that we did not perform 
the calculation correctly. We do not call the form or the 
algorithm of the calculation into question. We correct 
ourselves or our particular use of an arithmetic identity 
rather than the identity itself. All this means is that, 
first, mathematics is not empirical: the world does not 
determine truth in mathematics, since, for Poincar~, no 
matter how different a world we imagine, we cannot imagine 
arithmetic as being any different. And second, mathematics 
is not conventional, because our actual system is not the 
simplest (most convenient) out of a selection of possible 
systems; rather it is the only possible system we can en-
vision. This is because it is grounded in synthetic apriori 
knowledge. 
Whereas Kant saw the synthetic apriori in the metric 
3 POincare", (1891), p.49. 
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properties of space and time, Poincar~ locates the synthetic 
apriori in the weaker structural (or "topological") concepts 
of "order", continuity and indefinite iterability. I will 
now discuss the apriori temporal form of experience, or 
"arithmetic intuition", before turning to the apriori 
spatial form of experience, or "geometric intuition". 
(1) The Synthetic Apriori and Time 
One apriori form of intuition which contributes synthetic 
content to part of mathematics is instantiated in the 
apriori notion of time. Time is not something external 
and existing independently of us. Thus our understanding 
of time is not an empirically acquired concept. Rather, 
it is an apriori matter. Time is not in the world; we 
impose time ~ the world - on our classification and 
organisation of memory and knowledge. 
In addition, what we impose is not chosen, i.e., is 
not conventional. 
The order in which we arrange conscious 
phenomena does not admit of any arbitrariness. 
It is imposed on us and of it we can change 
nothing. 4 
Ordering our memories and classifying our perceptions is 
something which we must do in the way in which we do it, 
because it is something which is imposed by the nature 
of our minds. The conception of the passage of time is 
4 Poincar6, (1898), p.26 
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necessary for ordering and classifying our experience, so 
that we can communicate, understand and remember. Time 
is manifested as a certain set of relations between memories 
of events or sensations. But time does not consist in the 
relations between memories. Rather, the relations between 
memories, or order, would not exist without the imposition 
of the form of time upon them. 
Poincar~ argues that our awareness of time is an apriori 
form of intuition. If the notion of time was obtained by 
inductive generalisation from perception of actual events, 
it could at most consist in an understanding of the order 
of, and perbaps, the relative "distance" between actual 
memories, or "filled compartments", of time. However, there 
is more than this to our conception of time, e.g., the 
knowledge that our memories could be organised differently -
the awareness of the existence of "empty compartments", 
or possible-but-not-actual memories. Hence, the acquisition 
of our actual concept of time could not occur by aposteriori 
means alone. Memories ... 
... can only be finite in number. On that 
score, psychologic time should be discontinuous. 
Whence comes the feeling that between any two 
instants there are others? We arrange our 
recollections in time, but we know that there 
remain empty compartments. How could that 
be, if time were not a form pre-existent in 
our mind? How could we know there were empty 
compartments, if these compartments were re-
vealed to us only by their content? 5 
5 Poincarl, (1898), p~26. 
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There are many more possible memories than actual memories. 
Indeed, for Poincar{, our understanding of time is an 
understanding of an unbounded, dense (total) order; and 
knowledge of these properties of time could not be empirically 
acquired. 
Before we discuss the structural properties of time, we 
must first distinguish between time (or our notion or under-
standing of time) and the temporal form. Time is a construct, 
an intuitive structure, which satisfies the properties 
provided as the temporal form. The temporal form is a 
synthetic apriori intuition, or form of experience, which 
imposes a notion of linear order (the order type of the 
rationals, as it turns out) and an understanding of "indefinite 
i te rabili ty". Time, on the other hand is a convenient device 
for interpreting experience: a construction which satisfies 
~ the impositions of the temporal form. Because the 
temporal form supplies us with the notion of indefinite 
iterability, the intuitive structure of time consists in a 
model for a potentially infinite set. However, in addition 
to indefinite iterability in the sense in which it produces 
a potentially infinite set like the natural numbers - i.e., 
an unbounded domain - there is an indefinite iterability in 
between the possible compartments, or instants, of time. 
That is, the temporal form imposes an understanding of in-
definite iterability in a dense sense, in the sense in which 
it produces a domain like the rational numbers. Moreover, 
time is a structure via which we preserve the order of our 
memories once they occur; hence it provides a model for a 
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domain in which th~ order of the elements is fixed. There-
fore, time provides a model for an unbounded, dense (total) 
order. 
First, time is a totally ordered domain: "before" and 
"after" correspond to "less than" and "greater than"; and 
"simultaneous" corresponds to "equals". Second, time is 
unbounded. There is no last memory which is fixed in advance; 
and "indefinite" corresponds to "potentially infinite". 
Third, time is dense. The infinity of time does not only 
consist in the fact that there is no last possible compartment 
of time 1 no last memory fixed in advanc~ in addition, the 
infinity exists between the memories, in virtue of our 
understanding that between any two instants there is a third. 
Any procedure describing this understanding or "feeling" 
must be indefinitely iterable in a way which produces a dense 
structure. 
(2) The Synthetic Apriori and Space 
In parallel with the synthetic apriori of time, there is 
a synthetic apriori element in our notion of space. Time 
and space are "the frames in which nature seems enclosed"6 
which we impose upon nature. Much of the apriori element of 
the "frame" of space is not synthetic according to Poincar~. 
For example, the choice of a geometry is conventional; and 
6 Poincare, (190~, p.13. 
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in additional contrast with Kant, the number of dimensions 
we attribute to space is not even synthetic apriori for 
P · / o~ncare. Rather, it is partly a physiological, partly 
an empirical matter. It is partly determined by the way 
our sense of muscular movement corresponds with our vision, 
and obtaining, of objects; and it is partly determined by 
the way the world is: the nature of physical objects and 
light, etc. That the three-dimensionality of space is not 
an apriori condition imposed by the mind is indicated not 
only by the fact that we can reason on spaces of any given 
number of dimensions - i.e., that any dimensionality of 
space is consistent. (Alternative arithmetics are consistent; 
yet, for Poincar~, standard Peano arithmetic is synthetic 
apriori.) Rather, the dimensionality of space is not a 
synthetic apriori matter because we can construct viable 
empirical theories upon the hypothesis that space is, 
for instance, four-dimensional. Poincar~ admits that spaces 
of greater than three dimensions are very much harder to 
work with than three-dimensional spaces. But he maintains 
that this does not indicate the apriori status of the 
knowledge of the three-dimensionality of space. If it did, 
then the same argument could be used to urge the two-
dimensionality of space, as an apriori principle, since 
plane geometry is much easier than the geometry of three 
dimensions. Although three-dimensional space is most 
natural for us to imagine living in, a non-three-dimensional 
space is a viable ~andidate for an interpretation of our 
experience. Our visual analogies are merely less direct 
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with four or more coordinates. Hence, according to 
Poincare-'s definition of "synthetic apriori" - as something 
which forces itself upon us and constrains our thinking, 
and even our theoretical edifices - the three-dimensionality 
of space does not qualify. The degree of difficulty of 
imagining something like four-dimensional space, does not 
necessarily indicate a mental impossibility. 
We attribute three dimensions to perceptual space 
because it is the description which makes our everyday 
g e n era 1 i sat ion $ (th 0 ugh per hap s not a 11 0 f 0 u r sci en t i f i c 
laws or theories) the simplest. Hence, it is a certain set 
of facts about the exterior world (aposteriori facts) which 
i nd uces us tot h ink 0 f spa c e in t his way, and not apr i 0 r i 
conditions imposed by the mind. The reason three-dimension-
ality may have seemed apriori to Kant is because increasing 
the number of dimensions beyond three seems unnatural and 
counterintuitive - it is hard or impossible to "picture". 
But, the very fact that we ~, despite the increase in 
difficulty, have physical theories concerning spaces of 
differing dimensions, shows that the three-dimensionality 
of space is not something which constrains our thinking. 
Here we see a consequence of the essential difference 
between the Poincar~an and the Kantian theory of the 
synthetic apriori. For Kant, the synthetic apriori is the 
form of perception, and it is that to which our perceptual 
pictures must confQrm. Space is then three-dimensional 
because he could not picture how living in four-dimensional 
space would be different perceptually. / Whereas for Poincare, 
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the very fact that we can conceive of some creature 
(perhaps with a different type of eyes or different muscular 
sensations, or perhaps with ~ differences) and some world 
for w hi c h spa c e w 0 u 1 d be con sid ere d to h",,,e. a d iff ere n t 
number of dimensions - two, four, fi ve, etc. - reveals 
the fact that three-dimensionality is not an apriori 
characteristic of space. This is because Poincar~'s 
requirement is stronger: the significance of the synthetic 
apriori is something which constrains our ability to think 
(~ to perceive), and not merely our ability to perceive. 
There is, however, an aspect of perceptual space which 
Poincar~ considers to be synthetic a~riori. This is the 
continuity of space - the intuition which grounds geometric 
reasoning on spaces of ~ number of dimensions. For 
P · / olncare, this is the essence, the sine qua non - of what 
he calls "spatial intuition". This is Poincare-,s "form 
of spatial perception"; very much reduced from Kant's 
original position. 
To sum up Poincar~'s theory of the synthetic apriori, 
there are two types of apriori intuition, via which we 
instantiate our concepts in an apriori way. One I shall 
call Poincare's "arithmetic" intuition. This is given in 
the concept of indefinite iterability, and in the order 
types which are produced by various procedures which are 
indefinitely iterable. Arithmetic intuition plays an 
essential part in pur conception and characterisation of 
sets of numbers, e.g., the natural numbers, the rationals, 
and in induction. The other apriori intuition which plays 
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a major role in the foundations of our mathematical know-
ledge I shall call POincart's "geometric" intuition. This 
is encapsulated in the concept of continuity or continuous 
variability. Geometric intuition allows us to understand 
by the real numbers a (classically) continuous domain; in 
addition, it is indispensable in disciplines like "analysis 
situs", or topology, where proofs can require a consideration 
of parameters which are allowed to vary continuously. Arith-
metic intuition, and in particular the synthetic apriori 
status of the principle of induction, is the subject of 
Chapter 3, the next chapter. Geometric intuition will be 
addressed in Chapter 5, the subject of which is POincart,s 
theory of the continuum. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE ATTACK ON LOGICISM: ARITHMETIC INTUITION 
AND THE PRINCIPLE OF INDUCTION 
(1) Analysis of the Principle of Induction 
(2) The Problem of Induction for the Logicists 
(3) Some Attempts to Avoid the Circle 
(4) The Second Order Principle 
(5) Non-Inductive Arithmetic 
(6) The Synthetic Apriori Nature of Arithmetic Intuition 
According to Poincar{, the concept of indefinite 
i t era b iIi t Y is g i ve n by a s y nth e tic apr i 0 r i ,. a r i t h met i c" 
intuition which underlies all mathematical activity. On 
this view, the principle of induction is not an analytic 
consequence of the number-concepts, for the definitions 
of number require induction. Induction is a synthetic 
apriori principle because it is true of any domain which 
is a pure instantiation of the synth~tic apriori iterative 
concept. It is important to note that Poincar~ seems to 
equate the natural numbers, the principle of induction, 
and the concept of indefinite iterability. Though he 
does not regard them as equivalent, he asserts that they 
are of equal logical status - no one is logically prior, 
or more basic, than any other. They are each an apriori 
manifestation of arithmetic intuition. The concept of 
indefinite iterability is an apriori form of understanding 
which expresses arithmetic intuition; the natural numbers 
are an apriori pure instantiation of the apriori iterative 
concept; and the principle of induction is known to be 
true of the natural numbers directly, via arithmetic 
intuition. The subject of this chapter will be to examine 
and assess Poincar~'s theory of apriori arithmetic 
intuition. 
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(1) Analysis of the Principle of Induction 
Before Poincar~'s time, induction was not a logical 
tool; although it has been employed by logicians since 
the development of modern logic after Aristotle. Rather, 
induction was essentially "mathematical". And though 
it is now shared with the logicians, it is still a numerical 
principle, for it hinges on the special successive, or 
ordered, character of numbers. The principle of mathe-
matical induction can be taken as a second order axiom 
with the form, 
For Kant this principle would be synthetic because in con-
sidering an element together with its successor, we must 
employ our intuitions concerning succession. And these 
intuitions are not "analytic" because our intuitions 
concerning succession are not present in the concepts of 
number, of P, but are only present in virtue of the apriori 
temporal form via which we understand the concepts. It 
is our apriori intuition of time which allows us to do a 
proof by induction, because in considering an arbitrary 
element, n, as a single object or unit within an indefinite 
collection of successive units, we are considering the 
temporal attributes of objects. Because we are considering 
an instantiation of the nu~ber concept - albeit an 
arbitrary instantiation - we must consider n as an object, 
and hence, as an object in time. And thus we are employing 
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the apriori rules of synthesis of perception, of the 
imagination, and of understanding. 
Just as for Kant, for Poincare, too, induction is syn-
thetic. However, it is not in virtue of temporal intuition 
that induction is synthetic. Rather, the principle of 
induction is a synthetic apriori principle because it is 
knowable only by virtue of our apriori arithmetic intuition. 
The principle is a direct consequence of our iterative 
concept. The important point is not that we must consider 
the arbitrary n as an object in time. Rather, Poincar{ 
replaces the continuity of time or the temporal intuition 
with the more minimal concept of iteration. Thus, induction 
is synthetic because we must consider the arbitrary n as 
an iterative object, in an indefinite series of objects, 
the series being defined by an iterative rule of construc-
tion. Hence, the significance of induction lies in our 
special ability to consider nand n+l (or nand Sen)) as 
pure instantiations of the iterative concept. 
The conditional in the premise of induction,.V'n (P(n)"-7P(n+l)), 
is a condition by which we are assured that 
the property, P, is instantiated in an iterative model. 
If R is an iterative generating rule, then it defines 
one element in terms of its predecessor. So that if on 
the assumption of P (0{ ) - where of is the result of applying 
R an arbitrary number of times - we can show P ( R (c() ) , 
or P(o(') , then we {(now P is true of all the elements 
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generated by R. We know this because 0( was only an 
arbitrary instance in the iteration of R. Thus, if P is 
true of any element generated by R; and if we can show 
the conditional pea() 4 P(R(o(» to be true; then we 
know P to be true of all iterations of R. 
Essential to the proof of the conditional \:in (P(n)";P(n+l», 
is the arbitrariness of the n. If the proof of Pen) -t P(n+l) 
relied upon a particular property of n, then the inference 
via universal generalisation to '-<In (P (n) ~ P(n+l» would 
fail. It is via our arithmetic intuition that we are 
able to consider an arbitrary instance of an iteration, 
and thus that we know the principle of induction to be true. 
Via the principle of induction we make the leap from 
P(O), P(S(O», P(S(S(O»), ... , p(Sn(O», 
to 
"r:} nP(n) 
(where n, or Sn(o), is the result 'of applying therula SJstart-
ing with 0) n times), and we can see that these two 
expressions are equivalent. We can see this, argues Poincare', 
because induction, or pure arithmetic intuition, enables us 
to take the dots in the first expression seriously - in a 
non-metaphorical way - when the rule, 5, is iterative. 
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(2) The Problem of Induction for the Logicists 
The aim of logicism was to disprove Kant's thesis 
that mathematics has a content which is determined by 
our apriori intuitions of space and time. The method of 
showing this was to argue that all true mathematical 
statements could be proved via logic alone, without de-
pending on any "extra logical" intuitions. At the time 
of the birth of the modern logicist programmes, i.e., for 
Frege, Russell, Whitehead, the principle of induction 
was not regarded as a logical principle. Thus in order 
to prove any significant mathematical results it was 
necessary first to prove that induction is true. The 
logicists needed to show that the principle of induction 
can be derived as a theorem of a suitably extended logic 
once the primitives zero, natural number, and immediate 
predecessor have been defined, together with an equivalent 
of Frege's axiom 5, the axiom of comprehension. Induction 
would then be a logical consequence of the logistic 
definition of number; i.e., that numbers are inductive, 
would be (for most logicists, though not for Russell, 
since he considered even logic to be a synthetic matter*) 
an analytic truth. And if all true mathematical statements 
could be shown, in a similar way, to be analytic too, 
then Kant's thesis that the content of mathematical 
statements concerns space and time would be disproven. 
Their content would not be space and time, because, since 
they are analytic truths, they have no (non-logical) 
content at all. Indeed, it was the stunning achievement 
* Russell, (1903), p.434. 
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of Frege to conceive of such a suitably augmented system, 
and to show how it could be employed to derive induction 
as a theorem of logic. 
The problem with the augmented system, however (in 
addition to the unfortunately too strong, and contradictory, 
nature of Frege's axiom 5), is that in order to even set 
up a system which is powerful enough for arithmetic, arith-
metic principles must be invoked. Poincart objects, for 
instance, to considering a typical formulation of the 
Peano Axioms as defining the concept of number by postu-
lates. The logicist must be able to set up some system 
which is roughly equivalent to the Peano axioms. . ,/ POlncare 
gives the following formulation of the Peano axioms, 
and considers their efficacy in defining the concept of 
natural number. 
1. Zero is a whole number. 
2. Zero is not the successor of any whole number. 
3. The successor of a whole number is another whole number; 
to which it would be convenient to add: each whole 
number has a successor. 
4. Two whole numbers are equal if their successors are 
equal. 
5. If s is a class which contains 0, and which, if it 
contains the whole number x, then it contains the 
successor of ~, then it contains all the whole numbers. 
1 This fifth axiom is the principle of complete induction. 
1 Poincare: (1905b), p. 833. 
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However, because of the iterative nature of the axioms, 
they cannot be proved consistent without induction. But 
since induction is one of the axioms, any consistency 
proof would be circular. Iterative or recursive defin-
itions specify one entity in terms of the previous 
construction (or iteration). In addition, there is usually 
no reason to stop the constructing process. The domain 
thus generated by an iterative rule is, in general, 
indefinite or potentially infinite. So we cannot directly 
verify that the axioms are consistent, i.e., provide a 
finite model of the axioms, for they imply an infinite 
number of arithmetical propositions. 
Showing a definition or domain is consistent involves 
one of two approaches. Either we show it has a model 
in the system - an instance in which it is true; or, 
we prove that no contradiction follows from any propositions 
implied by the definition together with the totality of 
propositions of the system to which the definition is 
being added. When a structure is finite one can always 
(at least in principle) check or verify that each case 
of a definition is consistent with the previous structure. 
However, this is trivial and is not the situation here. 
In particular, one cannot verify (by checking instances) 
that an inductive domain is consistent, for the axiom 
of induction (5)" concerns any class of natural numbers, 
an d the _ colI e c't ion 0 fall s u c h cIa sse sis in fin i t e . 
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Hence, the difficulty with arithmetical induction is 
that it is, in a sense, "doubly" infinite. First, the range 
of the implicit class quantifier in 5 is infinite. Indeed, 
from a purely Platonistic, or extensional set-theoretic, 
point of view it is uncountably infinite, for its range is: 
all the subsets of the natural numbers, i.e., the Power set 
of IN. Because the possible instantiations of induction are 
not finite, we cannot verify by checking each possible case 
of induction (each possible property of natural numbers) 
to ensure its consistency. However, the other method of 
proving the consistency of a set of postulates - exhibiting 
a model - is also not available to us. For second, in 
addition to the infinity of the class-variable, the ~-variable, 
too, has an infinite range of possible arguments. Given 
a specific class, ~, the range of ~ is infinite. Hence, 
no model of the axioms is finite. 
The demonstration cannot be made by example. 
We cannot select a portion of the whole numbers 
- for instance, the three first - and demonstrate 
that they satisfy the definition. 
If I take the series 0, 1, 2, I can readily see 
that it satisfies axioms I, II, IV and V; but 
in order that it should satisfy axiom III, it 
is further necessary that 3 should be a whole 
number, and consequently that the series 0, 1, 
2, 3 should satisfy the axioms. We could 
verify that it satisfies axioms I, II, IV and V, 
but axiom III requires besides that 4 should 
be a whole number, and that the series 0, 1, 
2, 3, 4 should satisfy the axioms, and so on 
indefini tely. 
It is therefore, impossible to demonstrate the 
axioms for some whole numbers without demonstrat-
ing them for all.... 2 
2 Poincar~, (1905b), p.833; / quoted from Poincare (1908), pp.165-166. 
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We cannot show the consistency of a definition of which 
an induction axiom, or an iterative constructing rule, 
is a part, when the domain concerned is infinite, without 
presupposing the truth of some principle equivalent to 
the principle of induction. We cannot show directly, in 
a finite model, that an instance of the Peano axioms is 
consistent; for with each finite sample, (0,1, 2), we 
are "bundled along" by the recursive character of axiom 
III to a larger sample, (0, 1, 2, 3). Hence, the recursive 
character of the axioms, coupled with the fact that there 
is no reason to ~ the iteration at a particular, finite 
n, produces a domain which is inaccessible to a formal 
consistency proof which excludes an inductive principle. 
Poincar~'s argument is not merely to object to the 
lack of a non-circular consistency proof for the logistic 
structure; nor is it trivialised by GBdel's incomplete-
ness results (which came after Poincar~'s death). He 
has a deeper point to offer, concerning the procedure, 
in general, of setting up any formal system. First, the 
logicists wanted to set up a system adequate for arithmetic; 
so the system had to have the capacity for expressing and 
implying an infinite number of arithmetical statements. 
Thus the characterisation, of what an arithmetic formula 
is, 0 f w hat a n LJ ,n b e r is, etc., had to b ere cur s i v e . But 
then a prior understanding of the principle of induction 
is required, not merely in setting up the formal system, 
but in understanding why, for instance, Frege's derivation 
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constitutes a proof of the fifth Peano axiom. 
is thus caught in a circle. 
The circle is even more serious, however. 
The logicist 
It is not 
merely that in order to set up a system adequate for 
arithmetic - for statements about an infinite domain of 
objects, the numbers - one requires a prior understanding 
of induction. In addition, any non-trivial formal system 
at all requires an inductive intuition for its character-
isation. In order to be able to understand the recursive 
definition of a well-formed formula, of something as 
simple and basic as this, an inductive or arithmetic 
intuition must be presupposed. Thus, Poincar~'s point is 
not a mere technical one, but a very bold philosophical 
claim: induction is epistemologically prior even to logic. 
Induction is necessary, not only for understanding formal 
systems, but also for understanding logical structure in 
general. The logistic arithmetic formal system - astonish-
ing achievement that it is - cannot be regarded as 
exhibiting the analytic or logical character of our 
knowledge of induction; because understanding logic 
itself - understanding the logical methods used to derive 
the system - presupposes a prior understanding of the 
principle of induction. 
(3) Some Attempts to Avoid the Circle 
One may indeed q~estion the importance of epistemological 
~riority, or the necessity of consistency proofs. The 
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logicist, however, has no choice, since his project is 
to preserve the degree of certainty found in logic. All 
definitions must then be formal, and may presuppose the 
existence of no extra-logical intuitions or knowledge. 
And these definitions require a consistency proof, this 
being no trivial requirement. Definitions and postulates 
are not free. There is no way to ensure the acceptability 
of a definition other than by proving that it is a conserva-
tive extension of the system, i.e., is consistent. The 
problem with a definition which involves (or is strong 
enough to imply) induction, is that we cannot justify it 
(show we understand it) without using inductive means. 
So unless we have a prior grasp of the principle of 
induction and its consistency, such a proof establishes 
nothing. 
Poincar~ attacks logicism by exploiting this fact. 
Although his real quarrel is epistemological in nature, 
he argues for his position via a formal point concerning 
consistency proofs, or logical priority. (He had to do 
it this way because, whereas for him logic and epistemology 
are inseparable, for the logicist the true logical nature 
of grounding relations in a theory are independent of the 
epistemological question of the order in which we come 
to know aspects of a theory. Epistemological points would 
have been glossed over by the logicist; / Poincare saw that 
the only access for making his point, then, was in terms 
of a formal point, on the logicist's own ground.) The 
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logicist project was not to assume the existence of any 
facts outside of logic: to define all arithmetic concepts 
and relations in terms of logical concepts and relations 
alone; and, in addition, to prove all the postulates of 
arithmetic as theorems of the augmented logic. Thus, when 
proving things about the new system - that its definitions 
are acceptable, consistent - the logicist can use only 
previously accepted logical principles and rules. 
If showing the consistency of a new definition involves 
a non-logical principle, then it seems very dubious to 
consider such a new definition as presupposing only logical 
concepts. So that, in particular, if the intent of the logicist 
is to define the arithmetic concepts, metatheoretic proofs 
about the definitions can only be relative to a system 
which does not presuppose the arithmetic principles and 
concepts. One cannot employ, in the justification of a 
structure in question, one of the principles newly defined 
in the structure. Otherwise, the justification is circular 
and no fact has logical priority. The logicist's circle 
lies in the fact that he cannot use induction until the 
property of being a natural number is justified; but he 
cannot justify this property without using induction. 
The logicist may here attempt to avoid the circle in 
another way. He may concede that any consistency proof 
for the arithmetic concepts requires the principle of 
induction; but he ~ight claim that the metatheoretic 
principle is not the same as the object-theory principle; 
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and hence that the circularity is only apparent. No 
doubt the structure of the two principles is similar, but 
the subject matter in each is distinct. 
Neither Poincar6 nor Russell made a consistent employment 
of the use/mention distinction, which could perhaps be 
cited to argue that there are two different principles at 
work here: one (mathematical induction) concerns objects, 
and the other (metatheoretic induction) concerns propositions 
about the objects. However, this would only be fruitful 
for the logicist if he maintained that the second employment 
of induction, in the metatheory, is a logical principle. 
To use a metatheoretic version of a principle implies that 
the principle is acceptable on independent grounds - grounds 
which are independent of the particular project for which 
it is being invoked. So, for instance, the use of a 
metatheoretic Modus Ponendo Ponens (MPP) type of rule in 
the proof of the soundness of a logic which includes MPP 
as a rule in the object language, is circular, but accept-
able. For the soundness proof is not intended to be a 
suasive argument for accepting the MPP rule. So long as 
we are not calling the validity of MPP reasoning into 
question, the circularity is thought to be acceptable (and 
exists in all Tarski-type semantics); for the justification 
is directed not towards a single use of MPP, which we 
have accepted on independent linguistic grounds, but 
more towards investigating the soundness of indefinite 
iterations, or the arbitrary use, of MPP. 
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The contrast with MPP is that the subject of the 
principle of induction is indefinite iterations and 
arbitrary instances. This is why Poincart obj~cts that 
using induction in a meta theoretic proof of a formal 
system in which arithmetic induction is proved is non-
acceptably circular: because he feels the principles are 
really the same. No doubt there is a difference in the 
overt subject matter of the two uses; but, for POincare', 
they are merely two different applications of the same 
principle. 
The possible applications of the principle 
of induction are innumerable. Take, for 
instance, one ... in which it is sought to 
establish that a collection of axioms cannot 
lead to a contradiction ... 
When we have completed the nth syllogism, we 
see that we can form still another, which will 
be the (n+l)th: thus the number n serves for 
counting-a series of successive operations; 
it is a number that can be obtained by 
successi ve addi tions ... Thus, then, the 
way we have been brought to consider this 
number n involves a definition of the finite 
whole number. . . . 3 
Induction is a numerical principle, and any application 
of it involves reference to counting, or to the successive 
ordering of objects so that they can be, in effect, counted. 
No matter what the subject matter - whether we count 
numbers or propositions - the domain must be iterative, 
orderable, so that it possesses numerical properties. 
3 Poincar~, (1906a), pp.172-173. 
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And induction always refers to the numerical properties 
of the subject matter - in metatheoretic proofs, for example, 
to the number of steps in an arbitrary proof; or to the 
degree of complexity of an arbitrary wff and its successor 
(the next most complex iteration of a formation rule) - in 
conjunction with the properties which the objects have in 
virtue of their overt subject matter (in virtue of properties 
which the objects have ~ steps in a proof, or ~ well-
form ed - form u 1 a e) . Induction on the number of steps in a 
proof depends upon our being able to consider an arbitrary 
step of a proof - and thus u.pOf\our being able to consider 
the steps of a proof in an ordered, successive way. And 
induction on the degree of complexity of a wff depends upon 
our being able to define "degree" in a successive numerical 
way. The principles are epistemologically equivalent. 
So, for instance, when we do an induction on the com-
plexity of a wff, we can assert no more than that we have 
good arithmetical reasons for supposing that: if after n 
steps no contradiction has occurred; and if, by following 
the procedures as specified, we can prove that after n+l 
steps no contradiction will ensue; then, by induction on 
the complexity, or number of logical constants in the wffs, 
we can infer that the collection of all wffs which are 
constructed in accordance with the procedures specified, 
will be consistent. 
An understanding gf recursion schemas is necessary for 
the building of any infinite formal system. Thus, an 
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understanding of some form of the principle of induction 
is likewise necessary, if we are to understand ~ the 
definition schemas that they determine an infinite domain. 
It is in this sense that the circle is unavoidable for the 
logicist: an arithmetic principle, the principle of in-
duction, is prior even to logic, for it is necessary for 
understanding the logical methods employed in setting up 
and deriving truths about an infinite structure. 
(4) The Second Order Principle 
Let us consider the thesis of the circularity inherent 
in any definition of the numbers from another standpoint. 
Presumably what the logicist really needs is the second 
order principle of induction, 
'\J pl.P(o) & \ix(P(x) -7 P(x+l)) ~ Vx P(x)], 
as a theorem of logic. The reason he needs this is that 
his thesis is that arithmetic truth as we know it is really 
logical truth. And thus, he will want his system to denote 
the standard interpretation of arithmetic. That is, his 
system ought to exclude the non-standard, i.e., the non-
arithmetic, interpretations. Since the first order principle 
seems to admit too many interpretations, the logicist re-
quires the second order principle in order to capture all 
and ~ arithmetic truths. 
However, asserting the second order principle means, 
for the logicist, that some conception of an arbitrary 
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property of the natural numbers must be obtainable from 
logic alone. \'\~1 /I In other words, because the vP ranges over 
all possible properties of the natural numbers, the 
logicist must find, on purely logical grounds, a character-
isation of an arbitrary subset of an infinite set. Perhaps 
it is possible to extend the notion of logic so as to 
include quantification over properties as well as objects. 4 
However, such an extension is generally taken to imply an 
extension of the notion of logic into the transfinite: 
into the theory of types and order, or set theory. And 
while this may be possible, and even reasonable on certain 
grounds, there is an unavoidable circularity in so doing. 
We will have used logic to fix the concept of an arbitrary 
subset, but we will have, in essence, used set theory to 
"correct" or extend 10gic. 5 The comprehension principle 
might, as Frege thought, be a logical principle, but alas 
it is a logical falsehood. 
4 See Wright, (1983), especially Section xvii (Chapter 4), for 
arguments in favour of such an extension. 
5 Scott, (1985), pp.vii-viii, makes a parallel point in the 
following quote, where he is discussing the intuitive arguments 
for the set theoretic axioms: 
When we come to the Axiom of Choice, we begin to waver: 
it might be argued that it is implicit in the concept 
of the totally arbitrary set. On the other hand, there 
could be other notions of what it means to determine 
a set for which it would fail; thus, the act of 
assuming it is indeed axiomatic: it is 'self-evident' 
but not just a matter of logic. But then, perhaps it 
is a matter of logic after all, because the finite 
version is provable. In other words, first order logic 
is strong enough for some conclusions, but it is in 
general too weak: we ought perhaps to allow 'infinitary' 
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As Poincar~ well knew, the problem is one of the 
characterisation of the class of well-founded properties 
(or extensions). But such a characterisation must be 
drawn from elsewhere (other than "logiC"), if the circul-
arity is to be avoided. For Poincar~, the source is the 
form of intuition - well-founded, set-theoretic properties 
must have a content which is instantiable in arithmetic 
intuition - and the status of our knowledge is synthetic 
apriori. 
(5) Non-Inductive Arithmetic 
Poincar~ wishes to do more than point out the circle 
in the various forms of logicism. He has a positive 
thesis as well. For him, induction is true of the world 
because the principle of induction is true, and not just 
true in a model. We have no choice but to consider the 
numbers as inductive, because the principle of induction 
cannot coherently be rejected. 
6 
Let us next try to get rid of this (the 
principle of induction], and while rejecting 
this proposition let us construct a false 
arithmetic analogous to non-Euclidean geometry. 
We shall not be able to do it. 6 
inferences also. And at this point we begin to 
wonder what is meant by logic. It would seem rather 
circular if in making set theory preCise, we had to 
use set theory in orrler to make logic precise. 
" -Poincare, (1891), p.49. 
67 
However, this is simply false. We can do it. Peano 
Axioms (PA) 1 through 4 do not entail 5, the principle of 
induction; so by the completeness theorem there exist 
models of formal systems which satisfy PA 1 through 4 plus 
some form of the negation of axiom 5. So Poincar~ was 
wrong: there is a parallel between axiomatic (Euclidean) 
geometry and Peano arithmetic. The parallel postulate being 
independent of Euclid's other axioms, we can construct 
non-Euclidean geometries; and the induction postulate 
being independent of Peano's other axioms for arithmetic, 
we can construct a consistent non-Peanian (or non-inductive, 
or "false") arithmetic based on some form of the negation 
of induction. 
Geoffrey Hunter 7 points out this formal parallel in an 
argument to vindicate Kant's view of the synthetic apriori 
character of Euclidean geometry. Since, he argues, altern-
ative arithmetics are conceptually absurd, it is coherent 
for Kant to have maintained that non-Euclidean geometrics 
are, likewise, conceptually absurd or impossible, because 
mere consistency obviously does not prove "real possibility". 
However, the parallel Hunter points out may be employed 
to argue the opposite thesis. That is, since alternative 
geometrics are a real possibility, the formal parallel 
between Peano arithmetic and Euclidean geometry is evidence 
7 Hunter, (1980). 
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for the real possibility of alternative (non-Peanian, 
non-inductive) arithmetics. The question turns on just 
what is meant by "real possibili ty". For both Kant and 
Poincar~, mere consistency is not equivalent to real 
possibility, as Hunter emphasises. For Poincar:, however, 
the analogy between arithmetic and geometry breaks down 
at precisely this point. 
The breakdown in the analogy between arithmetic and 
geometry can even be shown formally. Whereas the con-
sistency proofs for non-Euclidean geometries occur in 
arithmetic strictly independent of anyone particular 
geometry, we must use arithmetic in the consistency proof 
for arithmetic, standard or non-standard. That is, in-
duction must be assumed elsewhere in our formal theories, 
in order to show that the negation of induction produces 
a consistent formal structure. Whereas, in contrast, we 
do not employ the parallel postulate in proving that a 
non-Euclidean geometry is consistent. Induction cannot 
be given up in the same way as the parallel postulate 
can be given up; 
formal thinking. 
it is part of the scaffolding of our 
Thus, the analogy between non-inductive 
arithmetics and non-Euclidean geometries is superficial. 
The analogy breaks down informally too. "Real possibil-
ity" means, for Poincar~, that a coherent account of 
experience is possible. Non-Euclidean geometry is really 
possible because a different metric geometry, Riemannian 
say, is a real candidate for the interpretation of our 
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experience. A non-Euclidean world might be different 
from our world, but there is nothing in the nature of 
coherent experience which rules out the possibility of ex-
perience of a non-Euclidean metric character. 8 The reason 
this is so, for Poincar~, is that non-Euclidean geometries -
the different, really possible, metric geometries - are, 
still, continuous: they still accord with apriori geometric 
intuition. And this is why there is nothing in the 
nature of coherent experience which rules them out: 
because they still have a content which is instantiable 
in our apriori form of understanding. 
The contrast with non-standard arithmetics then, lies, 
for Poincar~, in the fact that they are transgressed by 
apriori arithmetic intuition; they do not accord with 
our apriori form of experience. We cannot provide an 
account of experience of a non-inductive arithmetic world, 
because non-inductive arithmetic is ruled out by the nature 
of coherent experience. A non-inductive world is ruled 
out, because it transgresses apriori arithmetic intuition, 
which is one of the (apriori) factors which determine the 
nature of coherent experience. To be sure, non-standard 
arithmetic is consistent; and we can easily construct a 
model which shows this: simply by adding a non-inductive 
8 Helmholtz originally,argues this point. See, especially, "On the 
Origin and Significance of the Axioms of Geometry", (1870), and 
"On the Facts Underlying Geometry", (1868). 
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(non-successive) number to the set ~ , of natural numbers. 
However, since mere consistency does not prove "real 
possibility", Poincare' can maintain that while arithmetic 
and geometry are parallel with respect to the formal 
consistency of their non-standard theories, the parallel 
does not extend to the real possibility of their non-
standard theories. And the reason this lS so is also the 
reason why, for him, metric geometry is not a synthetic 
apriori matter: because no one, particular metric geometry 
is fixed by our apriori geometric intuition (of continuity). 
Whereas, in contrast, apriori arithmetic intuition forces 
or imposes the standard (inductive) interpretation of 
arithmetic, thereby ruling out the possibility of a 
coherent "non-inductive" (mathematical) experience. 
(6) The Synthetic Apriori Nature of Arithmetic Intuition 
F P · ~ or olncare, a synthetic apriori arithmetic intuition 
must exist; otherwise, we have no access to the cluster 
of concepts: indefinite iteration, (potential) infinity, 
"and so on", "etc.", the principle of induction. The 
world does not provide us with an indefinite iteration; 
indeed the world falsifies the actual (aposteriori) in-
stantiation of the concept: . d' 9 l.e., we leo So we do not 
9 See POincare', (1893)., p .22; see also the discussion on the 
apriori nature of the concept of continuity in Chapter 5. 
7l 
acquire the concept of indefinite iteration by ostension, 
for, being finite, we cannot perceive an indefinite 
iteration. 
Further, we cannot formally exhibit the concept, either. 
Any formal explication of a concept which denotes an 
iterative process, will necessarily involve a procedure 
which is itself iterative. That is, in order to understand 
the explication in the appropriate, "intended" way, we 
must already possess the concept which is being explicated. 
The idea of infinite divisibility or dense-
ness is not capturable by a formula or 
sentence, but only by an intuitive procedure 
that is itself dense in the appropriate 
respect. 10 
An intuitive understanding of indefinite iteration is 
necessary for the intended interpretation of quantified 
formulae, such as """;x:3 y ... ". That is, a prior intuitive 
understanding of the numbers is necessary for the proper 
interpretation of the logical formulae, in quantified logic, 
and by which the logicist defines the numbers. It is in 
this sense that our arithmetical understanding is prior 
to, and indeed, foundational for, our understanding of 
quantified logic - and hence for any definitions which 
involve such quantifiers, as well as for metatheoretical 
proofs. We cannot acquire the relevant concepts (indefinite 
10 Friedman, (1985), p.469. 
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iteration, succession, etc.); 
for experience as we know it. 
and yet they are necessary 
Hence, the very possibility of the natural numbers -
the very existence of the concept of Ifindefinitely" which 
is inherent in the notions of "+1", of "and so on", of 
" ••• " - shows that such an understanding must be apriori. 
This understanding is not what is extracted from our concepts 
(of "+1" etc.). That "there is no reason for stopping" 
is not part of the concept of the successor function. 
Rather, understanding by certain collecting rules that 
they determine infinite sets is something we put into our 
concepts. It is a fact about us, and hence, it is a fact 
which conditions what we count as understanding certain 
rules. The "true" understanding comes from the form of 
our "pictures" - that which shapes our concepts, and to 
which our concepts necessarily conform by an "active 
synthesis" (in Kantian language) of the mind. That is, 
that such an understanding of certain rules is the true 
or proper one, is a fact about our interpretation of 
concepts, and not about the content of the concepts them-
selves. 
And it is in this way, moreover, that induction -
though true of the numbers - is not part of the number-
concept; and thus, is not analytic. Rather, that numbers 
are inductive is our most natural interpretation - indeed, 
the ~ "true" in,terpretation - of the concept of number, 
because the numbers and the principle of induction are 
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both a pure manifestation of apriori arithmetic intuition. 
Knowledge of induction is apriori, because it 
is only the affirmation of the power 
of the mind which knows it can conceive of 
the indefinite repetition of the same act 
when the act is once possible. The mind 
has a direct intuition of this power, and 
experiment can only be for it an opportunity 
of using it, and thereby becoming conscious 
of it. 11 
And i tis be c a use 0 u r ( ., m 0 s t nat u r a 1") in t e r pre tat ion 0 f 
many other concepts and theories is a consequence of the 
same form of experience as that which imposes induction, 
that rejecting arithmetic induction is not a coherent 
possibility, with respect to an indefinite portion of our 
scientific and linguistic (or logical) practice. Because 
arithmetic intuition is a form of experience, it has 
consequences in domains which are not strictly mathematical. 
The principle of induction is thus a necessary aspect of 
the numbers, for induction expresses the apriori form of 
experience in general, via which we determine what is to 
count as a coherent experience, of which the standard 
arithmetic numbers are a pure model. 
11 Poincare', (1894.a), p-.13. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
,-
POINCARE'S THEORY OF INTUITIONS 
(1) Poincar~'s Conception of Logic: is it a Mere 
t~isconception? 
( 2 ) Russell's Logicism Does Not Refute Kant 
( 3 ) Intuitions and / Poincare's Theory of "Glossing Over" 
( 4) Intuitions and Poincare" s Theory of Definitions 
( 5 ) Set Theory an d Intuitions 
/ Poincare is often called a "pre-intuitionist" or 
a "semi-intuitionist" in virtue of the fact that he con-
tributed to the foundations of the school of thought 
called "Intuitionism". He certainly wielded a very strong 
theory of intuitions in his arguments against both the 
logicist and the Platonistic aspects of set theory. And 
yet, at times, he advocated non-constructive methods, even 
on undecidable domains, a practice which the intuitionist 
would, in general, reject: hence he is only "semi"-
intuitionistic. My aim in this chapter is to show, via 
an exploration of his use of the term "intuition", how 
. ;' POlncare's theory of intuitions is a very strong expression 
of the extent to which he was influenced by Kant, and the 
extent to which his philosophical writings were largely 
devoted to defending Kant's thesis of the synthetic apriori 
character of mathematics against the new challenges of 
logicism and set theory. I begin with an examination of 
Poincar~'s conception of logic. 
(1) Poincart's Conception of Logic: is it a Mere Mis-
conception? 
One could use v~rious remarks Poincar{ made about the 
nature of logic to argue that his conception of logic is 
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a misconception, and thus that his arguments against 
logicism ought to be dismissed. For the same reason that 
Russell dismisses Kant's theory concerning the spatio-
temporal foundation of mathematical knowledge - i.e., due 
to his ignorance of modern logic l - POincar€'s theory can 
likewise be dismissed. The four following remarks are 
arguably simply four mistakes. First, Poincar{ claims 
that the success of logicism would entail the emptiness of 
mathematics. 
The very possibility of mathematical science 
seems an insoluble contradiction... If ... 
all the propositions which it enunciates may 
be derived in order by the rules of formal 
logic, how is it that mathematics is not 
reduced to a giant tautology? 2 
Second, even if the logicist admitted that he needed 
some axioms or first principles, this still trivialises 
mathematics; for given the axioms, 
it seems that a sufficiently powerful mind 
could with a single glance perceive all 
its truths. 3 
Third, his idea of what logic is, would exclude from logic 
a certain type of definition which is a necessary part of 
mathematics. For Poi n car t, de fin i n g If b Y r e c ur r e n c e If is 
peculiarly non-logical in character. 
1 Russell, (1903), p.4. 
2 
3 
P · , Olncare, 
P · / olncare, 
(1894), p.l. 
(1894), p.3. 
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It is of a particular nature which dis-
tinguishes it even at this stage from 
the purely logical definition; the equality 
LX + a = (x + (a - 1) + 1) J, in fa c t, 
contains an infinite number of definitions, 
each having only one meaning when we know 
the meaning of its predecessor. 4 
/ Fourth, and last, Poincare seems to think that since the 
theorems of a formal mathematical theory form a recursively 
enumerable set, mathematics would thereby be trivialised 
by a strict formalisation in the logiCist spirit. 
What strikes us first of all in the new 
mathematics is its purely formal character 
... in order to demonstrate a theorem, it 
is not necessary or even useful to know 
what it means ... we might imagine a 
machine where we should put in axioms at 
one end and take out theorems at the 
other ... It is no more necessary for 
the mathematician than it is for these 
machines to know what he is doing. 5 
Let us consider the third point, about the "recursive" 
character of mathematical definitions, first. The logicist 
may object to Poincar~'s remarks, that disallowing recursive 
definitions from logic would be to beg the guestion against 
logicism. There is nothing contrary to "logic" in such 
definitions; and the fact that Poincar~ assumed that these 
specifications "transgress" the boundaries of "logic 
proper",just reveals how limited his account of logic was. 
The second and the fourth remarks go together. They each 
seem to involve the mistaken view that logic is trivial. 
/ 4 Poincare, (1894), p.7. 
/ 5 Poincare, (1905b), p.147. 
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P · / . olncare lS often saddled with the following argument: 
logic is decidable; if mathematics is reducible to logic, 
then mathematics would be decidable; but mathematics is 
not decidable; hence, mathematics is not reducible to 
logic. This is a correct form of argument, but the first 
premise is false, for as is well known, even first-order 
logic is not decidable. However, this is certainly not 
/ 
Poincare's argument. He never mentions "decidability" -
his comments concern the mechanical nature of deduction. 
What he is really objecting to is much deeper and more 
global than a mere objection to logicism, that the essence 
of mathematics is the systematic deduction of consequences 
of postulates. It is essentially a matter of emphasis. 
Poincar~ is interested in ~ some postulates are accepted 
and not others. What concerns him again and again is 
mathematical insight, creative mathematics, and not 
simply the generation of results on the basis of postulates. 
/ This is central to Poincare's thought and should not be 
lost sight of. 
Finally, regarding the first point, if logicism (i.e., 
Frege's logicism) had been successful, then mathematics 
would, in a sense, be empty, for there would be no synthetic, 
no "extralogical", content in our mathematical statements. 
Theorems would be analytic truths because they would be 
provable via logic plus stipulated conventions alone. 6 
6 This is the classic form of logicism, so pellucidly presented by 
C.G. Hempel in his famous paper, "On the Nature of Mathematical 
Truth"; Hempel, (1945). 
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However, it is extremely important to note that the 
"emptiness" of the logicist reconstruction of mathematics 
of course depends upon one's theory of the relation between 
logic and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Now, the 
Russellian thesis of logicism began with a theory of the 
syntheticity of symbolic logic - so the success of his 
programme would not have indicated the analytic character 
of mathematical truth. Rather, surprisingly, it would have 
indicated its synthetic apriori character. 7 
Regardless of such labels, however, Russell believed 
he had refuted Kant's thesis concerning the spatio-temporal 
character of the foundation of mathematical knowledge. 
The proof that all pure mathematics, 
including geometry, is nothing but 
formal logic, is a fatal blow to the 
Kantian philosophy ... The whole 
doctrine of apriori intuitions, by 
which Kant explained the possibility of 
pure mathematics, is wholly inapplicable 
to mathematics in its present form. 8 
And in Chapter 1 of The Principles of Mathematics, Russell 
makes clear that one of the aims of his book is a refut-
ation of Kant. 
There was, until very lately, a special 
difficulty in the principles of mathematics. 
It seemed plain that mathematics consisted 
7 "Kant. .. rightly perceived tha t [the propositions] of rna thematics 
are synthetic. It has since appeared that logic is just as synthetic 
as all other kinds of truth; but this is a purely philosophical 
question, which I shall here pass by." (Russell, (1903), see p.434 ). 
8 Russell, (1901), p.96. 
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of deductions, and yet the orthodox 
accounts of deduction were largely or 
wholly inapplicable to (insufficient for] 
existing mathematics ... In this fact 
lay the strength of the Kantian view, 
which asserted that mathematical reasoning 
is not strictly formal, but always uses 
int~itions, i.e., the apriori knowledge of 
space and ti~ Thanks to the progress of 
Symbolic Logic, especially as treated by 
Professor Peano, this part of the Kantian 
philosophy is now capable of a final and 
irrevocable refutation ... The fact that 
all Mathematics is Symbolic Logic is one 
of the greatest discoveries of our age .•. 9 
Now we may pose the following question: is it right to 
dismiss Poincar~'s arguments against logicism for the 
same reason that Russell dismisses Kant's arguments against 
Leibniz r i.e., on the basis of his (Kant's) ignorance of 
modern logic? 
(2) Russell's Logicism Does Not Refute Kant 
Actually, Russell never refuted Kant. It was his view 
that the truths of mathematics are nothing over and above 
the truths of symbolic logic. Mathematical truth - just 
like logical truth - is not mind-dependent; it does not 
concern our knowledge of space and time; 
10 true. 
it is simply 
Throughout logic and mathematics, the 
existence of the human or any other mind 
is totally irrelevant; ... the subject 
9 Russell, (1903), Section 4. 
10 Hylton, (1986), p.9. 
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matter of logic .•. would be equally 
true if there were no mental processes. 
It is true that, in that case, we should 
not know logic; but our knowledge must 
not be confounded with the truth we know 
... a truth and the knowledge of it are 
as distinct as an apple and the eating 
of it. 11 
Russell rejects epistemological issues as irrelevant. 
He takes the truths of logic - though perhaps "synthetic" -
as independent of space and time. Thus, showing mathem-
atics to be reducible to logic would be to show that 
mathematics, too, is independent of space and time, thus 
refuting Kant. 
The enrichment of logic which is necessary in order 
to obtain mathematics is a logic which is as powerful 
as set theory. For Russell this is the system of Principia 
Mathematica (PM). This augmented system, however, re-
quires an axiom of infinity and principles which are at 
least as powerful as the set-theoretic power set axiom 
and the axiom of choice. Thus, Russell's argument must 
be that these axioms are truths which are independent of 
our knowledge of space and time in order to be justified 
in considering them as part of logic. So the issue now 
hinges on how far these additional postulates can be 
regarded as independent of space and time. 
11 Russell, (1904),' p .259. 
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Let us take, for example, the axiom of infinity. 
Kant argues in the antinomies that certain concepts lead 
to contradictions, and one of these is the concept of a 
completed infinity (the famous first antinomy). Russell's 
argument against Kant's first antinomy consists in noting 
that (though) an 
enumeration of an infinite series is 
practically impossible. But the series 
may be none the less perfectly definable, 
as the class of terms having a specified 
relation to a specified term. It then 
remains a question, as with all classes, 
whether the class is finite or infinite; 
and in the latter alternative, as we saw 
in Part V, that there is nothing self-
contradictory. 12 
Russell construes Kant as asserting the self-contradictory 
nature of the concept of a completed infinity. This is, 
however, a misconstrual. Kant explicitly admits that the 
concept of a completed or actual infinity is consistent 
(is possible in the intellect). What he denies is that 
the completability of the infinite is anything like a 
logical principle. For it to be a logical principle, it 
would at least have to be true of our world that it 
contained a completed infinity. But for Kant this is 
precisely what is untrue; for the notion of a completed 
infinity results in a contradiction when it is applied 
to the totality of our experience. 
12 Russell, (1903), p.435. 
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Since unrepresentable and impossible are 
commonly treated as having the same 
meaning, the concepts both of the continuous 
and of the infinite come to be rejected 
by large numbers of people. For indeed, 
according to the laws of intuitive cognition, 
any representation of these concepts is 
absolutely impossible. 13 
However, this is just to say that there is a 
lack of accord between the sensitive faculty 
and the intellectual faculty ... the abstract 
ideas which the mind entertains when they 
have been received from the intellect very 
often cannot be followed up in the concrete 
and converted into intuitions .•. And this 
subjective resistance is, as frequently, no 
true indication of any objective inconsist-
ency ... 14 
The objection to notions like "actual in fini ty" is not 
that they are logically impossible, since there is no 
internal inconsistency in the concept of the actually in-
finite. Rather, Kant's argument is that certain concepts 
cannot hold without contradiction when applied to the 
totality of experience. 
Now, Russell's concern is with logical truth; but 
for Russell, logical truth did not have its modern inter-
pretation of "true in all possible worlds". It carried, 
rather, the sense of simply true. 
13 Kant, (1770), p .48. 
14 Kant, (1770), p.49. 
In particular, then, 
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the axiom of infinity must be a truth about our world, 
i.e., it must be true. So before Russell can claim to 
have "refuted" Kant he must argue that the .axioms of the 
augmented system PM are true. Thus, for example, he 
owes Kant an argument that the notion of a completed 
infinity is satisfiable in our world. But he does not 
supply us with such an argument. His remark concerning 
the "mere medical impossibility" of our completing the 
infinite 15 simply begs the question against Kant. 16 
Now, there do exist arguments concerning the status 
of our knowledge of the infinite which might be employed 
to support Russell. For example, Harold Hodes (1984) 
argues that the concept of infinity is available in logic, 
in modal logic. So that even if our actual world is 
finite, mathematical statements may still be true in some 
richer or bigger world which is accessible to our world. 
There is always a world with more objects in it than 
our world. The truths of statBments about infinite 
domains are, thus, truths of a suitable modal logic; 
and our understanding of such truths is to be explained in 
terms of possible world semantics. And Nicolas Goodman 
15 See Dummett, (1977), pp.59-60. 
16 "It is a most certain empirical fact that the mind is not 
capable of endlessly repeating the same act. Even apart from 
the fact that man is mortal, he is doomed to intervals of 
sleep ... " (Russell, (1904), p.259.) 
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(1984) also argues that truths about infinity are 
available in modal logic, where on his account, the 
accessibility relation is one of "knowability in principle" 
- the totality of true mathematical statements being those 
which are knowable (or provable) by an "ideal mathemat-
ician". Like the extendability in the heuristic of 
richer worlds, the capacities of the ideal mathematician 
are always extendable: he can always perform more acts, 
compute faster, he never sleeps, etc. 
Both of these accounts supply a notion of potential 
infinity. But this is insufficient for Russell's purposes, 
for his theory requires a notion of actual infinity. 
Moreover, while Poincar~ and Kant argue against a belief 
in actual infinity, neither objects to a notion of 
potential infinity as satisfiable in the totality of our 
experience. What they would object to, on the other 
hand, is the assumption that the semantic notions in the 
above, modern accounts - the notions of increasingly 
richer worlds and knowable in principle - are self-
explanatory. It would be their view that in order to 
understand these semantical notions we need to already 
possess a notion of potential infinity. That is, the 
notion of increasingly richer worlds only supplies a 
model for the mathematical concept of potential infinity, 
in virtue of the apriori iterative intuition. For, in 
Poincar6's view, it is only in virtue of this intuition 
that we interpret such iterative concepts in the standard 
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way. But the iterative intuition directly supplies us 
with an unaerstanding of potential infinity. So any 
explication of infinity via modal logic does not provide 
an epistemological source of even potential infinity, 
which can be seen as purely logical in nature, for an 
understanding ~ the required logical conception (the 
box,. "0", plus the heuristics designed to explain this 
s y m b 0 1 ), r e qui res ,~ ext r a log i cal" i n t u i t ion s . 
(3) Intuitions and Poincart,s Theory of "Glossing Over" 
Poincare argues not only against the logical status 
of the existential axioms which are necessary to obtain 
mathematics from logic. He also objects to the status 
of the machinery of the augmented system. That is, he 
agrees to the "arithmetisation" of mathematics insofar 
as this is possible (see Chapter 5, below); but he does 
not agree to the reducibility of arithmetic concepts to logic. 
We must not imagine that merely by revealing that certain 
concepts and methods are reducible to logic, we have 
thereby shown that they are essentially, arid were all 
along, purely logical concepts and purely logical methods. 
Poincar~ points out that mere reducibility to logic 
would not - even if it were successful - reveal the 
epistemological character and epistemological source of 
the so-reduced concepts. 
Even if they Lthe logicists] had been 
entirely successful, would the Kantians 
be finally condemned to silence? ..• 
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Even admitting that it has been 
established ... the philosopher would 
still retain the right to seek the origin 
of these conventions (or postulatesj, 
and to ask why they were judged preferable 
to the contrary conventions. 17 
The source of our understanding of both the concepts, 
reduced and unreduced, and of the methods employed in 
the augmented logicist system lies, according to this 
argument, in the form of intuition. In this section we 
shall explore why Poincar{ holds the view that the epist-
emological source of both logical and mathematical know~ 
ledge is (apriori) spatio-temporal intuition. 
Poincare's theory is a version of Kant's thesis that 
it is a consequence of the kind of qeings that we are -
i.e., finite - that without an active faculty which lays 
down the form of experience, we could not think (in the 
way that we do) or communicate (to the extent that we 
can) . This is the epistemological root of our mathemat-
ical abilities. 
Does the harmony the human intelligence 
thinks it discovers in nature exist out-
side of this intelligence? No, beyond 
doubt a reality completely independent of 
the mind which conceives it, sees or feels 
it, is an impossibility. A world as 
exterior as that, even if it existed, 
would for us be forever inaccessible. 
But what we call objective reality is, 
in the last analysis, what is common to 
many thinking beings, and could be common 
17 Poincare, (1905b), p.148. 
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to all; this common part, we shall see, 
can only be the harmony expressed by 
mathematical laws ... 18 
What is "common to many thinking beings, and could be 
common to all", what is objective, is the harmony establish-
ed by mathematical laws and relations, because these stem 
only from our apriori form of perception. Mathematical 
knowledge is "common to many thinking beings", but not 
to all, because only some thinking beings employ the apriori 
form of perception to this extent. And mathematical know-
ledge "could be common to all" thinking beings, because 
all thinking beings have the potential to do mathematics. 
Hence, it seems that Poincar6 must say that the apriori 
form of perception which enables us to do mathematics is 
a necessary aspect - a defining condition - of any finite 
thinking being. (I insert "finite" here to distinguish 
"thinking being" from a god-like being with infinite 
powers of surveillance, concentration, etc., which is 
obviously not Poincar~'s interest.) 
Let us explore this notion further. 
is a consequence of the fact that we require an apriori 
synthesising faculty to make sense of perceptual experience, 
that we can do mathematics. And thus "our need of thinking 
in images,,19 is common to both our thinking about empirical 
objects and our thinking about mathematical objects. In 
18 
19 
Poincare", 
P · .,; o1.ncare, 
(1905a/1946), p.209. 
(1889/1908), p.131. 
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both domains our actual data can never be "complete", can 
never exhaust all the possible data. A finite being 
cannot perceive all possible aspects of an empirical object; 
and thus, he can never obtain the (extensional) "thing-in-
itself", the "noumenon". Analogously, a finite being 
cannot construct an (extensional) infinite domain of math em-
atical objects, whereas there is no end to the number of 
possible iterations of certain rules. And yet we group 
together our perceptions, and we understand by this group 
a unified whole, an object. Moreover, we all do this in 
roughly the same way, so that experience is ordered and 
common. Analogously, we are able to "C.on:Sfl'l,("c.t" poten+io. l1 1 
infinite mathematical sets and perceive them as determinate 
objects. And we see them as determinate potential infinities 
because we understand by the rule of construction that 
there is no end to the number of possible iterations of 
the rule. 
Apriori intuition - the form of experience - is that 
via which, despite the inevitable incomplete character of 
experience, we understand by our experience an experience 
of a completed object, we understand by a rule that it 
characterises an infinite, yet determinate~ collection, 
Apriori intuition can thus be regarded as a "glossing over" 
faculty, whereby we "gloss over" the incomplete character 
of both empirical and non-empirical (mathematical and 
linguistic) experience. It is a procedure whereby we 
ignore all the elements which could be generated by a rule, 
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and we disregard or "smooth out" the disparate character 
of perception: 
it is therefore necessary that by an 
active operation of the mind we agree 
to consider two states of consciousness 
as identical by disregarding their 
differences. 20 
And we all do this in (roughly) the same way. It is in 
virtue of the fact that we "complete our pictures" and 
satisfy "our need of thinking in images" in a ~ystematic, 
uniform way that we are able to communicate and that we 
possess a mathematical concept of set. 2l For both Poincar~ 
and Kant the glossing over faculty, or the apriori form 
of experience, is what is common to all finite thinking 
beings. It thus potentially provides an explanation of why we can 
communicate, why our concepts "overlap" and meaning can 
b e de t e I' mi nat e , eve nth 0 ugh 0 u I' act u alp e l' c e p t u aId a t a i s 
always incomplete in different ways: because ~ finite 
thinking beings we all gloss over the data and complete 
our "pictures", or attribute determinacy to our concepts, 
in roughly the same way. 
Even something as straightforward as the understanding 
which is acquired in learning to apply the rules of 
20 POincart, (19l2b), p.31 (his emphasis). 
21 Hallett, (1983) uses the notion of "smoothing out" instead of 
"glossing over" to explain the same aspect of Kant I s theory, and 
to apply it to GBdel's understanding of the set concept. The 
concept of unity and that "of enduring object is used to smooth 
out an otherwise diverse and complicated manifold of represent-
ations", (p.19) and it is that which supplies our mathematical 
concept of set. (p.24) 
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elementary formal logic requires intuition, on Poincar~'s 
account. In order to understand the abstract characteris-
at ion of a rule we must understand an arbitrary instance 
of it. And this is an intui"tive, structural ("pictorial") 
understanding. Applying a rule requir~s that we see that 
the application possesses the same essential "structural" 
properties ("shape") as the arbitrary instance given in 
the schematic characterisation of the rule. The aspects 
which are structural are those properties which an arbitrary 
instance possesses. Apriori intuition supplies a uniform 
way to understand what these are. 
For example, to see that 
( P v Q) & (( R & 5 ) v T) l- C( P v g) & ( R & S) v (( P v Q) & 1.) 
is true, it is sufficient to see that it is an instance of 
the ICl.w of Distr·lblA+iv,+~~2L.. 
A & (BvC) ~~ (A&B) v (A&C). 
And to see that the first is an instance of the second, we 
must be able to "gloss over" the inessential differences, 
and see that the two formulae have the same overall struc-
ture: that "PvQ" can be taken as the "A"; tha t !l R&S" 
can be taken as the "B"; and that "T" can be taken as the 
HC" • Understanding the rules of formal logic is a pictorial 
22 Lemmon, (1971), pp .62-63. 
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understanding, insofar as doing a proof is picturing and 
assimilating various instances of a class of structures. 
We make certain strings of symbols "look" the same by 
disregarding or glossing over the actual symbols used, 
which are iQessential to its being an instantiation of an 
arbitrary instance. 
For Poincar{, "glossing over" or "smoothing out", which 
is imposed apriori by our forms of experience and under-
standing of an object, supplies organisation (via a concept 
of enduring object and unified whole) to our experience of 
the world. In addition, it supplies both an understanding 
of the mathematical concept of set, and an understanding 
of the notion of an arbitrary object. This results in two 
mathematical theses. One is that only potential infinities 
can be "constructed" sets (the one exception being the 
"set" of real numbers which is a primitive and immediate 
object of intuition, supplied by our apriori "geometric" 
understanding of continuity). Collections must be finite 
or rule-generated; otherwise, without a rule, there is 
nothing for apriori intuition to gloss over. (This is 
where Poincar~'s notion of glossing over is different from 
Hallett's account (1983) of GBdel, who, he claims, has 
access to the full, classical, set-theoretic universe in 
virtue of some such smoothing out faculty.) The incomplet-
~bility of the infinite is thus a direct result of the in 
principle incompletability of any experience of an object. 
For Poi n car tan d Ka nt, the pot e n t i a 11 yin fin i t e t h us de -
scribes the limits of our understanding, for it is a 
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consequence of the theory of the synthetic apriori applied 
to understanding. 
The other thesis which is a consequence of Poincar~'s 
theory of the synthetic apriori is that whenever a notion 
of arbitrary object intrudes, or is necessitated, so does 
apriori intuition. A "glossing over" is necessary in 
order to employ our notion of arbitrary instantiation; and 
this glossing over faculty is not part of logic. It is 
not characterisable by logic, and, indeed, it is presupposed 
~ logic. Thus, in a deep sense, an understanding of 
logic presupposes an understanding of arithmetic (as was 
s how n inC hap t e r 3, a bo ve ) . But also, in a more explicit 
sense, quantificatioIT theory - since it directly and ex-
plicitly employs a notion of arbitrary instance (in the 
rule of universal generalisation) - requires apriori intuition 
in its glossing over capacity. Therefore, even if Russell's 
logic is accepted as logic proper, employing this machinery 
or method requires apriori intuition, according to Poincar{. 
Thus any "reduction" of mathematics to such a logic does 
not show that Kant was wrong - that mathematics is independ-
ent of spatio-temporal intuition - for this machinery is 
founded on apriori spatio-temporal intuition. 
(4 ) '" Intuitions and Poincare's Theory of Definitions 
Poincar~ was in favour of the formalisation of mathematics; 23 
23 "Intuition cannot give us exactness, nor even certainty, and this 
has been recognised more and more." (Poincar~, (1889/1908), p .123 J 
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yet he felt that intuition ought not to be entirely 
banished from mathematics; since, on his account, intuitions 
are the epistemological source of even the formal, 
precise concepts and methods. In addition, it was his 
view that in order to apply mathematical results we require 
rough, intuitive "pictures", in order to be able to compare 
the mathematical objects in our theorems and definitions 
with the empirical objects of our scientific problems. 
Being an applied (as well as a "pure") mathematician 
himself, Poincare felt strongly about the necessary useful-
ness of mathematics: 
The eternal contemplation of its own 
navel is not the sole object of the 
science. It touches nature, and one 
day or other it will come into contact 
with it. Then it will be necessary to 
shake off purely verbal definitions and 
no longer to content ourselves with words. 24 
The logicist divorces the truth of mathematics from the 
forms of experience; but in so doing, he also divorces 
the content of mathematics from our experience of the world. 
The formal objects of logicist mathematics are unable to 
bridge the gap between symbol and reality; thus the in-
tuitive, pictorial notions which are epistemologically at 
the foundation of the formal concepts and methods are also 
pragmatically indispensable for the employment of mathematics. 
24 Poincare', (l906b): p .183. 
94 
It is through (intuition] that the mathem-
atical world remains in touch with the real 
world, and even if pure mathematics could do 
without it, we should still have to have 
recourse to it to fill up the gulf that 
separates the symbol from reality. 25 
/ 
Poincare's theory of mathematical definitions is the 
result of a compromise between his desire for certainty, and 
his theory of both the practical and the theoretical need 
"of thinking in images", for intuitions. Thus, for example, 
on his account there must be two parts to any definition of 
a set. The first part is that via which we distinguish all 
the objects which have a certain property; this is what 
is ordinarily thought of as the "defining condition" of 
the sets. In addition, there must be a second part to any 
well-founded mathematical definition, where an account of 
the nature of (and relations between) the particular members 
of the set is provided. In order to be said to understand 
a definition, in addition to the formal set-membership 
condition, <:p, "it is necessary to understand the set of 
particular objects which satisfy the [first part of the] 
definition".26 We must have an idea of the sorts of objects 
for which 1> is true. 
The first part of the definition, common to 
all the elements of the set, will teach us 
to distinguish them from the elements which 
are alien to this set; this will be the 
definition of the set; the second part will 
teach us to distinguish the different elements 
25 Poincar~, (1889/1908), pp.128-129. (My emphasis.) 
26 P · .", olncare, (1912a), p.69. 
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of the set from one another •.. [The 
second part is necessary;] otherwise 
the object would be inconceivable and 
the proposition [about an arbitrary 
object of the set] would have no meaning. 27 
The reason the second part of a definition is essential 
P · / for Olncare, has to do with his "constructivism" or non-
Platonism. There is no universe of sets given prior to 
our mathematical specifications; so the nature of the 
objects which satisfy any defining condition ¢, must be 
explicitly given by us. In the empirical case, the second 
part of a definition is, in general, not necessary. Facts 
about the particular objects which are called "birds" -
such as similarities and differences between different 
species, i.e., the relations between the elements - can be 
revealed gradually. The definition of "bird" carves out a 
piece of the independently given aposteriori world, and 
investigation into the world discloses certain contingent 
facts about the objects which we have picked out by the 
definition. However, in mathematics the situation is 
d i H e.re.n"t. There is no world independent of our postulates 
and domains which we can investigate by other (i.e., causal) 
means. So our mathematical definitions must either carve 
out a piece of a previously given mathematical domain (in 
a way which parallels definitions of things in the world), 
or we must invent a new domain. But if we are doing the 
latter, we must explicitly state the nature of the particular 
/ 
27 Poincare, (1909b), p.61. 
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elements in the domain. otherwise, our understanding of 
such abstract "objects" will not sustain an intuitive 
comparison with the perceptual objects of experience. For 
POincart, the requirement of this second part of the defin-
ition precludes the acceptability both of arbitrary infinite 
sets Rnd of ineliminably impredicative specifications. 
Arbitrary infinite collections have no particular character-
istics as'objects; and we cannot understand the particular 
nature and relations between all the objects of an in-
eliminably impredicatively specified collection, because 
the structure of such a set is not fixed - the order of 
its elements is always disruptible. 28 . / Thus, POlncare's 
theory of definitiors prohibits ineliminably impredicative 
specifications and arbitrary infinite collections from 
determining bona fide mathematical objects. Both of these 
notions feature in the classical set theoretic interpret-
ation of the continuum (e.g., in the power set operation 
applied to an infinite set). 
I will now (in the next section of this chapter) examine 
one very general argument against axiomatic set theory in 
the light of Poincar~'s theory of intuitions. In Chapters 
5 and 6, speci fic complaints regarding the set-theoretic 
construction (or non-construction) of the continuum will 
28 See, for example, Poincar~, (1909b), pp.46-48. 
of impredicativity is the subject of Chapter 6. 
. / POlncare's theory 
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be dealt with in more detail. 
(5) Set Theory and Intuitions 
Set theory developed as an extension 0+ the logicist 
programme; and Poincar~'s general arguments against set 
theory are an extension to his general arguments against 
logicism. The logicist wishes to bypass intuition in an 
effort to provide a sceptic-proof foundation for mathematics. 
His aim is to exhibit a purely logical basis for mathematics, 
which, with appropriate definitions, could produce all 
known and all knowable mathematical results. When this 
proved to be impossible without the aid of some non-logical 
axioms (e.g., Infinity, Reducibility, Choice), the pro-
gramme changed to "set theory". And the new aim was to 
provide a set-theoretic foundation for all mathematics 
which employed as few non-logical axioms as possible. 
. " POlncare's objection to this programme is that it is 
impossible to capture our mathematical intuitions by 
writing down axioms; what we can construct via apriori 
intuition, e.g., a line with no gaps, cannot be constructed 
via set theory, via logic and axioms alone. For when we 
try to write down axioms which produce sets via which 
we can mirror all results that our mathematical intuition 
formerly produced, axioms necessitating the acceptance 
of impredicatively defined sets are employed. And this 
violates what it means to "construct". Either the axioms 
aTe false in intuition, since they validate impredicative 
specifications; or, by limiting our domains and proofs 
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to those which are "constructive" (e.g., provable in 
Intuitionist analysis), the result is a gap between what 
we could formerly do - i.e., classical analysis - and 
what we can do via construction of sets alone. Hence, 
neither classical set theory nor Intuitionistic set theory 
is a faithful characterisation of pre-formalised mathematics. 
Both violate our mathematical intuition, according to 
;' 
Poincare. 
Now Russell considered this to be a stilted ViLW of 
the formalisation of mathematics. 
The object is not to banish "intuition", 
but to test and systematise its employment, 
to eliminate the errors to which its un-
governed use gives rise, and to discover 
general laws from which, by deduction, we 
can obtain true results never contradicted, 
and in crucial cases confirmed, by intuition. 29 
;' 
However, on Poincare's view, set theory does "banish" 
intuition, for it contradicts it. The axiom of infinity 
plus the power set axiom entails the acceptance of sets 
which cannot be specified in a predicative way, or, indeed, 
at all: e.g., in the classical acceptance of both 
arbitrary and uncountable infinities. In POincare-,s view, 
such "sets" directly violate our intuitive conception of 
"the set of " operation. 
The formalisation of mathematics found in modern set 
29 Russell, (1906b), p.194. 
99 
theories, rather than providing a foundation for the 
existing mathematical intuition, had to revise what was 
considered to be a mathematical intuition, a well-founded 
property, in order to recapture that which was formerly 
provided (albeit imprecisely) by intuitive mathematics, 
while at the same time avoiding contradictions. However, 
the new objects of mathematical intuition - i.e., arbitrary 
infinite collections and ineliminably impredicatively spec-
ified sets - rather than merely extending our notion of 
mathematical object, constituted (in Poincar~ls view) a 
violation of our prior concept of mathematical object. 
The new objects gave rise to formally undecidable state-
ments, or postulates which are independent of the theory 
itself, e.g., the Continuum Hypothesis; and they are only 
modelled in formal structures which presuppose their 
acceptability. 
Now, what can never be verified,30 and hence what is 
. ,-
meaningless for Po~ncare, is any statement concerning all 
the elements of an arbitrary infinite collection, or any 
statement which refers to an ineliminably impredicative 
specification. We can never, even in principle, construct 
either object in intuition - our glossing over faculty does 
not addre£s such "objects". There is no extension to our 
capacities via which we can imagine a determinate verification 
30 See Chapter 7. 
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of a statement about such an entity. 
allowed from "meaningful" mathematics. 
So they are dis-
. " POlncare often 
simultaneously criticises the global acceptance of impredic-
ativity and the belief in actual infinity31 because they 
both violate his theory of meaning (i.e., his theory of the 
synthetic apriori) for the same reason. They both purport 
to specify objects (sets) which are inconceivable to us as 
determinate objects. 
The problem is not merely that of the counterintuitive 
objects of the classical set-theoretic universe. In addition, 
by rejecting intuitive constraints on the notion of possible 
mathematical object, the set-theoretic characterisation of 
the mathematical universe leaves itself without a foundation. 
Axiomatic set theory, on Poincar:'s view, makes our intuitions 
secondary to the formal rules concerning the employment of 
the axioms. This results in two general objections, both 
of which stem from epistemological or foundational concerns. 
One is that certain intuitions cannot be formalised - they 
"can be felt but not expressed,,32 - so no formal expression 
will be "reducible" in the intended way.33 The second 
general objection is that if our intuitions are secondary 
to the formal postulates, then what constrains the acceptance 
31 Leading to unfortunate misinterpretations of his actual views when 
why he does so is disregarded, e.g., in Chihara, (1973), p.140, 
and in Kneale and KReale, (1962), pp.672-673. 
32 Poincar~, (1905b), p.149. 
33 This is discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 5. 
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of formal postulates? The choice and interpretation of 
axioms, in the absence of intuitive considerations, seems 
arbitrary, this view being confirmed by the discovery 
of the set-theoretic paradoxes. Consistency is necessary, 
so a change in the axioms was essential; but how do we 
change them without the alteration being merely ad hoc? 
/ Goodman, echoing Poincare's objection that modern axiomatic 
set theory is independent of our intuitions concerning 
the concepts of set and mathematical object, complains: 
"If mathematics is set theory, which set theory is it?,,34 
In Poincar~'s view, the only choice between triviality 
(of a strict constructivism) and contradiction (of set 
theory) was one which relied upon the theory of synthetic 
apriori intuitions. I now turn, in Chapter 5, to a dis-
cuss ion of how he implements this view in his arguments 
against the set theoretic "construction" of the classical 
continuum. 
34 Goodman, (1984), p.22. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
/ 
POINCARE'S THEORY OF THE CONTINUUM 
(1) Epistemology and the Characterisation Problem 
(2) Sets as Contained Collections 
(3) The Limits of the Arithmetisation of the Continuum 
(4) The Crucial Importance of Cantor's Result for 
Poincar~'s Theory of the Continuum 
/ Poincare's theory of the continuum is that it is a 
domain of continuous variation, the understanding of which 
is provided by geometric intuition. The continuum must be 
an intuitive geometric structure, because, while we possess 
an understanding of the concept of mathematical continuity, 
the continuum cannot be regarded as a set. The set-
theoretic characterisation of the classical continuum is 
precluded by Poincar~'s theory of meaning, and consequently 
by his theory of infinity, whereby only potentially infinite 
(or countable) sets are coherent. Yet his conception of 
the continuum is not that of the intuitionis~ nor does 
his theory involve any of the specific Brouwerian methods l 
for generating the intuitionist, i.e., iA countable, 
continuum. Rather, Poincar~'s theory of the continuum 
lies much closer to the classical Cantorian conception, for 
he regards the continuum as a structure which cannot be 
exhausted by any countable sequence - a structure which 
is, nevertheless, determinate. 
(1) Epistemology and the Characterisation Problem 
Poincar~'s objections to the set theoretic characteris-
ation of the continuum stem from epistemological concerns. 
1 See Brouwer, (1913). 
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His arguments concerning the continuum and geometric 
intuition are in this way parallel to his arguments con-
cerning induction and arithmetic intuition. He wishes to 
establish their synthetic apriori nature, thus defending 
Kant's thesis. 
Just as the arithmetic intuition of "indefinite 
iterability" cannot be a feature of the aposteriori world 
(the argument for the apriority of arithmetic intuition), 
neither can the geometric intuition of continuity be a 
feature we directly experience. Rather, in each case, 
apriori intuition must be imposed upon experience - must 
be a feature of our interpretation of experience - in 
order to maintain the coherency of experience. Thus, 
Poincar~ claims, even our experience of the physical 
continuum requires geometric intuition in order to "gloss 
over" the incoherent - indeed, contradictory2- situation 
provided by direct experience alone, which is a consequence 
~ 
2 What Poincare actually says is the following: 
The continua which we have just considered are mathematical 
continua; each of their points is an individual thing 
absolutely distinct from the others and, moreover, absolutely 
indivisible. The continua directly revealed by our senses 
and which I have called physical continua are altogether 
different •.. It is possible to tell the difference between 
a la-gram weight and a 12-gram weight at a guess; it would 
not be possible to tell an II-gram weight from either a 
lO-gram or a 12-gram weight .•. in order to construct a 
physical continuum, it is essential from what has been said 
before that two of their elements can, in certain cases, be 
considered as indistinguishable ... It is therefore necessary 
that by an active operation of the mind we agree to consider 
two states of consciousness as identical by disregarding 
their differences. (1912\;1) ,pp. 30-31. (My under lining of 
"active operation of the mind".) 
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of the inevitably limited or incomplete nature of our 
sense data. And since even our conception of the physical 
continuum requires apriori intuition to maintain the 
coherency of experience, we could not have arrived at the 
notion of mathematical continuity from our experience of 
physical continuity, independent of apriori intuition. 
The objection to the standard account of the continuum 
obtained, say, as the set of all subsets of the natural 
numbers! is epistemological. For Poincar~, interestingly, 
we can characterise the continuum. He appreciates the 
mathematical achievement represented by the "arithmetisation" 
of analysis. What he is denying is that this achievement 
of the rigorisation of analysis has the significance that 
the logicist claims it has: that it shows that mathematics 
is independent of extralogical intuitions. That is, 
Poincar~'s claim is that if we did not already possess an 
apriori understanding of continuity, the set-theoretic 
characterisation could not produce such a concept in our 
minds. 
3 
A continuum of n dimensions is a set of n 
coordinates, that is, a set of n quantities 
capable of varying independently one from the 
other and of assuming all real values which 
satisfy certain inequalities. This definition, 
flawless from the point of view of mathematics*, 
nevertheless could not be entirely satisfactory 
to us ... What it does not reveal is the 
profound reason for which these materials have 
been assembled in this fashion rather than in 
another. I do not mean that this 'arithmetiz-
ation' of mathematics is undesirable; I say 
that it is ~ot everything. 3 
/ 
Poincare, (l912b), pp.28-29. 
* This account of the n-dimensional continuum is not adequate, 
105 
The definition of an n-dimensional continuum is in-
adequate as an epistemological source for the concept 
of continuity. This characterisation presupposes an 
understanding of "all the real values of an interval"; 
but this presupposes an understanding of a continuous 
domain. Though, perhaps, mathematically acceptable, Poin-
car~'s point is that the characterisation is not 
epistemologically satisfying or revealing. 
Poincar~'s argument, however, is general. It is not 
merely that this characterisation is unacceptable, but 
that no characterisation could, in principle, succeed 
in capturing, in an exhaustive way, the notion of a 
continuous set of real numbers. Given Poincar~'s theory 
of meaning, a continuum could be a set-theoretic object 
only if we could characterise it (say, like the natural 
number sequence) by an algorithm for generating its 
members. Every infinite collection requires a rule for 
generating its members. There is the rule "+1" for gener:-
ating sequentially the natural numbers; and there is a 
method for generating sequentially the rationals. These 
are both countable sets, the members of which are generated 
sequentially by a finitely specifiable procedure; so 
they are acceptable, well-founded collections according 
/ 
to Poincare. 
as indeed Poincar~'s own foundational work on topological 
invariance shows. Poincare (l912b) cOnstitutes ~n expository 
article on the concept of dimension; see Brouwer, (1913), 
for a fundamental extension of Poincare's idea. 
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However, it is not possible for a rule or algorithm 
to generate (sequentially) an uncountable domain. And 
since the domain of real numbers cannot be generated by 
/ 
a rule (this is Poincare's interpretation of Cantor's 
/ 
result, discussed below), Poincare concludes that the 
domain of real numbers cannot be regarded as a set. It 
is impossible to characterise as a set the classical domain 
of real numbers, in a way which meets the requirements of 
his theory of meaning. 
The set-theoretician may now wonder whether this 
requirement does not merely beg the question against the 
classical set-theoretic characterisation of the continuum. 
Are there any independent arguments for accepting Poincar~'s 
requirements? We will now take a small detour into his 
theory of definitions of sets, in order to expand on 
the underlying reasons for rejecting the well-foundedness 
of uncountable collections. 
(2) Sets as Contained Collections 
For . / POlncare, a set is like a container which has 
just enough places for the objects which occupy it. In 
everyday life these containers are finite: the logic of 
sets is the logic of definite, contained collections. 
For example, "There were less than 100 students at the 
lecture" can be analysed as: "Of the finite and determinate 
set 'all the students at the lecture', its cardinal number 
i s 1 e sst han 1 0 0 ." Wet a 1 k 0 f set s 0 r colI ec t ion saIl 
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the time, but these are usually finite and determinate 
sets. Now, when the containers are not finite, in order 
to reason coherently about the elements which are inside, 
we must have an exact understanding of how the "container" 
expands, or how the elements take up their places inside 
it. Since Poincar~ claims that "infinite" only means 
"unending", or "a collection which never stops growing", 
in order to understand an infinite set, we must have an 
exact understanding of how it grows. If a set is not 
"contained" in a strict, finitistic, sense, it must at 
least be restricted and deterministic in its growth. This 
is what we understand when we understand an infinite set 
via its generating rule: the way in which its growth 
is restricted or defined. 
Poincar~'s objection, then, to considering the continuum 
as a well-defined collection, as a set, is that because 
we have no exact understanding of a generating rule for 
an arbitrary irrational number, we have no exact under-
standing of the container which houses them. We do not 
have a constructively acceptable procedure for determining 
how this container would have to grow, or expand, in 
order to capture all the real numbers, say, between 0 and 
1. Hence, such a container is not determinate; hence, 
such a container is not a set. 
The reason we have no exact understanding of how the 
container which h~lds, say, the open interval (0,1) 
grows, is because in order to obtain each of the elements 
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included in this classical real interval, we need to 
accept the existence of impredicatively characterised 
reals or arbitrary infinite sets. Impredicative defin-
itions are sentences which pick out an entity by referring 
to a collection of which it is a member: e.g., "tallest 
man in the room", "least upper bound", etc. The problem 
with impredicative definitions occurs when 1) the entity 
being defined is necessary for the completion, or for 
the complete characterisation, of a collection; and 2) 
the entity cannot be defined in any way - is not accessible 
via any route - other than via this very same completed 
collection, of which it is supposedly an element. In 
this way, so-called "vicious circles" are generated. We 
do not have the object (we cannot pick it out) until the 
collection is completed (since it cannot be characterised 
other than via the completed collection); and yet we 
cannot complete the collection without the object. (Note 
that vicious circles are not produced when an element can 
be defined by reference to the partially completed set 
of which it is a member, e.g., any natural number. It 
is only when the collection must be completed before one 
defines the entity (as in "class of all classes"), that 
vicious circles can be produced, for instance, by the 
question of whether or not the "completed" collection 
belongs ~ the collection, to itself.) Now, according to 
P · ,-olncare, vicious circles are to be excluded from math-
ematics. So the maxim is there is no legitimate mathe-
matical object whose characterisation is ineliminably 
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impredicative. (Poincar~'s theory of impredicativity is 
the subject of Chapter 6, below.) Let us suppose this 
is correct; impredicative definitions do not characterise 
mathematical objects. Where does this leave us with 
regard to the continuum? Is it true that in order to 
accept the classical account of the real numbers, we must 
accept that impredicative specifications do characterise 
legitimate mathematical objects? 
The matter is not absolutely clear. It would seem 
that in order to prove the absolute indenumerability of 
a domain, the impredicativity is ineliminable. As Wang 
says, 
It is no accident that all proofs of 
absolute indenumerability use impredicative 
sets. Indeed, it is certainly intuitively 
plausible that all predicative sets are 
denumerable. 4 
In order to avoid the problem of impredicativity, we must 
avoid the question of proving absolute indenumerability. 
However, Poincare' would object even to the "intuitive" 
characterisation of an uncountable set, as the power set 
of a countable set. The classical set of real numbers is 
often characterised by the power set axiom applied to the 
countable and determinate set N, of natural numbers. 
4 Wang, (1954), p.246'. 
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The outcome is the set of all subsets of IN , the under-
standing of which presupposes the notion of an arbitrary 
subset of N. \N, however, being infinite, the set of 
all subsets of ~ includes all the infinite subsets of 
N, th \..\.5 presupposing the notion of an arbitrary infinite 
subset of \N. However, for POincart, there is no such 
thing as an arbitrary infinite set. Infinite collections 
which are not rule-generated are incoherent; the ~ 
notion of an arbitrary infinite set is contradictory, for 
it is unfaithful both to the notion of the infinite and 
to the notion of a set or collection. 
Sets are objects which are formed by collecting the 
members together, and putting them into one "container". 
Finite sets are objects which are actually formable: we 
can list their elements between two brackets: ta,b,c, ... n}. 
Infinite sets are objects for which we have a rule. The 
rule governs the generation of elements, and thus the 
forming of the set. 
A collection is formed by the successive 
addition of new members; we can construct 
new objects [e.g., n+lJ by combining- DId] 
objects (n and 1, using the combiner," +" , 
then with these new objects construct newel' 
ones, and if the collection is infinite, it 
is because there is no reason for stopping. 5 
Finite collections are formed when the successive addition 
of new members terminates. Infinite collections are those 
5 P · / o.lncare, (1912a), p.67. 
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for which the successive addition of new members proceeds 
according to some rule of construction, such that we can 
see in the rule that there is no end to the number of 
possible constructions. That is, such that we can see 
in the rule that it is indefinitely iterable. If we cannot 
see the infinity of a set in the indefinite interability 
of a rule which generates it, we can have no sense of the 
individuating properties of its elements, of the relations 
which hold between them. Thus, for Poincar~, we cannot 
understand the object as 6 a set. In this way, collections 
must either be finite or specifiable by an iterative rule, 
in order for the particular elements to be capable of 
possessing a sense (in intuition). 
Sets must be collectQble or constructible in intuition. 
So coherent infinite sets must be rule-governed, so that 
they can be modelled in arithmetic intuition - the iter-
ative or collecting intuition. / For Poincare, potential, 
or rule-governed, infinity describes the limits of our 
arithmetic intuition which alone can provide an access 
to a sense of the particular elements of an infinite set. 
The characterisation of the set of reals, via the notion 
of arbitrary subset of ~, is, therefore, irredeemably 
illicit since it necessitates the notion of an arbitrary 
infinite subset of ~. 
6 See Chapter 4, section 4, above! for discussion on the necessity 
of understanding two parts of a definition of a set. 
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(3) The Limits of the Arithmetisation of the Continuum 
The arithmetisation of the continuum attributes a 
concrete existence to all the points of the real line. 
1Tis not an empty formal symbol. And yet the set-theoretic 
characterisation of the continuum involves accepting the 
propriety of impredicative specifications, or the existence 
of arbitrary infinite subsets of ~. How do we come to 
consider each point, each real number, as an object the 
ontological status of which is equal to all the others? 
How do we come to understand particular irrationals, like 
\I, iT , e? 
These particular elements have determinate content 
which is p~ovided by their use in mathematical practice, 
and insofar as we can construct them geometrically. They 
playa role in the arithmetisation of geometry, and so 
we understand them via the operations which produce them. 
We understand VT as the length of the hypotenuse of a right 
angle triangle whose other sides are length 1 unit. We under-
stand 11 as the circumference 0 f a circle whose radius is 
~. There is a theoretical need for these numbers 
stemming from geometrical argument, so they are intrinsic 
to any account of the continuum. 
However, since we understand particular irrationals 
via geometrical operations which produce them, it is 
Poincar"s view that our understanding of geometry, our 
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geometric intuition of continuity, must be epistemologic-
ally prior to the arithmetic construction of irrationals. 
Otherwise, his claim is, we could not explain why it is 
that we attribute the same "concrete" and ontological 
status to the constructions (irrationals) as to the materials 
employed in the constructions (the natural numbers), which 
form the basis of our operations. 
Should we have a notion of these numbers 
if we did not previously know a matter 
which we conceive ... as a continuum? 7 
Without apriori geometric intuition we should have 
had no reason for transcending the rationals. This set 
represents the limits of arithmetic intuition, of indefinite 
iteration, since it is everywhere dense. It is geometric 
intuition which suggests that there are numbers 
which are not members of the dense set~. It suggests 
the notion that there are numbers corresponding to 
every ppint on the line; that there are magnitudes 
corresponding exactlt to every length. 
The Poincar~ thesis is that history and epistemology 
here coincide. The geometric continuum is a line with no 
gaps; not a domain which has no gaps which we can see, 
but a domain with no gaps in principle. Hence, when a 
gap in the rationals is discovered, it is the apriori 
/ 
7 Poincare, (1893), p.21. 
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geometric intuition which warrants us in filling it, 
by inventing a new number, and considering this as an 
entity with the same ontological status as a natural or 
rational number. If our intuition of continuity were 
not more primitive than operations on rationals, we would 
have no more reason for admitting irrationals to the set 
of real numbers - i.e., defining this new set - than for 
concluding that we have "discovered" that the arithmetic 
numbers do not correspond to the points on the geometric 
line. Instead, in the domain of real analysis, we treat 
limits and Dedekind cuts - no matter what operations, and 
infinite sets these cuts involve - as units, just like 
257. And we gloss over all the points for which we have 
no characterisation, and - unlike the integers and 
rationals - for which we have no finite specification. 
This "glossing over" enables us to conceptualise and prove 
theorems about "any real number". For example, for any 
real number, it is either greater than, less than, or 
equal to any other real number; i.e., real numbers satisfy 
the axiom of total order; i.e.: 
(\I x) (Vy) (x , y t: IR.: x L y V x = y V x > y). 
It is our apriori intuition of continuity which grounds 
this axiom, and which grounds this practice of "glossing 
over". 
Via geometric intuition we "gloss over" the ineliminable 
impredicativity in any characterisation of a continuous 
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domain, thus preventing such a specification from being 
hopelessly vague or viciously circular. For instance, if 
real numbers are defined as the set of all possible 
Dedekind cuts, then some real numbers will be impredicative; 
for all Dedekind cuts will include ~ impredicatively 
specified cuts. Now, Poincar: has no objection to the 
way we characterise particular irrationals. For example, 
algebraic irrationals, like~, are straightforwardly 
expressed as: the positive root x, which satisfies the 
equation, 2 x -3=0. (The other x, of course is -i3.) 
But the algebraic numbers form only a countable subset 
of Cantor's uncountable set of reals. There can only be 
a denumerable number of such algebraically characterised 
numbers. Hence, in order to obtain the full classical 
set of real numbers, we must postulate the existence of 
an uncountable number of transcendental - i.e., non-
algebraic numbers. 
An algebraic number is one which 
satisfies some algebraic equation of the form 
( ) n n-I 1 a x + a x + .•• + ax + a = 0 (n ~ 1, a j 0) 
n n-l n 
where the a k are integers. 8 
A transcendental number is one which cannot be so ex-
pressed: it transcends the powers of algebraic methods. 
8 Courant and Robbins, (1941), p.103. 
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Transcendental numbers are the problematic, i.e., the 
interesting, objects. For, since there are only a 
countable number of algebraic numbers, if the set of real 
numbers is uncountable, there must be an uncountable number 
of Dedekind cuts which necessarily refer to limits of 
infinite series, some of which will be impredicatively 
specified, or which will not be specifiable at all. Can 
we really understand such a collection; can such a vague, 
indeterminate collection form a set? 
P · / Olncare's answer is, of course: no. Specific trans-
cendental numbers are acceptable because we can comprehend 
them as the limit of an ordered series. For instance, 
'Lf1'" and "e" are 0 b t a ina b 1 e, ina sen s e ; for though they 
are not constructible (algebraically)9 we can approach 
or approximate their construction. Since, via our 
geometric intuition, we know that, for instance, 1fexists -
provided we assume that there are arithmetic numbers 
corresponding to all geometric lengths or quantities, i.e., 
that geometry has a model lO - we can look for an arithmetic 
specification of 11, in terms of operations on rational 
9 Proof for transcendence of e to be found in Courant and Robbins, 
(1941), pp.297-299. 
;' 
10 Interestingly, for Poincare, this assumption leads to a circle 
(in the absence of the theory of geometric intuition), for in 
order to model geometry we must presuppose the real number system. 
Whereas here, we ar.e supposedly "constructing" a real number. 
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numbers. For example, the following are all character-
isations of T\as the limit of some infinite ordered 
sequence: 
(1) 11 1 1 1 1 (-1 )",+(_1_) 4- = "3 + 5" "'7 + ••• + + ... 2n-l 
(2) -rr2 1 -- I 1 1 = r+ 21. + 31. + ... + -+ 6 nz-
(3) 11' 2. 2 . 4. 4. 6 . 6 . 2n 2n 11 
"2 = T "3 3" "5 "5 "'7 ... 2n-l . .. 2n+l 
" But, Poincare would wonder, how do we know that these 
speci fications taken to the limi t (n ---?(/:)) capture the 
o b j e c t iT? I tis 0 n 1 y b Y reI yin g up 0 nap rio r g eo met ric 
understanding of the continuum, and hence of 1f - its 
place in geometry - that" is a determinate object; 
that our specifications have something to which they 
must conform, to which they must be faithful. Hence, 
our geometric intuition is primary, and conditions our 
construction of arithmetic numbers. 
One sees what a role geometric images play 
in all this; and this role is justified 
by the philosophy and history of the science. 
If arithmetic had remained free from all 
admixture of geometry, it would have known 
only the whole number; it is to adapt it-
self to the needs of geometry that it 
invented anything else. 12 
It is only via geometric intuition - the intuition of 
continuity - that our arithmetic constructions, especially 
11 Courant and Robbins, (1941), p.300. 
12 Poincar~, (1889/1908), quote taken from (1946) volume, p.442. 
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constructions of transcendental numbers, have a determin-
ate content over and above purely formal manipulations. 
Without this apriori intuition, providing a model, the 
constructions would be correct, and pure; but they would 
be devoid of any non-formal content, for they would not 
be part of mathematics. In order to be vindicated in 
believing that our constructions are not arbitrary, we 
rely upon geometric intuition to provide content and 
determinacy to our constructions. 
However, in addition, there is a vast domain of 
transcendental numbers for which we have no specification, 
and hence, no definite understanding. "All the Dedekind 
cuts" includes all arbitrary infinite sets of numbers. 
But this notion is not well-founded. "All the Dedekind 
cuts" is hopelessly vague and indefinite as the character-
isation of the construction of a set, for we have no 
general understanding of the particular elements which 
it includes. The only reason this characterisation of 
the reals - in terms of Dedekind cuts - makes sense at 
all, is because it accords with our apriori intuition 
of continuity. Our concept of continuity can thus be 
refined or explicated, but not brought about via the 
construction of a set, for this concept is required in 
order to gloss over the vagueness and impredicativity in 
any characterisation of an absolutely indenumerable domain, 
so that we can understand by the explication the determinate 
mathematical continuum. 
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The determinacy of elements of the set-theoretic 
construction of the continuum does not extend beyond 
particular transcendental numbers for which we have 
specifications (as limits). Our understanding of the 
nature of the classical continuum cannot, therefore, 
depend upon the construction of the elements within it. 
It is not an uncountable domain, a line with no gaps, 
because we can specify an uncountable number of elements. 
Rather, we see that it is uncountable precisely because 
we cannot completely specify or capture it by constructing 
all its elements, or "all Dedekind cuts". Insofar as we 
have a notion of the continuum as an uncountable domain, 
with no gaps in principle, it is a domain which transcends 
both constructibility and specifiability. Thus, insofar as 
we can strictly construct certain elements of the continuum, 
this "set" is countable; and conversely, insofar as we know 
the continuum is uncountable, we do not know it as a set. 
(4) The Crucial Importance of Cantor's Result for 
Poincart's Theory of the Continuum 
One might expect, given Poincar~ls thesis of the in-
coherence of the notion of "arbitrary subset", that Cantor's 
foundational theorem in set theory, to the effect that 
for any set x, card (P(x)))card (x), would have no 
significant content. This expectation might well be re-
inforced by noting that the proof that there is no map 
from a set x onto its power set, involves an impredicative 
119 
specification. Suppose f:x-tf(x); then the set z, 
characterised by 
z = fu f:x: jyE-lP(x) & y = feu) & ufy, 
is ineliminably impredicatively defined, since the set z 
is defined by reference to a totality (rCx» of which it 
itself is a member. Indeed, Poincar~ did object to the 
standard interpretation of the theorem, and in particular 
to its important instance, 
However, in the case of the instance PCN) > ~, he 
reinterpreted the proof of the specific claim, and took 
the result so interpreted as showing something fundamental 
about the nature of the continuum, and consequently, 
something fundamental about the epistemology of the con-
tinuum. He says of his account of Cantor's result, 
According to this reckoning, there would be 
only a single infinite cardinal number possible, 
the number Aleph-zero. Why, then, do we say 
the power of the continuum is not the power 
of the integers? 13 
The point is that he takes the theorem in the form that 
the power of the continuum is not the power of the integers. 
It is in his account of the proof of Cantor's theorem 
of the uncountability of the continuum,14 that he makes 
13 
14 
P · , olncare, 
Cantor, 
(1912a) , p.68. 
(1874 ).. 
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the most telling point. To see what it is, first consider 
the set of rational points. This collection has the 
property that it is dense, so any "natural" conception 
of the next rational, after a given one, seems to lose 
all significance. Consequently it might be thought that 
the collection of rationals, having such radically differ-
ent properties from the collection of integers, it would 
be required that the former collection would have to have 
a distinct treatment from that afforded by the collection 
of natural numbers. That is, it might be thought that 
they could not be seen as a countable, ordered sequence 
generated by the successive systematic application of 
an iterative rule. 
But that this is not so is indeed shown by Cantor's 
proof of the countability of the collection of rationals. 
That is, although the rationals have a different structure 
from the naturals and a quite distinct order type, this 
fact induces no special epistemological problems concerning 
our knowledge of the set of rational numbers. Therefore, 
it might be thought possible to treat the collection of 
all real numbers in the same way. It might be thought 
that the operation of "filling in" the gaps in the 
rationals, though inducing new structural properties, and 
yet again a distinct order type, nevertheless would still 
induce from the epistemological viewpoint no especially 
new difficulties. If every such "filling in" of the 
rationals could be effected by employing infinite sets 
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of natural numbers (say in the manner of Dedekind or 
Russell), each of which was a countable collection 
specified by a general rule for generating the members 
of the collection (e.g., without appeal to the notion of 
an arbitrarily specified subset), then nothing especially 
significant concerning the epistemology of analysis would 
follow. Poincar~ points out, however, that this is quite 
impossible given Cantor's result. No matter how we 
attempt to "order" or list the collection of all real 
numbers, that list cannot exhaust the continuum; the 
list is always "disruptable", as he says. 
And this is what we mean, according to the 
pragmatists [i.e., according to his own View], 
when we say that the power of the continuum 
is not the power of the integers. We mean 
that it is impossible to establish between 
these two sets a law of correspondence which 
will be free from this sort of disruption; 
whereas it is possible to do it, for example, 
when a straight line and a plane are involved. 15 
The point Poincar{ makes is entirely well taken for it 
shows that we cannot hope to approach the continuum from 
"below", so to speak, without allowing impredicative specif-
16 ications but this effectively rules out any (even 
15 
16 
~ Poincare, (1912a), p.68 
Poincar~ could not accept the Cantorian result in the form which 
asserts the absolute indenumerability of the continuum, for 
such a proof is bound to employ impredicative characterisations, 
e.g., in specifying the set z (P.119, above) (Cf. Wang, (1954)~ 
pp.244-245). But this of course does not detract from Poincare's 
reinterpretation of the proof, in essence, to the effect that 
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minimally) constructive theory of the (classical) continuum 
frolTl !'b.elow". 
If we want to effect the "construction" of the continuum 
from below, say by employing the full power set axiom, we 
will be involved in the epistemologically hopeless notion 
of "arbitrary subset". Thus Cantor's result (so inter-
preted), effectively rules out a constructive theory of 
the continuum, while if we use the full set-theoretic (or 
logistic) method, we will be involved in an epistemolog-
ical absurdity. So there is only one avenue left open. 
The existence of the continuum is guaranteed by nothing 
less than geometric intuition, and our knowledge of it 
is just as Kant claimed; knowledge synthetic apriori. 
Russell's "irrevocable refutation" of Kant is, after all, 
no refutation at all. If Kant's theory of the synthetic 
apriori is epistemologically problematic, it is no more 
so than the inevitable logistic reliance on the collection 
of all subsets of a given countable set. 
given any law which enume:cates sets of positive integers, we 
can find a set which differs from everyone in the enumeration, 
and so on indefinitely. Thus Cantor's theorem takes on the 
form of the "disruptabili ty" of all enumerations of -fl..€:- f"lni s 
Of"\. -tl-.e. CC9 .... +;n\.A~WJ. 
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POINCARE'S THEORY OF PREDICATIVITY 
(1) Analysis of the Concept of Impredicativity 
(2) The Emergence of the Concept 
(3) 
( 4 ) 
/ 
2.1 Poincare's account 
2.2 Russell's account 
The Objection to Zermelo's Solution 
, 
Poincare's Diagnosis and Solution of the Paradoxes 
4.1 Circles, vicious circles, and two types of 
definition 
/ 
4.2 Poincare's conception of set as constructed 
entity, and his "True Solution" 
Understanding Poincar~'s theory of impredicativity is 
essential to a proper understanding of his philosophy in 
general. Not only are his views considered to be found-
ational for intuitionism, he is also rightly considered to 
be a precursor to modern programmes in predicative analysis 
and predicative set theory. However, just as it is wrong 
to consider modern intuitionism as a natural extension of 
the whole of his philosophy, so is it a mistake to consider 
a predicative set theory as merely a more precise (yet 
faithful) encapsulation of his general position. Indeed, 
in view of the formality of these programmes, he would 
probably have opposed them. / Poincare did not have a theory 
of predicativity per se; rather the concept of impredicat-
ivity developed as part of his more general negative theses, 
of anti-logicism, anti-formalism, and above all, of anti-
Platonism. For example, it was convenient for him to argue 
against "Cantorism", or axiomatic set theory, by exploiting 
the problem of the set-theoretic paradoxes, a problem which 
is (for Poincar~) most naturally expressed via the notion 
of impredicativity. In this way, the issue of predicativity 
vs. impredicativity became part of a more general debate 
between Poincar~ on the one hand, and Russell, Zermelo, 
Peano, etc., on the other. It is the purpose of this 
chapter to analyse the concept of predicativity in terms 
of the history of its upbringing, and to explain Poincar~'s 
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theory of impredicativity and the paradoxes as a feature 
of his arguments on more foundational issues concerning 
the meaningfulness of mathematical statements, and concerning 
the joint issue of the ontology of the mathematical universe. 
There are two senses of Platonism, corresponding to the 
two foundational issues with which we are concerned - meaning 
. / 
and ontology - and we must first note that POlncare opposes 
both of them. The better known and less plausible explic-
ation is "ontological Platonism", which is a doctrine about 
a realm of mathematical objects the existence of which is 
somehow independent of our mathematical activity - of our 
awareness and access to them. Poincart opposes this in 
virtue of his constructivism: mathematical objects do not 
exist except insofar as we construct or define them - insofar 
as they are "conceived by the mind". The second explication 
of Platonism - which is at least prima facie distinct from 
the first (although it might entail the first, as Poincar~ 
seemed to believe l ) -is one whereby the question is shifted 
from the ontological issue of the existence of mathematical 
objects to the issue (in the theory of meaning) of the 
objectivity of mathematical truth. 
Now, Poincart certainly does not deny that mathematical 
1 For example, he regarded the acceptance of actual in finites as a 
necessary aspect of c,lassical set-theoretic "reductionism" (l906b), 
p.195. 
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truth is objective truth. He does not dispute the intell-
igibility of a distinction between meeting our most refined 
criteria and actually being mathematically true. 2 (Indeed, 
the intelligibility of such a distinction is arguably a 
necessary feature of any "knowledge-domain".) Our criteria 
and concepts are refinab1e, so those which we possess at 
any particular time need not capture or exhaust mathematical 
truth (as is argued in the Appendix). However, what Poincare' 
denies, and what the Platonist ~ Platonist asserts, is 
that this objectivity or determinacy of truth extends to 
statements which are in principle unverifiable. The 
distinction between Poincare' and the Platonist lies in 
Poincar{'s theory of meaning, which requires that all 
statements be in principle verifiable. (The content of 
this notion is the subject of Chapter 7, below.) When 
properly interpreted (in the light of his theory of the 
synthetic apriori), Poincar{'s criterion of in principle 
verifiability produces a neo-Kantian constructivist account 
of mathematics. And it is in virtue of this account that 
impredicative specifications are objectionable. 
(1) Analysis of the Concept of Impredicativity 
"Impredicative" is an adjective which describes a class 
of definitions. In particular, it is used in mathematical 
2 Wright, (1980), Chapter 1. 
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logic to describe a way of specifying sets or mathematical 
objects. (It is also sometimes misused to describe a 
class of sets or objects. 3 ) Impredicative definitions are 
(roughly) those which characterise an object (or concept, 
or property) (i) by referring to a totality of which the 
object is a member; or (ii) by employing a concept of 
which the object (concept, property) is an instantiation. 
For example, the specification, "red is that colour which, 
of all the colours in the visible spectrum, is at the 
long-wavelength end", is impredicative, for it defines "red" 
via a totality (all the colours), or via a concept (colour), 
of which red is an instantiation. 
Impredicative definitions are objectionable to Poincar~ 
only if they are viciously circular; and they are vicious-
ly circular only when they provide the sale access we can 
have to a mathematical (concept, property, or) object. 
I shall call impredicative characterisations "irreducible" 
or "ineliminable" when there is no corresponding predic-
ative equivalent available (e.g., by virtue of a prior 
theory). Ineliminable impredicative specifications must 
be excluded by the constructivist, for one certainly 
cannot construct an object via a circular procedure. If 
in order to construct an object we must first construct a 
a collection of which the object is a member, then such a 
construction (i.e., both constructions) is impossible. 
3 For example, Wang, (1954). 
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The ineliminable impredicativity of the characterisation 
of certain constructed objects, like "the set of all sets", 
is taken by the constructivist to be "viciously circular", 
and thus not a bona fide part of meaningful mathematics. 
For Poincart and Russell it is the absence of any ex-
plicit constraints on "the set of ... " operation which, 
in the context of a realist interpretation of the quantifiers, 
is to blame for the paradoxes. Such a lack of constraint 
allows ineliminable impredicative characterisations to be 
one of "the set of .•. " operations. "Naive realism" is 
generally characterised by the following (Russell's) axiom 
schema of set existence: 
3 y \:Jx (XE Y ~ cP ( x) ) • 
It is "naive", presumably, because we translate this as, 
Ii terally, "every property determines a set". And it is 
"realist" because of the way the quantifiers are interpret-
ed: the range of the "'<1" being the whole of the universe. 
Naive realism is contradictory, then, because the axiom 
schema, above, is contradictory under the ordinary (logical, 
logicist, or realist) interpretation of the quantifiers, 
If every property determines a set, then so does the 
property (Russell's) of being "non-self-membered"; 
may instantiate the axiom as follows: 
::1 y Yx (XEy H -(xEx». 
Let us call the set we are forming "y ": 
e 
so we 
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Vx (x6y f--) -(xE:x)). 
o 
But because the property ¢ is impredicative - it character-
ises a set in terms of a property of sets - and because 
oft he un res t ric ted "V" qua n t i fie r, y 0 i sit s elf a can did ate 
for ¢-ness: 
Y oE: Y 0 ~ - ( y l Yo) . 
Poincar: and Russell both felt that it is the impredicativity 
of considering a set for membership of itself which leads 
to the contradiction above. The attempt is to collect 
together and put into a set all the sets which are not 
members of themselves. But if we must really collect all 
the sets which are not members of themselves, we must also 
consider Yo' the set of all such sets, it being by defin-
ition (in virtue of the axiom) a set. We must decide 
whether <p (Yo) in order to obtain all the sets which 
possess ¢. But then the contradiction, y 6 Y H -(ycy ), 
o 0 0 0 
immediately follows. 
Poincart and Russell saw the same vicious circularity 
which is a feature of this paradox in many other paradoxes 
(e.g., Richard's paradox, and the Burali-Forti paradox). 
They thus formed the opinion that there is a class of such 
paradoxes, each of which is a consequence of the same 
viciously circular, or ineliminably impredicative element 
in the specification of the object concerned. A general 
characterisation qf the guilty class was needed. We will 
now turn to an examination of how this general character-
129 
isation, the concept of impredioativity, emerged in 
. I POlncare and in Russell. 
(2) The Emergence of the Concept 
The concept of predicativity evolved gradually by way 
of discussions between Poincare', Russell, Zermel0, and 
Peano in the period 1905-1912, the main venue being the 
Revue de Metaphysigue et de Morale. Part of the obscurity 
which may be associated with this concept and with the 
"Vicious Circle Principle" (VCP) which concerns it, lies 
in the fact that the "discussions" out of which the notion 
arises, were anything but friendly. Thus, the meaning of 
predicative/impredicative is influenced by its role in 
the general dispute between the logicists, formalists or 
"Cantorians", and the anti-logicists, anti-formalists, or 
"pragmatists" . Poincar~ lies in the latter camp; while 
R us sell, Z e r me 10, P e an 0, and 0 n e mig h tad d, C 0 ut u rat, a 11 
lie somewhere in the former camp. 
2 .. 1 / Poincare's account 
Poincart blames the paradoxes on a Cantorian point of 
view, and a logicist method, in general. He thus claims 
in 1905 4 that it is the belief in the actual infinite, 
or defining the finite in terms of the infinite, which 
makes the set-theoretical paradoxes arise. That is, the 
4 (1905b), pp.143-145. 
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purely formal treatment of sets, in conjunction with 
realism about the existence of sets, is the source of the 
problem. Thus, the existence of the paradoxes indicates 
the misguided nature of logicism and formal set-theory -
that it is based, as Poincar~ claimed all along, on mis-
taken presuppositions concerning the possibility of refuting 
Kant. It is for this reason that he also claims, in the 
t . 5 same sec lon , that it is not to formalism or Cantorism 
that we can turn to seek a solution. For instance, the 
Burali-Forti paradox arises because the logical apparatus 
cannot prevent one from considering "the collection of 
all the ordinal numbers"; whereas on the basis of intuitive 
considerations, on Poincart's view, we have no right to 
so abuse Cantor's notion of set formation 6 , and consider 
such a collection as even possibly well-founded. 7 That is, 
in the context of a set theory whereby every collection 
can be well-ordered or associated with an ordinal number -
\Ix 3 0( (x "",0() , x be i n gas eta n d 0/ be in g an 0 r din a 1 numb e r , 
such a result being necessary to generate the Burali-Forti 
paradox - the guilty classification is parallel to something 
as obviously problematic as "the set of all sets". The 
point Poincart is making, is that the problem lies at the 
very heart of these programmes, in their formalism; so 
5 
6 
7 
And later, in a continuation of the same article (1906b), p.180. 
Which is not that of Russell's naive axiom. See Hallett, (1984), 
pp.16-17, 33 for Cantor's requirement that our set-determining 
concepts be "fixed", "order ly 11 and "defini te" . 
. / POlncare, (1905b), p.lS9 and (l906b), p.l8S. 
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any revision in the formal rules will not guarantee the 
exclusion of any new paradoxes. 
Poincar~ was led to readdress the issue of the solution 
of the paradoxes, in the third (and final) of his series 
of articles entitled "les Math8'matiques et la logique,,8, 
in response to a paper by Russell ("On Some Difficulties 
in the Theory of Transfinite Numbers and Order Types"), 
published in the meantime (March 7, 1906~ which centred 
on this very question. 9 This time Poincar~ was somewhat 
more positive and clear on his views, and did not merely 
dismiss the problem as being that of the "other camp". 
He discusses Russell's various proposals - the zig-zag 
theory, the theory of the limitation of size, and the no-
class theory - makes different objections to each, then 
provides the first direct statement of his positive thesis 
in a section entitled "The True Solution". (I will con-
,-
tinue to trace the fundamentals of Poincare's notion; 
then, in sections 2.2 and 3 below I will turn to the 
" solutions of Russell and Zermelo, and explain Poincare's 
objections to them.) In brief, Poincart considered the 
main heuristic of the zig-zag theory (that of sufficient 
simplicity af definitions) to be obscure; the limitation 
of size theory to be ridiculous: a class may "be infinite, 
but it must not be too infinite"lO; and the no-class 
8 
. ,-POlncare, (1905-1906) . 
9 Russell, (1906a). 
10 POincar§, (1906b), p.188. 
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theory to be so drastic as to constitute an open defeat 
of logicism. 
Russell's first characterisation of the predicative/non-
predicative notion shows how it essentially arises out of 
the problem of set-theoretic paradoxes: 
Nor m s Cpr 0 per tie s, pro p 0 sit ion a 1 fun c t ion sJ 
which do not define classes I propose to 
call non-predicative; those which do define 
classes I shall call predicative. 11 
Compare with Poincar~'s statement whieh comes just a bit 
later that year: 
The definitions that must be regarded as 
non-predicative are those which contain a 
vicious circle. 12 
At this point, however, Poincar~was not attempting to 
de fin e " imp red i cat i vi t y" (0 r "n 0 n - pre d i cat i ve " ) . I twas 
his view that the examples show exactly what is meant. 
Thus he intended the example of Richard's antinomy, and 
Richard's diagnosis, to be clearly generalisable to the 
other similar antinomies. Richard's antinomy concerns the 
collection, E, of all the decimal numbers expressible in 
a finite number of words. Since the collection is denumer-
able (because each specification is finite), its elements 
can be ordered one-one and onto with the natural numbers, 
each element of E being assigned an n t: N. 
11 Russell, (1906a), p .14l. 
12 Poincar~, (1906b), p.190. 
However, upon 
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supposing that the order has been established we can 
define a new number, e*, which differs from each e in E 
th in its n place (by +1). Yet e* is defined, here, in a 
fini te number of words, so it is by hypothesis one 0 f the 
members of E. Thus, the contradiction: 
e* t E, and e* differs from every element 
in E, or -(e*'E). 
According to Poincare, Richard correctly analyses the 
problem, as he states below: 
E is the aggregate of all the numbers that 
can be defined by a finite number of words, 
without introducing the notion of the aggre-
gate E itself, otherwise the definition of 
E would contain a vicious circle, for we 
cannot define E by the aggregate E itself . 
... the same explanation serves for the 
other antinomies, as may be easily verified. 
Thus the definitions that must be regarded 
as non-predicative are those which contain a 
vicious circle. The above examples show 
sufficiently clearly what I mean by this. 13 
Poincar: begins in the next section of the paper to 
explicate his views on what is wrong with viciously cir-
cular or non-predicative definitions. Not all properties 
determine a class, because some properties are incapable 
of determining the precise boundaries of any class which 
we might suppose satisfies the properties. But since 
mathematical classes must have precise "boundaries" -
i.e., we must be able to form a determinate conception 
13 Poincare, (1906b), pp .189-190. 
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of "the set of ... Il entities in a way which parallels 
(the determinacy of) collections of empirical objects -
definitions must not make essential use of inexact concepts. 
A definition which contains a vicious circle 
defines nothing. It is of no use to say we 
are sure, whatever be the meaning given to 
our definition, that there is at least zero 
which belongs to the class of inductive 
numbers. It is not a question of knowing 
whether this class is empty, but whether it 
can be rigidly delimited. A "non-predicative 
class" is not an empty class, but a class with 
uncertain boundaries. 14 
A class must be rigid, or "immutable"; and the properties 
which define a class must fix the class so that it is not 
"disruptable" or "uncertain". That is, the problem of 
paradoxical collections is the problem of the well-founded-
ness or exactness of mathematical properties. 15 
"A definition which contains a vicious circle", however, 
is not very precise, nor even intuitively clear. In 1909 
Poincar{ shifts the problem to clarifying the nature of 
the "classes" which are taken to be denoted by the non-
predicative specifications. Here he tries to explain what 
he means by the "rigidityll, or lIimmutability" of a class, 
and, of great importance, to relate this effect with the 
non-predicative nature of the definition. 
14 Poincare, (1906b), p.191. 
15 I will return to the "geographical" metaphors - "boundary", 
"frontier", !'rigidity" - in Section 4, below. 
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From this we draw a distinction between 
two types of classifications applicable 
to the elements of infinite collections: 
the predicative classifications, which 
cannot be disordered by the introduction 
of new elements; the non-predicative 
classifications in which the introduction 
of new elements necessitates constant 
modification. 16 
In both 1906 and 1909 Poincar~ claims that there is a 
relation between the belief in actually infinite collections, 
e.g., in the Cantorian method of placing "the infinite 
before the finite ll17 , which is "contrary to all healthy 
18 psychologyll and the viciously circular definitions. 
This relation is often misconstrued (e.g., by Russell in 
his (1906b) and Chihara in his (1973), p.140) as a direct 
causal connection from a belief in actual infinity to 
the ensuing of paradoxes. However, this is not what 
Poincar~ intends, even in the earliest (1905) paper. What 
he asserts is that Cantorism, or the acceptance of actual 
infinities, leads one to employ impredicative specifications 
where they cannot (according to Poincar{'s account) 
meaningfully be employed, to denote a determinate mathemat-
ical object. In particular, . / POlncare objects to the 
unrestricted extensional account of quantification which 
is validated by the realist (or Cantorian) belief in actual 
infinity. That is, for Poincar~, it is the mistake of 
/ 
16 Poincare, (l909b),. p.47. 
;-
17 Poincare, (1906b), p.195. 
18 P · / olncare, (1905b), pp.144-145. 
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the realist to assume that the correct account of the 11-;" 
quantifier, applied to infinite sets, is that of an infinite 
conjunction. It is the combination of realism about a 
totality - considering it as there before we generate its 
elements - plus unrestrictedqu.a.r\tification on the totality, 
which allows the range of a quantifier in the specification 
of a totality to include the totality itself. 
By 1912 Poincart offers a more precise, more general 
analysis of the concept of impredicativity. Impredicative 
definitions are those which use: 
raJ a relation between the object to be 
defined and all the individual objects of 
a genus of which the object to be defined 
is itself supposed to be a member (or [b] 
of which one supposes to be members objects 
which themselves can be defined only by the 
object to be defined). This is what happens 
if we posit the two following postulates: 
~aJ X (object to be defined) is related 
in such and such a way to all members 
of the genus G. 
X is a member of G. 
Or else the following three postulates: 
lb] X is related in such and such a way 
to all the members of the genus G. 
Y is related in such and such a way 
to X. 
Y is a member of G. 19 
Chihara provides a more modern, more precise characteris-
ation of the logical notion of impredicativity, in terms 
of quantification: 
19 POincart, (1912a), p.70. 
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A specification of a set A by means of the 
schema 
(x) (x 6 A H rPx) 
is impredicative if the set A, were it to 
exist, or any set presupposing the existence 
of A, falls within the range of a bound vari-
able in the specification. 20 
If the range of any bound variable in ¢ has A as a member, 
then the specification via ~ of A is impredicative. 
Finally, Poincar{ relates the impredicativity of a specif-
ication to the presence of a vicious circle, thus 
distinguishing the two notions: 
To the pragmatists such a definition implies 
a vicious circle. It is not possible to 
define X without knowing all the members of 
the genus G, and consequently without knowing 
X which is one of them. 21 
2.2 Russell's account 
Russell's concept of impredicativity is eventually 
expressed in his Ramified Theory of Types (RT). Like 
. '" POlncare's concept, Russell's too evolved gradually out 
of a desire to isolate and exclude the mistake involved 
in producing the paradoxes. The Simple Theory of Types, 
outlined in Appendix B of Russell's volume, The Principle 
of Mathematics 22 , is later rejected by Russell, and the 
more complicated Ramified Theory put forward, for yarious 
20 Chihara, (1973), p.5. 
21 . /' POlncare, (1912a), p.70. 
22 Russell, (1903). 
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reasons (which, I feel are interrelated; and so I will 
not attempt to say exactly which doctrines are a consequence 
of which others, if, indeed, this can be done at all). To 
be sure, a major reason Russell was not satisfied with the 
Simple Theory was that it is not global: it only solves 
the synt?ctic paradoxes, i.e. those which can be construed 
in terms of classes. Whereas, with POincart, Russell saw 
the same mistake at the foundation of all the paradoxes. 
Russell also felt it was necessary for the solution of 
the paradoxes to be a consequence of a more general theory 
(of what it makes sense to say), so that the theory could 
be seen as a logical result, and less arbitrary or ad hoc: 
It is important to observe that the vicious-
circle principle is not itself the solution 
of vicious-circle paradoxes, but merely the 
result which a theory must yield if it is to 
afford a solution of them. It is necessary, 
that is to say, to construct a theory of 
expressions containing apparent variables 
which will yield the vicious circle principle 
as an outcome. It is for this reason that 
we need a reconstruction of logical first 
principles, and cannot rest content with the 
mere fact that the paradoxes are due to 
vicious circles. 23 
And, regarding Poincar~ls "intuitive", anti-logicist solu-
tion", Russell "quips": 
We may concede. that positive errors are less 
likely to emerge, if we only apply our rules 
where "intuition" (i.e. common sense) suggests 
that we may safely do so. But there are some 
people who would prefer true rules of reasoning 
... So long as we only know that a rule holds 
23 Russell, (1906b), p.205. 
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in ordinary cases, without knowing what 
cases are ordinary, our mathematics is in 
a precarious condition. 24 
The theory which excludes the paradoxes must be a result 
of the principles of logicism, for Russell. 
The theory, thus takes the form of a IIno-classes" 
theory, so that it may be construed as a set of logical 
principles. The thought that classes are fictions is re-
inforced by two other problems: (i) because the empty 
set, ¢' is not a collection; and (ii) because singleton 
sets, fa~, are not equivalent to the single elements which 
are their members (la~ ~ a). In addition, Russell was 
perhaps uneasy about the notion of a stratification or 
layering of objects via logic, which is necessary (in the 
Simple Theory) if classes are considered as Frege considered 
them, as objects. There were also problems outside of 
set theory, Russell's solutions of which were related to 
his work on solving the paradoxes. For example, the 
problem of how we can understand sentences which do not 
successfully refer, and what their precise meanings are, 
is a problem which Russell solved by turning from an ex-
tensional to an intensional point of view. That is, "The 
KiDg of France is bald"-problem, which led to the theory 
of definite descriptions, and (then) to the theory of 
substitutions: the two joint precursors to RT. 25 
24 Russell, (1906b), p.l96. 
25 See Russell (1905) and (1906c). 
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Russell wished to eliminate any assumptions in logic 
(and in mathematics), and in the linguistic analysis of 
the meanings of our assertions, about the ontology of 
the universe. He thus needed to analyse all expressions 
in terms of propositional functions, and to restrict the 
ranges of the quantifiers in the expressions of all pro-
positional functions, to those which are meaningful or 
significant for the concepts employed. (So, in effect, 
he agrees with Poincare that at least part of the problem 
of the paradoxes lies in the unrestricted quantification 
employed. Whereas, however, Poincar~ sees this as the 
result of a misplaced realism about (certain) totalities, 
Russell attributes this to logic: to a more general 
mistake to be found in an imprecise analysis of the workings 
of our language.) Due to the theory of definite descrip-
tions classes are analysed as propositional functions, 
and like most nouns (except for "this" and "that") are a 
mere facon de parler. Impredicativity is to be character-
ised in terms of propositions and propositional functions; 
and the VCP is the statement (roughly) that: 
a function is not well-defined unless all 
its [possible] values are already well-
defined. 26 
the values of a function cannot contain terms 
only definable in terms of that function ... 
(llitherwise] the values of the function would 
not be determinate until the function was 
determinate, whereas we found that the 
26 Russell, (1910), p.39. 
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function is not determinate unless its 
values are previously determinate.) 
Hence, there must be no such thing as 
the value for r:p x wi th the argument 
r{Jx, or with any argument which involves 
rj) ~ ••• In fact II q, ( rf:>~) II must be a symbol 
which does not express anything 27 
IIArgumentsl1 for a propositional function are those ex-
pressions which can be substituted for the x in the ¢~, 
or are those which fall in the range of any bound variables 
in ¢ . Thus, for Russell, a predicative definition is a 
propositional function (or proposition) which accords with 
RT. 
A predicative function of a variable argument 
is any function which can be specified without 
introducing new kinds of variables not 
necessarily presupposed by the variable which 
is the argument. 28 
In other words, for Russell, the statement of some univers-
ally quantified expression for example, presupposes the 
prior existence of a domain of objects (or expressions) 
which mayor may not be instances of the expression in 
question (which are possible arguments for the function). 
And no quantified expression can include itself in its 
range of possible arguments, or instantiations, because a 
quantified expression cannot meaningfully presuppose the 
prior determinacy or existence of itself. The instances 
which would in general make a specification impredicative 
27 Russell, (1910), p.40. 
28 Russell, (1910), p.54. 
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are thus not possible arguments for the propositiunal 
function. They are "values of x with which' cPx' is 
meaningless".29 
Whatever the merits of Russell's expression of the 
concept of impredicativity, the full programme CRT) - of 
which the VCP is a consequence - cannot be accepted. It 
does not accord with his logicism, for it is not logic, on 
any augmented account. His rejection of all existential 
assumptions about the ontology of the universe is bought 
at the cost of parallel assumptions about the nature of 
our concepts. These are embodied in the necessary axioms 
of Infinity - whereby it is possible to have infinitely 
many arguments in a truth-function - and Reducibility -
the assumption that there is always a primitive predicate 
corresponding to each defined symbol in the hierarchy; an 
assumption which is, in effect, equivalent to the ontological 
assumption of the existence of a set of real objects as 
arguments for every symbol. In addition to the "non-logical" 
nature of these axioms Poincart objects that a logicism 
embodied by a theory like RT is circular. For RT pre-
supposes the theory of ordinals already to be established: 
it requires functions the specifications of which can refer 
to all finite orders. And thus, RT is giving up and not 
expressing logicism, as Russell had intended it to, for 
29 Russell, (1910), p.41. 
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it shows that a theory of arithmetic is prior to the 
formalisation of language proposed. 
(3) The Objection to Zermelo's Solution 
On Zermelo's view, the paradoxes result from allowing 
the consideration of sets which are simply too "big", i.e., 
the size of the universe. The totalities which are referred 
to in the contradictory specifications can be thought of 
as the size of the universe because they are unextendable 
(Fraenkel's metaphor). They are closed under diagonalis-
ation; so we do not "get out" of them via certain 
diagonalising operations, as in the characterisation of 
e* in Richard's antinomy. Zermelo's solution is to lay 
down explicit axioms whereby a universe of sets isomorphic 
to Cantor's transfinite hierarchy can be produced; but 
where none of the problematic "too big", absolutely in-
finite sets can be produced. 
Poincar~ objects, however, that Zermelo's diagnosis 
of the paradoxes - that it is a matter of the size of the 
totalities referred to - is simply wrong. On his view -
on his interpretation of Zermelo's argument - the argument 
for a "limitation of size" principle, turns on a mis-
assimilation of the two distinct classes of impredicativity.30 
30 "La raison invoquee par M. Zermelo ne saurait donc suffire pour 
.justi fier l' emploi des definitions 'non predicatives' car 
l' assimilation qu' il fait est inexacte." (Poincare", (1909a), p .119. ) 
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Poincare admits that there are harmless impredicative 
specifications; so he agrees that there is no justification 
for excluding all impredicative characterisations. But 
the distinction between the harmless and the harmful im-
predicative specifications, does not lie in the size of 
any totality which is presupposed (referred to) in the 
specification; but rather in the issue of whether or not 
the totality referred to has been previously defined. That 
is, if our definition (of an object in terms of a collection 
to which it belongs) is not a construction, is not creative, 
then the impredicativity is harmless: not viciously circular, 
and not paradoxical. It is only when both the object to 
be defined and the totality to which it belongs are being 
defined (generated, constructed) for the first time, that 
impredicative specifications must be disallowed. 31 
However, Poincart's distinction between harmless and 
harmful impredicative specifications depends on his possess-
ing a sharp distinction between creative and non-creative 
specifications. And Zermelo, not being (any sort of) a 
constructivist, does not share such a distinction. On his 
view, there is no profound difference between creative and 
non-creative definitions. And thus, the distinction 
between the two classes of impredicative specifications 
must lie elsewhere: for him, in the extensional matter 
of the size of the collections to which the specifications 
31 This - Poincarl's diagnosis and solution - will be discussed at 
length in Section 4, below. 
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refer. Cantor's idea that every well-founded property 
determines a set is not really captured by Russell's compre-
hension principle, 
nor by Frege's class existence principle, 
r x : f ( x ) ~ = [x: g ( x ) ~ ~ \/x (f ( x) ~ g ( x ) ) . 
" Whereas Poincare accepted Cantor's intuitive comprehension 
principle - where the well-foundedness of the q; (i.e., 4 must 
be predicative when the specification is creative) is what 
obviates the contradictions - Zermelo focuses not on the 
nature of the ~, but on the nature of the range of cp. 
His solution is simple: let us merely stipulate that the 
range of + is not "too big", by requiring that q; determine 
a subset of some independent set z: 
'..J z 3 y Vx (x E. y H (x e z & ¢ ( x) ) • 32 
Thus, we ensure that the set y is small with respect to 
the set-theoretic universe, for it is always a subset of 
(and so either the same size or smaller than) some other 
accepted set z. This, in effect, stipulates that no specif-
ications are "creative" in Poincar~'s sense, for we (suppose 
we) always already have all the objects which might have 
the property ~ . 
32 Kunen, (1980), pp .10-11. 
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Although Zermelo's system - in particular his revised 
comprehension schema (RCS) - does succeed in blocking the 
derivation of a contradiction from the impredicative 
/ properties of the syntactic paradoxes, Poincare could not 
accept it as really solving the paradoxes. The problem 
with the paradoxical totalities may be that they are too 
big, and so contradictory; but this "diagnosis" does not 
address the question of the true origin of the problem. 
What makes them too big in the first place is the question 
to which Poincare demands an answer. For him, the answer 
is the ineliminable impredicativity, or vicious circularity, 
of their specifications. 
. / POlncare sees something common in all the paradoxes -
finite/infinite, syntactic/semantic - and he was the first 
to globalise Richard's diagnosis (of his own paradox).33 
The mere size of a collection cannot be the whole problem, 
for, as Russell pointed out 34 , there are paradoxes which 
do not even concern a collection (e.g., the liar). Con-
cerning those paradoxes which do involve a reference to a 
collection, Poincare. correctly sees the problem as one of the acceptance 
33 See Section 2.1, above. 
34 Russell, (1906b), p.197. 
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of totalities with imprecise, unfixed, indeterminate 
boundaries, frontiers or walls. 35 
A "non-predicative class" is not an empty 
class, but a class with uncertain boundaries. 36 
To be sure, sets which are "too big" according to Zermelo's 
account, will have uncertain boundaries - because, in 
effect, they have no boundaries at all (being the size of 
the universe). However, the sets which are too big in an 
intuitive sense do not seem to exhaust all those with 
uncertain boundaries. So, Zermelo's solution is not in-
tuitively satisfying, for he merely blocks the paradoxes 
by blocking one symptom of the problem (sets which are too 
big), rather than solving the paradoxes by looking for 
their true origin. 
In addition, Poincar~ objects that the axioms themselves 
are not "intuitive" - i.e., they do not demand immediate 
assent in virtue of our concept of set alone. Thus, an 
argument to the effect that the axioms are true, are faithful 
to our pre-formal concepts of set and of object, is required. 
But on Poincar~'s view the arguments Zermelo provides 
(concerning the source of the paradoxes, concerning Russell's 
comprehension schema) are misleading. 
Mr. Zermelo does not allow himself to 
consider the set of all the objects which 
35 The nature of such "geographical" metaphors is discussed in 
Section 4, below. 
36 Poincare", (l906b), p.191. (My emphasis.) (Quoted more fully 
below, pp.158-159.) 
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satisfy a certain condition because it 
seems to him that this set is never 
closed; that it will always be possible 
to introduce new objects (to the range of 
¢]. 37 
Poincar{ interprets Zermelo's argument for his ReS as 
pointing out the need for determinate boundaries on the 
range of p in any set specification. However, the mere 
stipulBtion of the existence of the set z on which ~ is 
defined does not show that the set y, which the schema 
asserts exists, is small, or closed in our intuitive sense, 
because the set z might already be too big. 
There are two points here. First, there is no way to 
tell what the nature of z is. It might very well be the 
case, given the aXloms of infinity and power set, that z 
/ is already too big on Poincare's conception of set (as 
constrained by our iterative intuition). Thus the fact 
that the set y is a subset of z does not reassure us that 
Y is "small", does not "contain" y, for y could be the 
same size as z - i.e., too big. 
Mr. Zermelo has no scruple in speaking 
of the set of objects which are a part of 
a certain Menge M and which also satisfy a 
certain condition. It seems to him one 
cannot possess a Men~e without possessing 
at the same time all its elements. Among 
these elements he will choose those which 
satisfy a certain condition ... without 
fear of being disturbed by unforeseen 
elements, since he already has all these 
elements in his hands. By positing before-
hand this Menge M, he has erected an 
37 Poincare', (1909b), p.59. 
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enclosing wall which keeps out intruders 
who could come from without. But he does 
not query whether there could be intruders 
from within whom he enclosed inside his 
walls. If the Menge M possesses an in-
finite number of elements, this means not 
that these elements can be conceived of 
as existing beforehand all at once, but 
that it is possible for new ones to arise 
constantly; they will arise inside the 
wall instead of outside, that is all. 38 
That is, for Poincar:, postulating the pre-existence of 
the set z does not ensure that the specification of y is 
not in some sense creative, especially if z is infinite 
if all the elements of z may not be considered as pre-
existing. Furthermore (second), given the independence 
of the (general) Continuum Hypothesis from ZFC 39 , z (or 
'"X. 2 I b) can b e as big as 0 n eli k e s . But t his now vi 0 I ate s 
all our intuitiqns concerning what is closed or determinate. 
For Poincar{, what is closed or determinate, or an 
acceptable set, is not what is merely extendable according 
to the axioms of ZFC. The mere availability of iterations 
of the axioms to produce bigger, more extensive sets than 
in the previous stage of iterations of tithe set of ... tI, 
is not sufficient to show that +0(,", eC\.Gh se.+ -th;....s o\Ota...iV\.ed-
at every stage - we only have determinate, acceptable, 
"small" sets. To show that an arbitrary Zermelo set is 
extendable, one must indeed presuppose that the axioms 
38 P · / olncare, (1909b), pp.59-60. 
39 Cohen, (1963),highlights the drama of this situation with his 
"forcing" technique. 
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(e.g., of separation) are applicable. (For example, in 
s how i n g t hat a set, x, is ext e n da b 1 e by 11 d i ago n ali sin g 0 u t " 
of it, one requires the axiom of separation to form a subset 
of X.40) However, this is not to show, but to presuppose, 
to proclaim that the Zermelo sets are determinate. That is, 
crudely, showing that a set is extendable depends on Zermelo's 
own characterisation of extendability as embodied in his 
axioms. But establishing the acceptability of (the sets 
which are produced by) his axioms was the whole point of 
the argument concerning extendability. The base case of 
the collection of Zermelo sets would be the first application 
of his axioms, i.e.,:p(IN). But the acceptability of this 
set is precisely what is in need of justification. For 
Poincar~ the base case is too big; so that showing that 
iterations of the axioms does not take us out of the domain 
of such acceptable sets is to show nothing. And even re-
gardless of Poincar:'s views on the constraints imposed by 
our iterative intuition, there seems to be no non-arbitrary 
way to evaluate the (cardinal) size of this set (the base case); 
so calling it small is to presume and not to show that Zermelo 
sets are all small. 
/ 
Thus, Poincare says: 
A classification was relied upon which was 
not immutable and which could not be so; 
the precaution was taken to proclaim it 
immutable; but this precaution was in-
sufficient. 41 
40 See Hallett, (1984), Chapter 5, especially p.204, for a more 
detailed argument. 
/ 41 Poincare, (1909b), p.45. 
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Therefore, not only do Zermelo's axioms violate our pre-
formal concept of set; his arguments for his axioms are 
circular. For there is no way to argue, as Fraenkel attempted 
(as shown by Hallett), for the thesis that mere extendability 
captures our intuitions concerning the determinacy of a set, 
without presupposing that the ability to diagonalise out 
shows a set to be determinate, i.e. not too big already. 
. / For POlncare, therefore, the Zermelo axioms are insufficient 
both formally and intuitively. 
This is why Mr. Zermelo's axioms could not 
be satisfactory to me. Not only do they 
not seem evident to me, but when I am asked 
whether they are free from contradictions, 
I shall not know what to answer ... even 
though he has closed his sheepfold carefully, 
I am not sure that he has not set the wolf 
to mind the sheep. 42 
(4) POincart's Diagnosis and Solution of the Paradoxes 
Poincar~ rejected Zermelo's solution of the paradoxes; 
yet there is something right in Zermelo's diagnosis that 
Poincare accepts, and that is the recognition that the mere 
presence of impredicativity is not sufficient to explain 
the paradoxes. 
4.1 Circles, vicious Circles, and two types of definitions 
All impredicative definitions are circular, for they 
define an object in a way which is "self-referential": the 
/ 42 Poincare, (1909b), p. 60. 
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definition of the object X either refers directly to 
X, or it refers to a different mathematical object Y, 
the existence of Y presupposing the existence of X. 
However, not all circles are vicious, and not all impred-
icative definitions are viciously circular or paradoxical. 
For example, "tallest man in the room" is impredicative, 
for it picks out a man, the tallest one, via a relation 
(the relation being "taller than") between the man and 
all the members of the totality, men in the room. But 
the object of our definition is a man in the room, so he 
is a member of the totality via which he is defined. So 
this definition is impredicative. However, it is by no 
means viciously circular. It is meaningf~l for via it 
we can pick out, deterministically, the object (the man) 
which satisfies the specification. Impredicative specif-
ications are common in everyday speech: "Out of all 
the horses I prefer the bay with the white socks"; " 
the chair (out of all the chairs in the room) with the 
high back"; "the chapter in this thesis which concentrates 
most on impredicativity". It is because the objects in 
the totalities of the "everyday" specifications are 
empirical, because the collections are finite and survey-
able, their existence independent of the specifications, 
that the circularity presents no epistemological problem 
whatever. Now, the distinction between objects which we 
need to create or construct, and objects which exist 
independent of u~, or which have already been constructed, 
/ is central to Poincare's philosophy; and it plays a 
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crucial role in his solution of the paradoxes. 
Poincar~ is some sort of a constructivist (a neo-Kantian 
sort), and thus he claims that a mathematical "object 
exists only when it is conceived by the mind".43 So 
the specification which makes the object exist (in the 
mind) must accord with the apriori conditions of the mind 
(i.e., logic plus the apriori forms of intuition) in order 
for the specification to be meaningful and succeed in 
denoting a determinate object. 
X exists only by virtue of its definition~ 
which has meaning only if all the members 
of G are known beforehand, and X in particular. 
It would be useless to say ..• that it is not 
a vicious circle to define X by its relation 
to X ••• 44 
Imp red i c a ti ve s p e c i f i cat ion s fa i 1 t 0 fi x a d e t e r min ate 
mathematical object because, in the absence of any prior 
such fixing, it is impossible to construct a (new) math-
ematical object by virtue of an impredicative definition. 
GBdel makes the following famous remarks on definitions 
which are constructive or creative, i.e., definitions 
which specify objects which are constructed by ourselves: 
43 
44 
In this case there must clearly exist a 
definition (namely the description of 
the construction) which does not refer 
to a totality to which the object defined 
belongs, because the construction of a 
/ Poincare, (1912a), p.72. 
'" Poincare, (1912a) , p.7l. 
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thing can certainly not be based on a 
totality of things to which the thing 
constructed itself belongs. If, however, 
it is a question of objects that exist 
independently of our constructions, there 
is nothing in the least absurd in the 
existence of totalities containing members, 
which can be described (i.e. uniquely 
characterised) only by reference to this 
totality. 45 
It is only when the totalities need to be constructed, 
when the definitions are creating the objects, that impred-
icative specifications are an issue. It is thus that 
Russell's famous informal statement of the VCP, which is 
really two, non-equivalent statements, depends upon a 
constructive point of view. Russell states that certain 
sorts of objects, e.g., "propositions, classes, cardinal 
and ordinal numbers, etc. represent illegitimate totalities, 
and are therefore capable of giving rise to vicious circle 
fallacies".46 On his view the paradoxes, 01' vicious 
circles, arise as a result of assuming the existence of 
such illegitimate totalities, an assumption which is realist, 
in essence. And the acceptability of Russell's solution 
requires a non-realist point of view (in keeping with his 
no-class theory whereby classes are mere fictions). 
The principle which enables us to avoid 
illegitimate totalities may be stated as 
follows: "Whatever involves all of a 
collection must not be one of"the collection"; 
or, conversely: "If, provided a certain 
45 GCldel, (1944), p.456. 
46 Russell (1910), p.38. 
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collection had a total, it would have 
members only definable in terms of that 
total, then the said collection has no 
total. 47 
The "involvement" relation in the first statement is im-
precise; and in the absence of constructivist constraints, 
it is unclear why there is anything wrong with one of a 
collection involving all of the collection. The second 
statement is better in its emphasis on "~ definable", 
but there is still no argument here for accepting it in 
the absence of anti-realist presuppositions, i.e., in the 
absence of Russell's whole theory. We must be constructing 
the collection which has members only definable (i.e., 
only constructible) in terms of the collection, in order 
to explain our rejection of the existence of the totality. 
The contrast with realism is the following. I four 
conception is non-constructive, and sets - like men -
exist independent of our specifications, then how we define 
the sets is independent of the matter of their existence. 
ao, on the face of it at least, impredicativity does not 
need to be a concern for the Platonist. However, if our 
conception is constructivist, or non-realist, and sets, 
unlike empirical objects, exist only insofar as we define 
or can define them; then, no matter how far we extend 
the strength of "can" here (thereby strengthening the 
notion of constructibility), we can never accept the 
47 Russell, (1910), p.37. 
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existence of a set the construction of which is only 
characterisable by an impredicative specification. Thus, 
"all of a collection must not be one of the collection" 
only when both the element and the collection to which it 
belongs require each other for constructibility. For then 
neither will be constructible due to this "vicious circle". 
Commenting on the paradox of "the smallest integer which 
cannot be defined by a sentence with fewer than one hundred 
/ French words", Poincare provides an insightful analysis 
of ~ the impredicativity here leads to a vicious circle: 
This reasoning rests on a classification 
of integers into two categories: those 
which can be defined by a sentence with 
~ewer than one hundred French words and 
those which cannot be. In asking the 
question, we proclaim implicitly that this 
classification is immutable and that we 
begin our reasoning only after having 
established it definitively. But that is 
not possible ... the classification of 
numbers can be fixed only after the 
selection of the sentences is completed, 
and this selection can be completed only 
after the classification is determined, 
so that neither the classification nor 
the selection can ever be terminated. 48 
It is the old "chicken and the egg" question, which has 
no answer, since each object seems to require the other for 
its existence. This is what the "only definable" in 
Russell's statement is meant to capture: that the said 
48 Poincar~, (1909b)" p.46. 
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collection of elements does not exist relative to some 
other definition in a prior theory. And it is because it 
does not exist in virtue of some other fact - e.g., those 
embraced by Platonistic assumptions - that the postulate 
is "creative fl or constructive, and thus that it must be 
predicative. (Thus, one of GtJdel's criticisms of Russell's 
RT 49 is that the strongly non-constructive axioms of in-
finity and reducibility violate the constructive presuppos-
itions necessary for accepting his version of the VCP.) 
4.2 Poincare's conception of set as constructed entity, 
and his "True Solution,,50 
Poincar~'s solution of the paradoxes relies explicitly 
on his constructivism, to which he remained faithful. 
Interestingly, he accepted Cantor's "intuitive axioms",51 
and he was in general in favour of increasing precision in 
mathematics. But the formal definitions cannot replace 
the intuitive notions; and the axioms are only true in 
intuitive domains: i.e., domains which are constrained by 
(his neo-Kantian) constructivist principles. 52 It is thus 
49 
50 
51 
52 
Gtldel, (1944). 
The title of a section in his (l906b), p.189, is "The True Solution". 
. "" POJ.ncare, (1905b), P .159. 
"It is true that Cantorism has been useful, but that was when 
it was applied to a real problem, whose terms were clearly defined, 
and then it was possible to advance without danger." (Poincare, 
(1906b), p.195.) 
158 
that his solution of the paradoxes did not require him 
to alter or add to his principles, for some theory of 
predicativism is already entailed by his theory of meaning 
(whereby we must "verify" or prove that any definition of 
a new entity is consistent), and by, in general, his 
constructivism. Sets are constructed objects, formed by 
"the set of .. , ". oper~tion, with respect to some property 
or properties of previous well-defined, determinate 
objects. The existence of a set requires that ~ construct 
it by virtue of a definition which collects together its 
elements, or (when the number of elements is infinite) 
by virtue of an iterative generating rule. In order for 
the set to be determinate, the rule must be determinate, 
the definition must "collect together" the elements in a 
determinate way. Thus, the nature of the characterisation 
of an object is relevant to the question of the existence 
of the object. If the characterisation is viciously 
circular (if it is impredicative and the totality to which 
it refers does not exist independently of the specification), 
then whether or not we know that certain objects Qre 
members - e.g., it is determinate that 1, 2 and 3 will 
be members of the totality E in Richard's paradox - it is 
impossible to possess a determinate conception of all 
the members of the totality; for its boundaries are in-
determinate. 
A definition which contains a vicious 
circle defines nothing '" It is not 
a question of knowing whether this class 
is empty, but whether it can be rigidly 
delimited. A "non-predicative class" 
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is not an empty class, but a class 
with uncertain boundaries. 53 
Impredicative definitions are unfaithful to our under-
standing of an object, not because they fail to pick out 
any members, but because they fail to fix the boundaries 
of the set of members they purport to pick out. 
Objects ~ objects have determinate, definite 
"boundaries". This is just what we mean by an object. 
the determinacy is not provided by the empirical world, 
If 
then in order to consider a concept as determining a well-
defined, bona fide object, we must contribute the determinacy 
ourselves. Since, for Poincare, mathematical sets are 
constructed objects, we must ensure that our specifications 
denote only determinate sets, with precise definite 
boundaries. According to Poincare this means we can only 
consider sets which are predicatively specifiable in a 
finite number of words. A set will be determinately 
specified if the oature of all its objects, if the structure 
of the "container", can be determinately specified. Let 
us return to the container metaphor of Chapter 5 to ex-
" plain Poincare's conception of a closed, determinate set. 
A set is like a container or box with just enough room 
or places to hold all and only the objects which are its 
members. A set is determinate when all of its spaces have 
53 Poincar{, (1906b), p.191. (My underlining.) 
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been filled, or when there is a general rule governing 
the way in which we put or generate the objects in the box. 
In virtue of arithmetic intuition we can treat potential 
infinities as completed - as if the container was filled. 
That is, via our understanding of an iterative rule we 
can "gloss over" all the elements which have not been 
generated, or put into the box, "pretend" that they are 
there, and close the box: put its lid on. Thus, for 
/ Poincare, the determinacy criterion for the acceptability 
of a set specification means that the set can be completed, 
either actually or via apriori intuition, and then con-
sidered closed because all of the members have been, in 
general, determined. "The set of ... " operation is in 
general limited to those rules which can be closed via 
apriori arithmetic intuition, or enclosed between two 
brackets: [0, 1, 2 ... n, ... j. In addition, he permits 
a special "set": the set of points on the geometric 
continuum, the set of real numbers, as a primitive object 
of intuition - not characterisable by a rule - as an object 
of apriori geometric intuition. (The finite numbers are 
primitive and immediate objects of intuition.) 
This conception of sets, however, automatically excludes 
the harmful impredicative specifications from being meaning-
ful. In order to define a new entity by referring to a 
set, the set must be a determinate object; we must be able 
to think of it as closed or completely filled "with its 
lid on", either because it is finite or in virtue of apriori 
intuition. This is an anti-Platonist or anti-Cantorian 
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(constructive) view, for according to Poincar~, a totality 
cannot be considered as given independently of its members. 54 
So in order to have a totality (in terms of which to specify 
an object) we must have all its members, and this must be 
minimally guaranteed in the intuitive, neo-Kantian sense. 
Thus, if a characterisation, of~, is creative, and if it 
refers to a totality, X, what ~ cannot be is one of the 
elements of X. For, by hypothesis, X is already completely 
filled, with its lid on, i.e., closed. 
This reasoning rests on a classification 
In asking the question, we proclaim 
implicitly that this classification is 
immutable and that we begin our reasoning 
only after having established it definitively 
55 
Thus any specification which is creative, and which is in 
terms of the whole of a totality, must be one whereby we 
"diagonalise out" of the totality. The only condition 
under which a specification can be acceptably impredicative 
is when it is not creating a new member (of the totality), 
but merely picking out one of the members already (created) 
in X. In this way, it already being in the box, we do not 
have to disrupt any elements to put it in. Moreover, on 
this conception, what can never be acceptable is a set 
belonging to itself, as in the set of all sets, or the 
54 Heinzmann, (1985), p.60. 
55 Poincare', (1909b), p.46. Quoted more fully above, p.156. 
162 
application of "the set of ... " applied to the collection 
of all ordinals. These impredicative specifications do 
not arise because one cannot put a box into itself. Im-
predicative specifications are thus allowed only when 
they are of the harmless variety, i.e., when they are 
non-creative. For then the totality can be thought of 
as completed, the box closed, and the specification in 
terms of all the members of the totality can only pick out 
an existing member, and never add a new member to the box. 
Therefore, the contrast between creative and non-
creative specifications was central for Poincar{, and it 
is not a distinction merely between empirical and non-
empirical domains. Even within constructive (i.e., non-
Platonist) mathematics a distinction between creative 
and non-creative definitions can be sustained. Creative 
definitions are postulates which introduce a new domain: 
e.g., the use of the addition of the root of a natural 
number which has no rational square root (like 'f2, V) 
to generate the surd field: a+bU for a, b E (Q; and 
the addition of ~ to form the field of complex numbers: 
a+bi for a, b ~ ~. Non-creative definitions do not 
introduce or form a new object or domain, so that impred-
icativity can be tolerated, as in the following examples: 
the impredicative least upper bound theorem; and the 
impredioative specification of the neutral element of a 
group.56 
56 Heinzmann, (1985), pp.42-43. 
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The non-creative specifications will sustain impredic-
ativity without paradoxical consequences because the 
specification of an element e in terms of all the elements 
in a collection E (one of which is e) comes after the 
specification of E (which must be determinate). Thus, 
we would have independent access to all the members of E, 
including e, by virtue of the specification of E; so we 
may pick e out via reference to all the elements of E. 
It must here be noted that "independent access", for 
Poincar{, includes not only explicit, prior constructions, 
but domains which are given primitively, in apriori in-
tui tion as well - like N and ~. And it is in virtue of 
his theory of the synthetic apriori, i.e., arithmetic plus 
geometric intuition, that Poincar{ can accept the least 
upper bound theorem in the same way that he can accept a 
specification like fx: Neither presents 
any epistemological problems, because the totalities 
referred to - If-? and \N - "exist" (in intuition) before 
the impredicative specification. 
, , . 
Plus generalement, Sl nous envisageons un 
ensemble E de nombres reels positifs, par 
exem~le, on peut demontrer que cet ensemble 
posse de une limite inferieure e; cette 
limite inferieure est definie apr~s l'ensemble 
E; et il n'y a pas de petition de principe 
puisque e ne fait pas en general partie de E. 
Dans certains cas particuliers, il peut 
arriver que e fasse partie de E. Dans ces 
cas particuliers, il n'y a pas non plus de 
petition de principe puisque e ne fait pas 
partie de E.en vertu de sa definition,mais 
par sui te d I une demons t ra ti on pos;!. er i eure 
a la fois a-la definition de E et a celIe 
de e. 57 
57 Poincar{, (1909a), p.119. 
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Impredicative specifications are paradoxical when they 
refer to totalities which do not (yet) exist as closed, 
determinate sets. Thus the paradoxical cases arise as a 
result of a misplaced realism about the existence of such 
totalities, or about the objectivity of truth of any 
statements concerning all of the members of such a totality. 
For example, neither the totality of sets, nor the totality 
o f sub set s 0 f tN ( for a 11 the sub set s w 0 u 1 din c 1 u d e all 
the arbitrary infinite subsets), are intuitive mathematical 
objects for Poincar~. So any "semi-realism" (or realism) 
about these collections is illicit, and any impredicative 
specification which presupposes the determinacy of such a 
collection is unjustifiable. " This is Poincare's objection 
to the set-theorists: when the totality of real numbers 
is construed as a totality of arbitrary sets (of natural 
numbers, or arbitrary Dedekind cuts, for example) the im-
predicativity in the specification of the least upper bound 
is no longer acceptable. This is because in the absence 
of apriori geometric intuition, we no longer have a determin-
ate totality of real numbers which can be thought of as 
"closed", because every formal characterisation of the 
classical totality will require the acceptance of inelimin-
ably impredicative specifications. So to attempt to replace 
geometric intuition with a formal notion like least upper 
bound (which guarantees the nature of the classical 
continuum - i.e., that there are no gaps in principle) is 
illicit, for it is ,to remove the totality which forms the 
only foundation we can have for the impredicative specification 
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of least upper bound. 
Furthermore, PoincareS"s "solution" can be understood 
as global if one interprets the semantic paradoxes (as he 
see me d to, e. g., in his (19 09 b ) as in vol vi n 9 the (m is p 1 ace d ) 
assumption of a totality of semantic objects. For example, 
the Grelling paradox of heterologicality can be taken as 
a paradox in second order logic: 
(\}oI.) (Het (O{)H -O«o{»). 
An adjective, 0(, is heterological if and only if it does 
not apply to itself. For example, "big" is heterological 
because "big" is not a big word; but "small" is not hetero-
logical (it is autological) because "small" is a small word. 
The paradox arises under the Platonist assumption that it 
is a determinate matter in every possible case whether or 
not an adjective is heterological; that is, under the 
Platonist assumption of the existence of a determinate 
totality of adjectives in terms of which we can define 
"heterological" . But "heterological" is an adjective, so 
it must already be in the "container" of all adjectives 
so the paradox arises thus: 
Het (Het) H - Het (Het). 
And the impredicativity of the specification of "heterological" 
is ineliminable, for "heterological" can only be defined in 
terms of such a totality, it being a property of adjectives. 
Now, Poincar{ would object that the (second order) 
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assumption of a container of all adjectives is illicit. 
No such determinate collection exists. And since it is not 
a primitive object of apriori intuition, any specification 
which presupposes the determinacy of such a collection is 
not meaningful. 
Whereas we have a clear grasp of certain (infinite) 
totalities of finite numbers, as a consequence of our 
general intuitive grasp of "finite numbers", we have no 
intuitive grasp of the set-theoretic notion of arbitrary 
set or collection (nor of the semantic notion of, e~g., 
arbitrary adjective). The totality of all sets does not 
exist previously or primitively in intuition - nor can we 
construct it, or characterise it l'from below" via accept-
able (exhaustive) operations. Thus, from a neo-Kantian 
constructivist p~int of view, any specification, any bound 
variable in a defining condition, ¢, which ranges over 
sets, must range over totalities of sets which are previously 
defined in an explicit way. This makes available a general 
notion of the set, and so, an understanding of an arbitrary 
member, thus enabling the set to be an object of intuition. 
The set must be an object of intuition in order for state-
ments about the set to be verifiable, P · / as Olncare's theory 
of meaning requires. Poincar~'s constructivism, therefore, 
which he explicates in terms of a theory of verifiability 
in principle, automatically excludes the problematic im-
predicative characterisations: they are not meaningful. 
An object defined by a specification, ¢, cannot be in the 
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range of any quantifier of its defining condition, nor 
can it be a member of a totality which is in the range of 
a quantifier in p, unless it is a member of a totality to 
which we have independent and prior access - either relative 
to a prior postulate or theory, or when the totality is a 
primitive object of apriori intuition. The specification 
is simply not meaningful otherwise. For Poincar~, the 
nature of our minds, i.e., the synthetic apriori form of 
experience, determines "the true solution" of the paradoxes; 
for it determines what is to count as a meaningful mathemat-
ical specification. His theory of meaning is one arena in 
which he grounds the rejection of the unacceptable cases 
of impredicativity. Both his theory of meaning and his 
theory of impredicativity, however, are to be found in the 
conclusions of a very general constructivism, interpreted -
as it must be for Poincar~ - in the light of what is 
guaranteed by apriori intuition. 
ation of the central notion in 
I now turn to an examin-
POincart,s theory of meaning: 
the notion of verifiability in principle. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
VERIFIABILITY 
(1) Poincar~'s Criterion of Meaning 
(2) How Poincar~ Employs the Notion 
(3) A Precise Statement of the General Requirement of 
Verifiability in Principle 
(4) Three Aspects of "Verifiability" 
(5) Potential Infinity and the Domain Argument Blocked 
(6) Strict Finitism and the Objection to Poincart,s 
Theory of Verifiability 
(7) A Misguided Argument Against the Strict Finitist 
(8) Poincar/'s Defence of the Notion of Indefinite 
Iterability 
( 9 ) " Poincare's Theory of Verifiability, and a Middle 
Position Between Intuitionism and Platonism 
In Chapters 4 and 6 I showed how Poincare's predicativist 
account of mathematics was a consequence of his particular 
theory of meaning. The central component of his theory 
of meaning is the notion of verifiability in principle. 
This notion is, however, far from unproblematic; and we 
must now enquire as to whether it is coherent. If verifi-
ability in principle - also constructible in principle, 
provable in principle, decidable in principle - cannot 
be given a clear sense, then that which is the very corner-
stone of Poincart's philosophy of mathematics is possibly 
empty, and the whole edifice crumbles. Hence, we must 
argue that his verificationist theory of meaning, interpreted 
in the light of his background claims concerning the 
synthetic apriori, provides a workable account of the 
foundations of analysis. 
/ As discussed in Chapter 4, Poincare's notion of 
understanding - that we must understand in terms of 
"pictures" - is not verificationist in the classic logical 
positivist sense. Our concepts do not have to be reducible 
to ostensive definitions, or to terms which have only 
empirical content. Our concepts can also irreducibly refer 
to apriori, non-empirical "pictures": that which we can 
"represent to ourselves". This aspect of his theory of 
meaning is directly culled from Kant, and it informs, in 
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particular, the central component of veri fiabili ty in principle. I 
will now take it that the existence of such apriori 
"pictures" is accepted, so that we can proceed with the 
present aim: to investigate the notion of verifiability 
in principle (in the light of the theory of the synthetic 
apriori), as it functions in Poincar~'s theory of meaning. 
(1) / Poincare's Criterion of Meaning 
/ 
There are two distinct thoughts in Poincare's account 
of the meaningfulness of mathematical statements. These 
are related, but they need to be distinguished. First, 
claimants to mathematical truth must be in principle 
provable. If a statement is mathematically meaningful, 
there must be nothing which in principle bars the possib-
ility of proof. This is because Poincare rejects verification 
transcendent truth in mathematics. There is no coherent 
notion of mathematical truth which transcends all (however 
"informal") methods of proof. 
Second, mathematical statements must be "verifiable". 
By this Poincar~ means that a proposed theorem must have 
an instantiable content. There must either exist a 
procedure, or computation, which shows that at least one 
instance of a general claim is true (or which refutes it); 
or, we must have some conception of what would constitute 
either a verification of an instance of the claim, or a 
refutation of it. ' This second idea is the more philosoph-
ically important one, and will playa crucial role in 
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securing both Poincart's acceptance of potential infinities, 
and his attack on the existence of uncountable collections. 
Hence, the important notion in his theory of meaning is 
verifiability in principle. It is the claim of this 
chapter that such a conception can arise and withstand 
criticism only on the basis of the apriori forms of in-
tuition. It is to an examination of this criterion to 
which I now turn. 
(2) How Poincar{ Employs the Notion 
Poincar~ requires of mathematical statements that 
they be verifiable; otherwise, they are meaningless. 
When a theorem is brought to (my] attention 
without giving [me] a means of verifying it, 
[I) see in it only unintelligible verbiage. 1 
Every mathematical theorem must be capable 
of verification. When I state this theorem, 
I assert that all the verifications of it 
which I shall attempt will succeed; and 
even if one of these proofs requires efforts 
which exceed the capability of a man, I 
assert that, if many generations, one 
hundred if need be, deem it appropriate to 
undertake the verification, it will still succeed. 
The theorem has no other meaning and this 
is still true if we mention infinite numbers 
in its statement. 2 
The statement of a theorem just is the statement that 
1 
, 
Poincare, (1912a), p. bb. 
2 - / POlncare, (1909b), p. 62. 
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every instance is verifiably true. By verification of 
a theorem Poincar~ means a proof that the mathematical 
statement is true for at least one instance of the domain 
to which it refers. Lack of a general proof does not imply 
that a statement is meaningless; this would be far too 
strong. Rather, lack of a means of showing a statement 
is true or false for one instance, implies that it is 
meaningless. Fermat's last theorem is not yet proved, 
but it is unquestionably meaningful. And the reason this 
is so, is that we show by a finite decidable procedure 
an arithmetic computation - that an instance verifies the 
general statement. Though we have no formal proof that 
there are no n's greater than 2, such that 
xn + yn = zn, for x, y, z, n integers; 
we can show within Peano arithmetic that it is true for 
an instance. Thus, 
and this confirms or verifies the theorem, because it 
instantiates the general claim. For POincart, the fact 
that we can consider an instantiation of the general claim 
guarantees that the claim has determinate content. That 
is, the verifiability of a claim shows that it is in 
principle provable (or refutable in general)~ 
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(3) A Precise Statement of the General Requirement of 
Verifiability in Principle 
Let us attempt to generalise Poincar~'s notion of 
"verifiable" in a way which would apply to any sort of 
statement. We will contrast "verifiability in principle" 
with "verifiability in practice". 
(i) To say that a statement, S, is decidable or 
verifiable in practice is to say that we can actually 
position ourselves so as to be in a state of information 
which enables us to decide (or provide evidence for) the 
truth-value of S. 
(ii) To say that S is decidable or verifiable in 
principle is to say that it is not impossible to be in 
a state of information in which we can decide the truth 
value of S. That is, we can envision indefinite, but 
finite, extensions of our actual state of affairs or 
circumstances - such as time available, or powers of 
memory - such that if these were to obtain then we would 
be ~n a state of information which would enable us to 
decide upon the truth value of S. There must be nothing 
which in principle bars a decision; only our own actual 
limitations can be seen as preventing the decision. 
The reason verifiability and provability is so important 
I 
to Poincare is because there is no such thing as a math-
ematical fact which is completely independent of actual, 
or in principle, possible mathematical activity. Meaning 
must be linked with practice. So - contra classical 
173 
realism - statements, which are in principle beyond the 
verification capacities of ~ finite being, are meaningless 
because they are in principle undecidable. If a ~t8tement 
cannot be decided or modelled by a finite being no matter 
how much we extend his or her powers via finite additions, 
then it has no determinate content. 
In order to consider a mathematical claim to be mean-
ingful, we must be able to show, or we must be able to 
envision showing, that an instance of it is either true 
or false. But what is it "to be able to show", or "to 
be able to envision showing"? We must now enquire into 
the methods allowed for showing that an instance of a statement 
is true or false, for verifying it. In addition, we 
require an account of the constraints put on our powers 
of envisioning: we ~equire an account of the constraints 
on the in principle aspect of verifiability in principle. 
fA description of the acceptable procedures will clarify the 
content of the notion of verification, and of verifiable 
in principle. 
(4) Three Aspects of "Verifiability" 
What is verifiable in Poincar~'s sense is directly 
determined by three things: (i) the finitude of our 
human capacities; (ii) our apriori arithmetical intuition; 
and (iii) our apriori geometrical intuition. These corre-
spond to the ways in which we understand (mentioned above 
and discussed in Chapter 4): either in terms of a 
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reduction to concepts which we know by acquaintance 
(parallel to (i) - alone); or in terms of a reduction 
to concepts which are instantiated in apriori intuition 
((i) plus (ii) plus (iii). The methods allowed, then, 
for verifying an instance of a general mathematical claim, 
will be informed by the ways in which we can "picture", 
or understand. It is not only actual, finitely decidable 
operations which determine meaningful mathematical struc-
tures - which determine our pictures. Our apriori 
intuitions also provide apriori "pictures"; these extend-
ing what is mathematically acceptable, or verifiable, by 
supplementing the class of permissible operations. Our 
concepts can be instantiated via constructions, actually 
carrying out the operation, or via apriori intuition. 
Part of the class of what is mathematically meaningful 
for Poincar~ - that which is determined by (i) plus (ii) 
alone - corresponds to what is intuitionistically 
acceptable. Namely, those statements which are finitely 
refutable, or for which we have a constructively acceptable 
proof, are meaningful for both Poincar~ and the intuitionist. 
The intuitionist accepts the same domains as those which 
are sanctioned by Poincar~'s arithmetic intuition; for 
he accepts potentially infinite domains, or domains which 
are "constructibte" according to an effective rule. This 
is the special intuitionistic sense of "constructible". 
Although there may be no reason for stopping the iteration 
of a rule - so that we never actually complete the 
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construction - we can treat certain rules as defining 
determinate sets which are potentially infinite (certain 
potentially infinite sets are "constructible"), if the 
rules are sufficiently clear. The rules will, for the 
intuitionist, be sufficiently clear, if the outcome at 
every stage of construction of the set is determinate or 
effective, given the value of the prior stage. 3 The 
difference between Poincart and the intuitionist - at 
this point - is that POincart, and not the latter, roots 
our understanding of the indefinite iterability of a rule, 
and hence, the potentially infinite nature of certain sets, 
in our apriori arithmetic intuition (as was discussed in 
Chapter 2).4 
However, in addition to (i) and (ii) - in addition to 
constructive or intuitionistically acceptable proofs or 
, 
refutations - what is meaningful for Poincare is determined 
also by that which the intuitionist would reject: namely, 
non - con s t r u c t i v e pro c e d u res, pro vi d edt he pro per tie s 0 f the 
domains in question are guaranteed by (iii) apriorl 
3 See Heyting, (1971), pp.32-34 for the notion of an effective rule, 
and pp.13-15 concerning the infinity of the natural numbers. See 
also, Dummett, (1977), e.g., pp.55-65. 
4 POincart,s neo-Kantianism thus provides a foundation for explaining 
- as against the Wittgensteinian strict finitist - how it is we 
can have the certainty about a rule that at any stage we will be 
able to generate the next element, and that this is ~ determinate 
matter. See Wittgenstein, (1956); and see below, Sections 6-8, 
for more detailed discussion on this matter. 
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(geometric) intuition. This is precisely where POincarean 
mathematics differs in content from intuitionistic math-
ematics; and why, for example, Poincar8"s continuum has 
such a different character from the intuitionistic one. 
It is because not only our constructive procedures - sanc-
tioned, for Poincar~, by arithmetic intuition - but also 
our apriori geometric intuition will determine which 
domains will be mathematically acceptable, or which domains 
will be in principle verifiable or "picturable". And the 
methods which are acceptable for verifying statements will 
depend upon whether the domain concerned is purportedly 
arithmetical, or whether it exists only in virtue of our 
geometric intuition. Now Poi n car { i ShOT CI.. rev i s ion i st. 
With regard to effective domains - those which are gener-
ated by an effective rule - the intuitionist can agree 
with POincar8'. However, their theories diverge in that 
" Poincare accepts the applicability of classical logic to 
domains which are not generated by an effective rule, 
i.e., to the mathematical continuum, since our knowledge 
of this domain is generated by apriori geometric intuition; 
whereas in the absence of the theory of the synthetic 
apriori, the intuitionist cannot - according to his own 
principles - stretch his account of bona fide mathematical 
domains past the denumerable. This is why Poincar~'s 
theory of the continuum is not intuitionistic. 
(5) Potential Infinity and the Domain Argument Blocked 
Poincar€'s theory of the continuum is not, however, 
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classical either, as was shown in Chapter 5. A statement 
about an arbitrary real number, or an arbitrary point on 
the continuum, has content; but its content is not to be 
explained by reference to the classical, set-theoretic 
characterisation of the set of all possible subsets of 
the natural numbers (each subset corresponding to a unique 
real number). Arbitrary infinite collections are not 
meaningful domains, so POincar§'s theory of meaning directly 
prohibits the set-theoretic characterisation of the real 
line. Thus, statements about the continuum, about continu-
ous variation, are not grounded in the existence of some 
actual infinity - as Cantor argued - but in virtue of 
geometric intuition. This is the foundation of Poincar6's 
rejection of Cantor's domain argument. He (Poincar6) 
asserts that 
Every mathematical theorem must be capable of 
verification .... and this is still true if 
we mention infinite numbers in its statement. 
But since the verifications can apply only to 
finite numbers, it follows that every theorem 
concerning infinite numbers or particularly 
what are called infinite sets, or transfinite 
cardinals, or transfinite ordinals, etc., etc., 
can only be a concise manner of stating pro-
positions about finite numbers. If it is 
otherwise, this theorem will not be verifiable, 
and if it is not verifiable, it will be meaning-
less. 
And it follows that there could not be any 
evident axiom concerning infinite numbers; 
every property of infinite numbers is nothing 
more than a translation of a property of finite 
numbers. It is the latter which could be evident, 
while it would be necessary to prove the first 
by comparing it with the latter and by showing 
that the translation is exact. 5 
5 Poincare, (1909b), pp.62-63. 
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The point being made by Poincart is thus that since we 
are finite, every verification must either be composed of 
a finite number of discrete steps, or it must be grounded 
in apriori intuition (either arithmetic or geometric). Not 
even one instance of a theorem can refer ineliminably to 
an actually infinite set or to an infinite number, for +hO~\--. OlAr 
theorems cannot fail to refer, the only objects to which 
they can refer are finite. 
Thus, for example, any theorem concerning all real numbers, 
or even all natural numbers, refers to an infinite domain, 
as in the commutativity of addition: 
However~ the infinity exists in the number of possible in-
stantiations of the theorem, and not in the objects referred 
to in a single instantiation. Every instance of this 
theorem refers only to finite numbers; ana so every instance 
is verifiable (in principle) via a finite deterministic 
computation. Whereas, the contrast with, e.g., the classical 
theorem in its full generality - that for any set x, P(x) ii 
2x _ is that there are instances of this theorem which refer 
ineliminably to infinite numbers; e. g • , as in "P(N) = 2(N. 
These instances are not even in principle verifiable, for 
we have no apriori intuitions concerning the unlimited 
universe of infinite numbers which is sanctioned by classical 
set theory. For Poincar6, we only have intuitions about 
the finite numbers, as provided apriori in arithmetic and 
geometric intuition. 
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So for Poincare, our understanding of "limit" was 
confused and unclear until the notions of "variable" and 
"going to infinity" were translated into explications in 
which there was no irreducible reference to infinity or to 
infinite procedures. 
I shall cite the following theorems as 
examples: the set of prime numbers is 
without bound; the series £l/nL is con-
vergent, etc. Each one of these can be 
translated into equalities or inequalities 
in which only finite numbers are involved. 
These theorems partake of infinity not 
because one of the possible [verifications] 
itself partakes of infinity but because the 
p 0 s sib 1 e Lv e r i f i Cel t ion s Jar e i n fin i t e i n 
number. 6 
Weierstrass formulated "limit of a sequence, [o..n"\ = y 
as n tends to infinity", as: 
lim 
n-4 CC 
In English: no matter how small f is, you can always 
get closer to y by taking n large enough. Statements 
about limits are meaningful insofar as "tending to infinity" 
can be "translated" into a precise statement which refers 
only to finite numbers. That is, their meaningfulness 
depends upon the precise formulation not requiring the 
existence of actual infinities. So POincart,s theory is 
7 in direct opposition to Cantor's famous domain argument. 
6 Poincar~, (1912a), p .66. (I substitute "verification" for "proof" 
as it occurs in the 1963 edition; for given the context, "proof" is 
a misleading translation. ) 
7 See Hallett, (1984), pp.1-32. 
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Here we see the clash of the two giants in a dispute 
which is, at base, realism versus anti-realism. Cantor is 
unashamedly realist in his conception of "free mathematics", 
where coherence and the Divine intellect are the only con-
straints - this leading to the view that there is an actual 
infinity which corresponds to every potential infinity.8 
And Poincar§ is fervently anti-realist in his view that 
mathematics is not free; the existence of a mathematical 
object depends on its being conceived by a finite mind; and 
thus there are no actual infinities. 
And why do the pragmatists refuse to permit 
objects which could not be defined in a finite 
number of words? It is because they believe 
that an object exists only when it is conceived 
by the mind and that an object could not be 
conceived by the mind independently of a being 
capable of thinking. There is indeed idealism 
in that. And since a rational subject is a 
man, or something which resembles a man, and 
consequently is a finite being, infinity can 
have no other meaning than the possibility of 
creating as many finite objects as we wish. 9 
Such a dispute, however, can be decided only -if at all -
in the context of a detailed investigation into more general 
foundational issues in the philosophy of language and in 
epistemology.lO Poincar~ recognises the depth of the issue, 
8 Hallett, (1984), pp.14-25. 
9 Poincare', (1912a), p. 72. 
10 Such as are founded, for example, in Dummett's arguments concerning 
the acquisition and manifestation of our concepts in general (See 
Dummett, (19731), and crystallised by Wright in, e.g., his (1986), 
especially section II, pp.18-32) 
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and in a very poignant passage opines that such a recon-
ciliation is unlikely: 
At all times there have been opposite 
tendencies in philosophy and it does not 
seem that these tendencies are on the verge 
of being reconciled. • .. There is therefore 
no hope of seeing harmony established between 
the pragmatists and the Cantorians. Men do 
not agree because they do not speak the same 
language, and there are languages which cannot 
be learned. 11 
(6) Strict Finitism and the Objection to Poincart's 
Theory of Verifiability 
/ Poincare's theory of meaning, especially as it is 
wielded in arguments against Platonism, expresses the view 
that the conferral of truth or falsity, i.e., the meaning 
of a statement, must be fundamentally related to the way 
in which we investigate whether or not it is true. This 
is why when there is in principle ~ way to determine 
whether a statement is true or false (and when there is 
no apriori intuition corresponding to the domain in question), 
it has no meaning. Thus, the argument against Platonism 
is that it accepts the existence of domains which are 
meaningless, domains which ( for P 0 iq car e) can not, be 
ineliminably involved in meaningful statements. Th us, 
there is a gap between the meaning or content of a Platon-
istically acceptable mathematical statement and our 
11 P · ,-. Olncare, (1912a), p.74. 
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mathematical practice. 
Poincar~, however, accepts the existence of potentially 
infinite collections, and indeed, the set of all real 
numbers. Are these really meaningful domains? Are the 
meanings of statements about the domains accessible to us 
in the appropriate way: by reference to our capacities 
for verification? The strict finitist employs POincart,s 
argument against the Platonist (in the theory of meaning) 
to argue against Poincar~'s own theory. Just as actual 
infinity transcends all our powers of construction and 
verifiability, so does potential infinity, for we can never 
verify a statement about all of (even) a potentially in-
finite collection. The concepts of both actual and 
potential infinity are illicit, for acceptance of even 
potential infinities severs the purported link between 
practice (i.e., verification) and meaning. 12 
Now, we cannot expect Poincar~ to refute the sophisti-
cated strict finitist, for he was not acquainted with any 
such arguments. Moreover, the latter's position is 
probably irrefutable, because insular. However, on the 
basis of Poincar~'s ~ principles, strict finitism is 
12 See, for example, Wittgenstein's remarks (1956), and Wright's 
systematic treatment of these in his (1980); in addition, see 
the more localised (to mathematiCS) strict finitist arguments in 
Wright, (1982). 
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simply dismissable, for it is unfaithful to intuitions 
we, as a matter of fact, have. 
A man, however talkative he may be, will 
never in his lifetime utter more than a 
billion words. Consequently, shall we ex-
clude from science the objects whose 
definition contains one billion and one 
words? ... 
However talkative a man may be, mankind will 
be still more talkative and, since we do not 
know how long mankind will last, we cannot 
limit beforehand the field of its investigations. 
We merely know that this field will always 
remain limited; and even though we might be 
able to determine the date of its disappearance, 
there are other celestial bodies which could 
take up the work left unfinished on Earth. 
The pragmatists, moreover, would have no 
qualms in imagining a mankind much more 
talkative than ours, but still retaining 
something human; they refuse to argue on 
the hypothesis of some infinitely talkative 
divinity... 13 
Potential infinity is meaningful according to Poincar~'s 
notion of verifiability, because of the coherence of the 
idea of indefinite but finite extensions, to our speed 
of thought or speech, to the existence of mankind. The 
understanding of indefinite extendability, then, is what 
defines the distinction between finite sets and potential 
infinity, as well as the distinction between potential and 
actual infinity. For it is through the understanding of 
this heuristic that we qua finite beings can "construct" 
potential infinities. The understanding of indefinite 
13 P · / olncare, (1912a), pp.66-67. 
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iterability extends and informs Poincar~'s criterion 
of verifiability in principle, which, in the end, is 
grounded in the epistemological theory of the synthetic 
apriori. 
(7) A Misguided Argument ~gainst the Strict Finitist 
One might attempt to argue that the theory of the 
synthetic apriori is not necessary to establish a stable 
position in opposition to both the strict finitist and 
the Platonist by citing the deep distinction between rule-
governed and non-rule-governed infinities. 
/ For Poincare, there are two types of construction (which 
correspond to the two parts of a definition, discussed above 
(p.92 passim)): (i) the creative construction, where we define 
a new object or domain, and (ii) the generative construction, 
where we generate elements via ~ given rule which defines 
the relation between the elements of a domain, e.g., "+1".' There 
is a deep difference between these two types of definition. 
Each creative definition requires a new act of intuition; 
hence, there are only ever a finite number of these possible, 
and no more than a potential infinity of these is coherent. 
This is because each must be fully defined in a finite 
number of words. One cannot define a sequence of creative 
I . 
constructions, the successor n ln terms of the prior con-
struct n, for such 'a definition is not creative in the 
sense intended. Fo~ this reason, there is here no sense 
of the potentially infinite, for the infinity in potential 
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infinity lies in its characterisability by a rule. 
When we are constructing elements according to an 
accepted generating rule or recursive procedure, each 
element does not require a separate act of intuition. 
Because the defining condition allows one element to be 
defined in terms of another, each element is related to 
all the others. Thus we can have a general intuitive idea 
of the domain as a whole - via our intuitive understanding 
of an arbitrary element of the domain. In this way we 
can "see at a glance" the whole of the structure of a 
potentially infinite set. And thus, we can treat certain 
potentially infinite sets, where an understanding of this 
sort is possible - i.e., where we can satisfy an inductive 
axiom - as unified wholes. 
This argument falters, however; for the existence of 
the distinction described above, between types of con-
struction, does not establish the well-foundedness of 
the classical concept of indefinite iterability. For 
the strict finitist may allow that the distinction be-
tween creative and generative constructions is clear. 
It is just that he simultaneously denies that the distinc-
tion defines two different types of objects. These two 
different ways of defining do not lead to two essentially 
different classes of entities. His point is that we are 
actually limited even in generating elements according 
t 0 a sin 9 1 e a c c e p t.e d pro c e d u r e, 1 ike " + 1 " . Hence our 
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concept of the set produced in this procedure is not a 
concept of a potentially infinite set. We are mistaken 
if we think it is so, for the very same reasons as were 
used in arguing against the Platonist: the meaning of our 
mathematical notions cannot coherently extend beyond math-
ematical practice. The meaning of our mathematical concepts 
is provided by actual mathematical activity; hence, any 
meaning or content which in principle outruns mathematical 
act i vi t Y is inc 0 her e nt, an d th e de t e r min a c yin con ten tis 
merely an illusion. 
(8) Poincar" s Defence of the Notion of Indefinite 
Iterability 
For Poincar~, we can see in certain generating rules 
that they determine a potentially infinite collection; and 
this is no illusion only because of the existence of apriori 
intuition. This is the whole point of his argument against 
logicism: that the "and so on", as in "l, 3, 5, 7, and so 
on", or the dots, as in t 1, 3, 5, 7, ... 1, can indicate 
a potential infinity is a fact about the nature of our 
minds. The infinity is not an illusion because it is uni-
versally imposed by the synthetic apriori forms of perception 
and understanding. 
It may at first have seemed paradoxical that Poincar{ 
agrees with the strict finitist that we cannot arrive at 
the concepts of indefinite iterability or continuity via 
187 
experience alone; for the procedures we employ to explain 
or to characterise these concepts are themselves instances 
of these concepts. That is, the only way to represent 
these concepts is to provide an interpretation which makes 
them true. For example, 
The idea of infinite divisibility or denseness 
is not capturable by a formula or sentence, 
but only by an intuitive procedure that is it-
self dense in the appropriate respect One 
simply cannot separate ):;,e idea or represent-
ation of infinite divisibility from what we 
would now call a model or realisation of that 
idea •.. 14 
However, whereas the strict finitist might for this reason 
deny that these concepts (or for example, that of the 
actually infinite) can have the content normally ascribed 
to them, Poincar§ never doubts that the content of these 
concepts is determinate and standard. He never doubts that 
we possess certain concepts, their existence to be ex-
plained, if at all, via the theory of the synthetic apriori. 
Therefore, there is a profound difference between the 
foundations of the two theories. The difference is mani-
fested in what counts as verifiable, or possible. For 
Poincar~, apriori intuitions exist; hence they supplement 
the methods and operations used to delimit the class of 
acceptable mathematical objects or what is verifiable, by 
14 Friedman, (1985), P .469. QMy emphasis.) This conception was 
discussed at length in Chapter 2. 
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imposing a certain interpretation on our understanding of 
our concepts and rules. 
Since the strict finitist does not accept the theory of 
the synthetic apriori, his interpretation of certain con-
cepts will be different. Poincar~'s view of what we are 
able to understand by our concepts is enriched by his 
theory of the synthetic apriori. Hence his account of 
legitimate mathematical domains is richer. For Poincare', 
then, the strict finitist shuns our true intuitions, and 
takes the metaphor of "construction" far too literally. 
(9) POincar6,s Theory of Verifiabilit» and a Middle 
Position Between Intuitionism and Platonism 
The usual Platonist argument against the intuitionistic 
and for the classical iterative conception of the set-
theoretic universe,lS is that just as with potential infinity, 
which the intuitionist accepts, we can stretch our concept 
of possibility so that the power set operation - the "con-
struction" of all the subsets of a set - is well-founded 
at any stage in the hierarchy. That is, our concept of 
construction can be extended, so that we can understand; 
say, applying the power set axiom to an infinite set, by 
analogy with the same axiom applied to finite sets. Our 
15 See Hallett, (1984),. pp.214-223. 
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understanding of the actual, or of the uncountably, 
infinite, or of arbitrary infinite sets is via' analogy 
with the finite. 
. /' However, for POlncare, no amount of stretching of our 
concepts, by analogy or otherwise, can succeed. Such 
"analogies" are lost on finite beings, for the analogy 
can only be perceived as such, or "grasped", provided we 
already have a concept of "arbitrary infinite". But this 
is what the analogy was designed to explain. On the other 
hand, Poincar~ was not an intuitionist, nor even a "pre-
i n t u i t ion i s t ", ash e iss 0 met i me s call e d (e. g., b Y B l' 0 uw e l' ) • 
For he regarded the classical continuum of real numbers 
as a bona fide mathematical object: it is an object of 
immediate awareness, a primitive domain given in apriori 
(geometric) intuition. The distinctive character of the 
two sorts of apriori intuition (arithmetic and geometric), 
which supplement Poincar~'s criterion of verifiability in 
principle, necessitates an intermediate position between 
the intuitionist and the Platonist, i.e., a neo-Kantian 
position. 
The continuum, though it exists, is not an object as 
the Platonist conceives it. It is an intuitive form or 
primitive structure, and not a set. The fundamental 
intuition of continuity will simply not bear further 
epistemological analysis (at least along logicist or con-
struc ti vist 1 ines )'. It thus cannot be treated as a 
completed collection, or as an object, upon which further 
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operations can be performed. So, for example, on th is 
(Kantian) account, there is simply ~ sense in the notion 
of the collection of all subsets of \R" or the set of 
all functions from 1R into R . If the essence of the 
mathematical significance of the notion of set is the 
idea that, in general, the operation of forming a IIset 
of ... 11 then creates a new object which can automatically 
be added to the domain of application of permissible 
operations (e.g., which is capable of being the argument 
of a function); then Poincar~ is claiming that this con-
ception of set is illusory. For it cannot in general apply 
to infinite sets. Geometric intuition guarantees the 
existence of the continuum, but it does not guarantee it 
as a completed determinate domain, as falling under the 
above description of set. 
/ To sum up Poincare's position: though he emphasises 
the criterion of verifiability of mathematical statements, 
what is verifiable for him must be informed by his 
epistemological theory of the synthetic apriori. He is 
no strict finitist, for what is verifiable is not limited 
to our finite abilities to perform operations. It also 
depends upon what we can verify apriori, in arithmetic 
and geometric intuition. In this way, he is also not an 
intuitionist, for his notion of in principle verifiable 
includes non-constructive operations on domains where the 
operations are guaranteed by apriori intuition. 16 And 
16 To take a very simple example, there are domains where Poincar{ 
would accept the assertion of flp V - plI where an intuitionist 
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thus, the nature of his continuum, since it is guaranteed 
by geometric intuition, is more "classical" than "in-
tuitionistic". Yet he is not Platonist - even though he 
employs classical logic in all acceptable domains - for 
his view of what is acceptable is more limited than that 
of the Platonist. The constraints provided by the theory 
of the synthetic apriori disallow, for example, impredicat-
ive specifications. Hence, although with the Platonist he 
accepts the existence of the classical continuum - the 
determinate domain of all real numbers - in opposition to 
the Platonist, the continuum cannot be "arithmetised", i.e., 
it cannot be treated as a collection of set-theoretic 
entities (infinite sets of natural numbers); so it is not 
a set. And thus, of particular importance, the continuum 
is not a set-theoretic object upon which further operations 
can automatically be performed. The existence of the 
synthetic apriori, and the sharp distinction between 
arithmetic and geometric intuition, allows the enrichment 
of the notion of in principle verifiability to stop at 
just this point: to determine a position in between the 
Platonist and the intuitionst. 
would demur. Thus in the decimal expansion of 11 either a sequence 
of seven sevens occurs or it does not; this.follows from the 
determinacy of the numberlT which is a consequence of geometric 
intuition. More significantly, Poincartwould accept in general, 
the theorem of the linear order of the reals; for again, on the 
basis of geometric intuition, it would be assertable - contra-
Bro\.Awer - that Vd~r (J ~ r V ~= r V d) r), for arbitrary 
"points", ~ and r. 
APPENDIX 
MATHEMATICS AND THE APRIORI 
(1) The Basic Structure of Kitcher's Argument: A Tenuous 
Relation Between Certainty and the Apriori 
(2) Kitcber's Definition of "Apriori Warrant", and Some 
Counterexamples 
(3) The Problem with Kitcher's Definition 
(4) Revising Kitcher's Definition: Two Types of Uncertainty 
(5) Further Explication of the Distinction 
(6) In Defence of Our New Explication 
The claim that mathematics is synthetic apriori is 
most commonly and most famously attacked by focusing on 
the synthetic aspect; i.e., by arguing against Kant's thesis 
that mathematics has a subject matter. For example, the 
logicists (Frege, Russell, etc.) endeavoured to show that 
Kant was wrong about the content of mathematics by showing 
that mathematical truths are really analytic truths. Their 
object was thus to show how any true mathematical statement 
could be proved using logic plus Kant's containment 
relation among concepts alone. They would then have 
succeeded in showing mathematics to be as sceptic-proof as 
logic, because its foundation would be essentially that of 
logic. P · " olncare's arguments against the coherence and 
success of both logicism and set theory are discussed 
throughout this work. l 
However, of equal importance to the synthetic apriori 
is a defence of the epistemological claim that mathematical 
knowledge is knowledge apriori. Modern "empiricists" 
sometimes extend their empiricism to mathematics by arguing 
that even our mathematical knowledge is not apriori because 
I See Chapters 3 and 4 for arguments against logicism; see 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 for arguments against set theory. 
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it is not truly independent of experience. On the contrary, 
coming to know a mathematical statement depends in an 
important and essential way on the presence of certain ex-
periential factors, such that if they (aposteriori facts) 
are not present, mathematical knowledge could not be obtained. 
One such argument, expressed in a sophisticated manner, is 
found in Philip Kitcher's recent work, The Nature of Mathemat-
ical Knowledge. 2 In this chapter I will concentrate on 
defending mathematical apriorism, . P' /, l.e., Olncare s thesis, 
from Kitcher's very general empiricist attack. 
(1) The Basic Structure of Kitcher's Argument: A Tenuous 
Relation Between Certainty and the Apriori 
Kitcher argues against mathematical apriorism by pointing 
out the existence of empirical or experiential factors in 
mathematical knowledge. Whether or not mathematics seems 
apriori, underneath it all it is really aposteriori. The 
structure of mathematical progress and revolutions mirrors 
that of the physical sciences. 3 And since the nature of 
knowledge in the physical sciences is the paradigm of 
aposteriori knowledge, the existence of this parallel is 
evidence that the two areas of discourse do not involve two 
essentially different types of knowledge. This claim, though 
very plausibly argued, does not seem to me correct. 
2 Kitcher, (1983). 
3 For a precise development of this view, see Michael Hallett, "Towards 
a Theory of Mathematical Research Programmes" (I) and (II), British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, (1979). 
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The reason mathematical knowledge is, for Kitcher, more 
like scientific knowledge than like some other kind of 
knowledge, is due to the ever-present possibility in both 
domains that we might be mistaken. No matter how certain 
we are about a belief at one time, t, it is always imaginable 
that we find out at a later time, t + k, that we were wrong 
at t. Even for the simplest of proofs, or for the solutions 
of the simplest 801ynomial ~quations, it is always 
possible for the reasoning in the proof or the computation 
to be wrong. This argument cannot simply be dismissed as 
a globalised version of Cartesian scepticism and nothing 
more. The argument is that just like in everyday assertions 
about the world, the possibility that something might 
happen to alter our belief about the status of our state 
of information at time t, is always a coherent possibility. 
I can always imagine learning something new about the 
situation at time t - e.g., that I was actually drunk or 
drugged at the time of computation - so that I come to 
doubt whether or not any bona fide knowledge was acquired. 
Both science and mathematics are uncertain disciplines, 
for what seems to be a similar sort of reason: that we 
can learn something new or more about the state of affairs 
at time t which induces doubt about the conclusion then 
obtained. To summarise, then, Kitcher imagines that 
mathematical uncertainty arises in exactly the same way 
as scientific uncertainty: by learning something new 
about our backgrou,nd experience. Hence, his conclusion 
is that mathematics could not be apriori. 
However, the uncertainty of mathematics indicates to 
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Kitcher that it is aposteriori, only because he fails to 
properly distinguish between types of uncertainty. This 
failing, as we shall see, is rooted in the particular way 
in which he defines apriori knowledge. Why should certainty 
be linked in the first place with the apriori? Kitcher, 
here, plays on the vagueness of our intuitions concerning 
certainty. He raises the important question: if some-
thing is really known apriori how can it not be true? How 
can we come to doubt whether or not a belief is really 
knowledge Cis really true), if the belief was acquired 
via apriori means? How can we not be certain about the 
apriori? The question must be answered by the mathematical 
apriorist, for Kitcher's point about the lingering coherency 
of the possibility of doubt is unassailable. And it is 
not immediately clear what the relation between certainty 
and the apriori is. What is clear, however, is that it 
is unreasonable to demand that in order for an item of 
knowledge to be a candidate for the apriori, it must not 
be doubtable in any way. For this would be to demand 
Cartesian certainty of the apriori; i.e., a refutation 
of Cartesian scepticism would be a prerequisite to mathemat-
ical apriorism. And this, it seems, is impossible. 
In essence, Kitcher demands too much of mathematical 
knowledge. His conditions, which an item of knowledge 
must meet in order to be considered apriori, are much too 
strong. His arguments against the apriority of mathematical 
knowledge rely upon his drawing a distinction in a 
particular way. And the way in which he draws it effect-
ively defines apriori knowledge out of existence. 
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Mathematical knowledge is thus not apriori because no 
knowledge is. This is because Kitcher does not take into 
account the different ways in which uncertainty can be 
raised. He concedes that some form of experience may be 
necessary for ~ sort of knowledge - so that the apriorist 
is not committed to the thesis that we have innate knowledge. 
Hence, he intends not to stack the deck against the 
apriorist, but to allow the minimal experience which may be 
nec.essary in order to acquire any concept. So that, though it 
is usually via experience that we acquire our concepts, 
our reasoning via these concepts may still be apriori. For 
instance, though we may come to know what "triangle" 
means by os tension - by being presented with certain 
pictures of figures with slightly different shapes and 
varying in size, but yet with something in common - we 
can still reason in an apriori way with the concept of 
"triangle". So that, "The triangle has three sides", 
may be regarded as apriori. This is an instance of an 
analytic apriori truth: it is necessarily true given the 
meanings of the terms. In addition, even if a statement 
represents a contingent fact about the world, Kitcher 
wishes not to automatically exclude this class from 
candidacy for apriori knowledge. 
Our goal is to construe apriori knowledge 
as knowledge which is independent of 
experience, and this can be achieved without 
closing the case against the contingent 
apriori. 4 
4 Kitcher, (1983), p.24. 
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Thus, for example, one might consider the statement, 
"There is something that is conscious" to be an instance 
of a contingent truth - for it could have been the case 
that no conscious beings existed - which is knowable 
apriori - for in merely considering it, one realises it is 
true; and hence, we do not need to investigate the world 
to see if it is true. Therefore, on the face of it, 
Kitcher intends to be very generous and broad-minded in his 
view of what mayor may not count as apriori knowledge. 
(2) Kitcher's Definition of "Apriori Warrant", and Some 
Counterexamples 
However, once he starts to pin down his idea of what 
constitutes the apriori we see that his views are anything 
but generous to the apriorist. It turns out that, for 
Kitcher, in order for an item of knowledge to count as 
apriori it must be indefeasibly certain. 
To generate knowledge independently of 
experience, apriori warrants must produce 
warranted true belief in counter factual 
situations where experiences are different 
... On this account apriori warrants are 
ultra-reliable; they never lead us astray. 5 
"In counter factual situations, where experiences are 
different ..• " we must still hold the same (true) belief 
in order for it to have been produced by an apriori warrant. 
"Apriori" and "certainty" - absolute certainty - are 
5 Kitcher, (1983), p.24. 
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necessarily linked, according to Kitcher; where, for him, 
the possibility of uncertainty implies that the belief 
could not have been acquired by bona fide apriori means. 
Rather than generous, this is very strong indeed. 
Let us examine his explicit set of conditions. 
(2) X knows apriori that £ if and only if 
X knows that £ and XIS belief that £ 
was produced by a process which is an 
apriori warrant for it. 
(3) ~ is an apriori warrant for XIS belief 
that £ if ~ is a process such that, 
given any life £, sufficient for X for 
£, 
a) some process of the same type could 
produce in X a belief that £, 
b) if a process of the same type were 
to produce in X a belief that £, then 
it would warrant X in believing that 
£, 
c) if a process of the same type were to 
produce in X a belief that £, then £. 6 
These are not only strong. As it turns out, these conditions 
actually beg the case against the possibility of any non-
trivial apriori knowledge. 
Why should uncertainty be incompatible with apriority? 
For Kitcher it is due to condition (3) b), above. 
If a process of the same type were to pro-
duce in X a belief that £, then it would 
warrant X in believing that £; 
and it would do this whatever the background experience. So, 
for instance, in the case of long formal proofs which replace 
6 Kitcher, (1983), p.24. 
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complex informal proofs, it is reasonable to be uncertain 
about whether or not there is a mistake in the long formal 
proof. Indeed, the person who dismisses the possibility 
of a mistake is unreasonable. 7 If uncertainty is reasonable, 
then this process - of the same ~ as the informal proof, 
but longer and with no steps glossed over - does not 
warrant belief that £ (that the theorem is proved, or true). 
Hence, the original warrant - the informal proof - is not 
apriori. This is because (3) b) has been violated: since 
a process of the same type (i.e., proof) leads to an un-
certainty in its warrant for £, due to the background 
condition of it being longer, the apriority of the original 
warrant is impugned. 
That is damaging enough, but Kitchel' does not contest 
only the apriority of long, complex reasoning as Descartes 
did. For mathematical proof to count as bestowing apriori 
knowledge, not only must it be certain, but so must the 
principles and axioms from which it stems. That is, they 
must be apriori. And the rules of inference must preserve 
this status. So, according to him, a mathematical apriorist 
is committed to something like the following: 
(4) There is a class of statements A and 
a class of rules of inference R such 
that 
a) each member of A is a basic apriori 
b) 
statement, 
R is apriority-each member of an 
preserving rule, 
7 Kitchel', (1983), p.42. 
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c) each statement of standard math-
ematics occurs as the last member 
of a sequence, all of whose members 
either belong to A or come from 
previous members in accordance with 
some rule in R. 8 
However, more "counterexamples": 
communitY",9 then, 
since "knowers form a 
at best correct or reasonable social 
practice can determine which sequences 
are proofs. Yet now we must ask what 
makes the adoption of a theory or system 
correct or reasonable. 10 
Hence, his "social challenge" in a simpli fied form: if 
everyone doubts my proof, I will too. Again condition (3) b) 
is violated. I can envision background circumstances which 
would cause me to doubt a warrant which is of the same 
type as the present one; hence the present warrant is not 
apriori. In addition, 
it is conceivable that we could become 
reasonably convinced by our own experience 
that the ingestion of certain substances 
had enabled us to solve baffling theoretical 
puzzles and that, during one of these episodes, 
we had discovered a counterexample to a math-
ematical axiom... 11 
Even our axioms or principles are in danger of being doubt-
able, and thus, they are not apriori. 
8 Kitcher, (1983), p.39. 
9 Kitcher, (1983), p.14. 
10 Kitcher, (1983), p.39. 
11 Kitcher, (1983), p.90. 
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(3) The Problem with Kitcher's Definition 
The problem with Kitcher's account of apriori knowledge 
is that he thinks there is an if-then relation between 
apriority and certainty. That is, any belief which is 
produced by an apriori warrant must be certain. I f a 
warrant is apriori, it must be "able to discharge its 
warranting function, no matter what background of disruptive 
experience we may have" 12 Kitcher captures this idea 
primarily with (3) b). It is my opinion that there is a 
problem with Kitcher's definition and that is, primarily, 
t hat his con d i t ion (3) b) is too s t ron g . 
If the possibility of any mistake must be disallowed 
in order for knowledge to be apriori, then how can such 
an item be knowledge at all? If there is no possibility 
of any sort of mistake whatever, then it seems what is in 
question is not objective knowledge, but mere subjective 
awareness. Certain statements, like "I am in pain", "I 
see red", may come out apriori on Kitcher's account; and 
these are the avowals: if true, incorrigibly so. More-
over, nothing other than incorrigible truths will be allowed 
if (3) b) obtains. Yet, according to most apriorists, these 
will not count as apriori knowledge, because avowals are 
not items of knowledge which are accessible to everyone, 
but only to the experiencing subject. Clearly, where and 
how Kitcher draws the distinction between apriori and 
12 Kitcher, (1983), p.35. 
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aposteriori knowledge is contentious. And since his 
arguments against the apriority of mathematical knowledge 
depend on his particular characterisation of apriori 
warrant, his argument is invalid. Since the way he makes 
out the apriori/aposteriori distinction debars ~ (signific-
ant - i.e., not incorrigible) knowledge from being apriori, 
he begs the question against mathematical knowledge being 
apriori. 
(4) Revising Kitcher's Definition: Two Types of Uncertainty 
Kitcher is not entirely wrong in his intuition that 
there is a relation between apriori knowledge and certainty. 
Knowledge produced by an apriori warrant is indefeasible, 
providing the warrant is successful - providing we carry out 
the operations correctly. In this way, the counterfactual 
experiences employed, in making out the distinction between 
apriori and aposteriori warrants, cannot be ones in which 
we come to doubt whether or not we have proceeded correctly. 
How accurately we in fact follow a rule should have no 
bearing on what kind of rule it is. This is essentially 
where Kitcher's mistake lies: his explication of what 
kind of procedure an apriori warrant is, implicitly dis-
allows the undeniable fact that we can always misperform 
an operation. Hence, nothing turns out to be apriori for 
Kitcher, because he conflates what kind of procedure 
something is with the question of the correctness of our 
particular use of a procedure. This is because in the 
class of possible counter factual experiences, which must 
be looked at in order to determine whether or not a 
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particular experience is necessary in producing a 
belief - and hence, in determining whether or not a 
belief is produced via an apriori warrant - he allows into 
this class counterfactual experiences in which we have 
applied a rule incorre~. Cleariy the apriority of a 
warrant cannot be decided by holding it accountable for 
our possible misapplication of such a warrant. 
The nature of the set of counterfactual, doubt-inducing 
experiences, which can count against the possibility of 
apriori knowledge, should be examined more closely. 
Kitcher clearly allows anything into this set. Any sort 
of experience we can imagine which would, if true, cause 
uncertainty, counts against the apriority of a warrant, 
according to (3) b). But we will be more discriminating. 
We will distinguish between two sorts of uncertainty, or 
two sorts of potential error. (1) The first sort indicates 
that the warrant for the belief under scrutiny did not 
fix or force the conclusion: though the evidence-statements 
which constitute the warrant may still hold, further 
evidence may lead us to abandon the claim, while simultane-
ously granting that the warrant we did have for the claim 
was a good one, indeed the best there could be. If this 
sort of uncertainty is possible, then the belief is 
aposteriori. (2) The other type of potential uncertainty 
is present in both apriori and aposteriori beliefs. This 
is where the potential error lies not in the world, but 
somewhere in the w~rranting processes themselves, for 
instance, in the way in which the warrant was applied. In 
this case, when doubting the original claim we are doubting 
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the original warrant: either that it was appropriate to 
the situation; or that though the ~ of warrant was 
appropriate, we doubt our particular application (instanti-
ation) of it. My proposal is that a distinguishing 
feature of apriori warrants is that only uncertainty of 
this type (type 2) is possible. 
For instance, by making a computation error we are 
misapplying a rule; and thus we are not successful in 
obtaining apriori knowledge, not because the warrant was 
not of a bona fide apriori type, but because we have not 
obtained any knowledge at all. It is still correct to 
call the type of warranting procedure computation - apriori. 
The point is, just because a warrant is apriori does not 
mean there is no scope for human error. Yet this is what 
Kitcher seems to require of apriori warrants, and so this 
is where his account goes wrong. 
If apriori knowledge is to have a chance at being a 
clear and yet useful distinction - useful in describing 
some non-empty class - we must be cautious enough to 
provide an account of apriori warrants which both contrasts 
with aposteriori warrants, but which has in common with the 
aposteriori the ability to produce (corrigible) knowledge. 
The paradigm aposteriori case is perceptual: we draw a 
conclusion about the world on the basis of perceptual 
experience - our experience of the world. For example, we 
see a person in ov~ralls carrying a painting out of a museum 
room, and we infer on the basis of past experiences of 
workers in broad daylight, that he is on official relocating 
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business. However, there are two ways in which our 
inference could be wrong. (1) The man might be a thief. 
That is, our perceptual faculties may be working properly -
the man we seem to see is real, etc. - it is just that the 
world does not measure up to our hypothesis about his 
occupation. Or (2) our perceptual faculties may be mal-
functioning: 
in a museum. 
there is no man, and perhaps we are not even 
Case 1 is a situation where we may doubt 
the conclusion or inference without doubting any of the 
premises or warrants. Our perceptual statements still 
hold; there really is a man in overalls, etc. And our 
general rules are still true: it is still true that 
usually, or in general, men who transport paintings in 
broad daylight in museums are on official orders. In 
contrast, case 2 depicts an instance of the type of 
situation where doubt about the conclusion occurs via 
doubt about at least one of the warranting premises. I 
repeat my proposal: what distinguishes aposteriori beliefs 
or knowledge is that error of type I is always possible. 
Or, to state it conversely, the distinguishing feature of 
apriori warrants is the impossibility of type 1 doubt 
or error. Hence, rather than allowing ~ doubt-inducing 
counterfactual experiences to count against the apriority 
of a belief, we ought to restrict the type of counterfactual 
experience which indicates a belief was produced by an 
aposteriori warrant to that of type 1# Aposteriori 
warrants can lead ~s astray either due to faulty mechanisms, 
so that what seems to be the case is not really the case 
(i.e., our perceptions do not mirror the world); or due 
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to the world simply not measuring up to our hypotheses. 
This second way is where our perceptual evidence is not at 
fault: there really is a man in overalls ... It is, rather, 
the judgement made on the basis of that evidence which is 
at fault. 
The inductive character of aposteriori warrants forces 
the situation where it is always possible to have type 1 
error. Why should this be the mark of the aposteriori, 
rather than a mere distinction between induction and de-
duction? A distinction between induction and deduction is 
employed. But this distinction is related to the apriori/ 
aposteriori distinction, for aposteriori knowledge is 
generally translated as "knowledge in the light of sense 
experience" 13 The presence of experience of a certain 
sort - a sensory sort - is necessary for a warrant to be 
aposteriori. The relationship between our sense experience 
and our (aposteriori) hypotheses is evidential or inductive, 
for the subject of hypotheses which rest on sense experience 
is the world: that which causes our sense experiences, and 
which is (for most people, in some sense) independent of 
our awareness of it. Since our aposteriori hypotheses 
concern facts the status of which are (on the most ordinary 
interpretation) independent of our manner of investigating 
them, there is always a gap between the process of investig-
ation and the discovery of the truth. Hence, it is clear 
13 Peter A. Angeles, (1981). (My emphasis.) 
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that there are two ways of getting aposteriori knowledge 
wrong, illustrated by the two cases. So that even if one 
contests dividing up the counter factual experiences to co-
incide with the apriori/aposteriori distinction in the way 
we have urged, he or she can still admit such a distinction 
exists. 
Furthermore, it is plausible to distinguish between apriori 
and aposteriori by looking at the ~ in which uncertainty 
arises. For it bears out our intuitions concerning the 
inductive character of aposteriori knowledge - i.e., the 
presence of type 1 possible error as the mark of aposteriori. 
And, in addition, it bears out our intuitions concerning 
the apriori: that mathematics and logic are apriori, and 
that the root of any mistake here has nothing to do with 
sense experience, but involves only the warranting processes 
themselves. To summarise, any warrant can be rejected. 
Hence, case 2 where the warranting process itself is 
impugned or doubtable, is no way to distinguish between 
types of warrant. For this happens with both apriori and 
aposteriori warrants. Thus, type 1 recalcitrant experience 
is a plausible candidate for a distinguishing factor. 
(5) Further Explication of the Distinction 
Let us examine the two sets of cases more closely. If 
an item of knowledge is apriori, then the belief that it 
is true must be produced via an apriori warrant. An apriori 
warrant is one which satisfies Kitcher's conditions, with 
the added clause "provided we perform the necessary operations 
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in the warrant correctly". Thus, for example (3) b) would 
be revised to: 
(3) ~) if a process of the same type were 
to produce in X a belief that £, then 
it would warrant X in believing that 
£, provided X carries out all its 
operations correctly. 
Adding this clause excludes all counter factual experiences 
which induce doubt about the belief that £ by inducing doubt 
about the warrant for £. We can thus retain a useful 
notion of apriori which, yet, contrasts with our notion of 
the aposteriori. 
There is no gap between best possible evidence and 
apriori truth. Having the best possible evidence for believing 
that £ guarantees the truth of £, if £ is an apriori belief. 
For if we really have the best possible evidence, or warrant, 
then this means that the warrant was carried out properly; 
and if the warrant was carried out properly, then there is 
no other place for doubt to arise. 14 The only way we can 
be mistaken about a possible item of apriori knowledge is 
via the warrant. Uncertainty here stems only from doubt 
about the pedigree of the warranting process; e.g., worry 
14 Hence we see questions about the objectivity of apriori truths 
arise in conjunction with an account of that in which the apriori 
consists. For if there is no gap between best possible warrant and 
truth when an item of knowledge is apriori, then it seems such 
items cannot be regarded as objective in the same sort of way as 
statements about the-empirical world are regarded as objective. 
This is especially acute for the non-Platonist, for whom following 
the procedure correctly is what constitutes truth in, for example, 
mathematics and logic. 
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about an addition mistake in a long computation; or 
worry about the clarity of our concepts. If a belief is 
apriori, the only way we can fail to obtain "knowledge" 
is by failing to have secured a proper warrant. 
In contrast, there is always a gap between best possible 
evidence and aposteriori truth. Our warrant for an item 
of aposteriori knowledge may be unassailable, and we can 
still be mistaken about our belief. That is, doubt about 
the belief can occur other than via a doubt about our 
warranting experience. We can have the best possible evidence 
for believing that £, and yet £ may not be true. For 
instance, the best possible evidence that you are in pain 
is for me to see you writhing about on the floor. And yet 
I can still be wrong. You may not be in pain; you may 
be playing a trick on me. I can have the best possible 
evidence and still be wrong in my inference, because 
aposteriori hypotheses require cooperation from the ex-
terior world in order for me to be right. Another example: 
I can have the best possible evidence for believing that 
there is a cat on the mat next door: e 1 - there is 
something that looks like a cat; 
cat; e 3 it is purring; e 4 
e 2 - it smells like a 
it is not the first 
time I have seen it there; e 5 - there is communal agreement 
that my neighbour owns a cat (i.e., we have spoken about 
"his catll); etc. However, it is possible that what looks, 
smells, sounds, etc. like a cat is really some sort of 
sophisticated, smelly automaton. The point is, the 
conclusion, "There is a cat ... ", is doubtable without 
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necessarily doubting any of the items of evidence, any 
of the e ll.'s, for it. This is because we can add inform-
ation which is inconsistent with our former conclusion 
about the existence of the cat, but which is consistent 
with all the evidence we employed in arriving at the belief. 
Hence, an aposteriori warrant (a set of aposteriori 
evidential statements) can never fix a particular conclusion. 
There will always be indefinitely many possible conclusions 
which - though incompatible with one another - will all be 
compatible with the warrant. This is why it is not 
necessary in the case of an aposteriori belief to doubt the 
warrant when we doubt the conclusion (though, of course, 
this too is always possible; e.g., an hallucination). 
Whereas with apriori beliefs, the only avenue to doubt 
about the conclusion is one which necessitates doubt about 
(at least part of) the warrant along the way. 
Therefore, the proposal is to meet Kitcher's challenge 
to find a weaker view of apriori warrant which does not 
"trivialise" the notion. It is possible, because refining 
his conditions (3) a)-c) turns out to make a big difference 
in what comes out as apriori. That is, by refining his 
conditions, apriori knowledge becomes possible. 
The charge that my argument against apriorism 
presupposes too strong a notion of apriority 
is relatively easy to rebut ... To abandon 
it is to abandon the fundamental idea that 
apriori knowledge is knowledge which is in-
dependent of experience. The apriorist would 
be saying that one can know apriori that £ in 
a particular' way, even though, given appropriate 
experiences, one would not be able to know that 
£ in the same way. But if alternative ex-
periences co~ld undermine one's knowledge then 
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there are features of one's current 
experience which are relevant to the 
knowledge, namely those features whose 
absence would change the current experience 
into the subversive experience ... To 
reject condition (3b), the condition of 
my analysis on which the central arguments 
have turned, would be to strip apriorism 
of its distinctive claim. 
And footnote 1: 
I would contend that the analysis of apriori 
knowledge given in Chapter 1 provides the 
only clear account of the epistemological 
notion of apriority which is currently avail-
able. Hence if someone wants to protest that 
my analysis stacks the deck against the 
apriorist, it is incumbent upon him to provide 
an alternative. Given the arguments ... 
rehearsed in Chapter 1 .•. [either] the 
distinctive idea of epistemological apriority 
will have been abandoned, [or] ..• apriorism 
will be vulnerable in just the way I have 
taken it to be. 15 
However, it is here contended that it is unreasonable, and 
indeed unfaithful to the prior meaning of the term, to 
analyse apriori knowledge as knowledge which holds despite 
~ counterfactual experience whatever. In particular, 
it seems acceptable to say that "there ~ features of 
one's current experience which are relevant to" apriori 
knowledge, so long as these features have to do with our 
warranting procedures. That is, provided the experiences 
are only necessary in order to support the claim that, 
for instance, we had carried out certain apriori operations 
correctly, these features are not of a sensory type, and 
15 Kitcher, (1983), pp.88-89. 
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hence do not impugn the apriority of the warrant. 
knowledge is 
knowledge derived from the function of 
reason without reference to sense experience. 
Non-empirical knowledge. To know something 
apriori is to know it prior to experiencing 
anything like it in the external world. The 
truth of apriori knowledge (a) is not derived 
from sense experience, (b) cannot be checked 
against sense experience, (c) cannot be re-
futed by any sense experience. 16 
Apriori 
Sense experience cannot refute apriori knowledge - the 
world cannot "step in" to provide doubt-inducing experience 
in an additive way, as is possible with aposteriori 
knowledge. However, this is not to say it cannot be 
refuted at all. My proposal is to distinguish between 
apriori and aposteriori knowledge by focusing on the 
non-empirical nature of apriori warrants. 
What is distinctive about aposteriori knowledge is that 
we can be wrong about our conclusion despite the fact that 
our warrant - even the best possible warrant - still holds. 
This contrasts with apriori knowledge. The ~ of 
counterfactual experience which indicates a warrant is not 
apriori, is one in which the warrant still holds, and yet 
we have independent reason to revise the conclusion. On 
the other hand, if, in order to doubt the conclusion, we 
must doubt or impugn the warranting process, then such a 
conclusion is known on apriori grounds. Mathematics turns 
16 Angeles, (1981). 
213 
out to be apriori, since it is usually thought that 
having a proper warrant is what determines truth (or at 
least is co-extensional with a certain range of what is 
true) in mathematics. There is no gap here between the 
pro p r i e t y or cor r e c t n e s s 0 f a war ran tan d w hat is, in fa c t , 
true. 
(6) In Defence of Our New Explication 
I will defend the new proposal by testing it against 
Kitcher's counterexamples, cited above. 
1) The example of complex long proofs is 
straightforward. The uncertainty here 
stems from an uncertainty about whether 
or not one has followed the procedures ~ 
specified. So doubt is doubt about the 
warranting process - the actual proving 
activity. So this example of recalcitrant 
experience does not fall into the "distinct-
ively aposteriori" category. Hence it 
does not bear against the apriority of the 
warranting procedure of mathematical or 
logical proofs. 
2) The example of revolutions in mathematical 
standards is somewhat more difficult, for 
it raises a question about the correctness 
of an apriori warrant itself. Uncertainty 
about a theorem caused by an imagined change 
in the standards of correctness makes 
proofs - a class of purported apriori 
warrants - seem correct only relative to 
a community. Whereas, on the ordinary view, 
if a rule, axiom, or principle is knowable 
apriori, then it should be knowable in any 
community in which it is possible to obtain 
the relevant concepts. 
3) The case of the possibility of ingesting 
magical substances which enable us to see 
counterexamples to an axiom is equally 
difficult - albeit a bit more strange -
for the same sort of reason. If an axiom 
is knowable apriori, then it must be true; 
but if so, how can it be that we can en-
vision even the bare abstract possibility 
of a counterexample? 
214 
One could merely dismiss the objections posed by the 
latter two examples by saying that in both cases what is 
occurring is a doubt about a warrant. 
ness and axioms are warranting tools; 
Standards of correct-
hence, neither case 
threatens the apriority of such processes, according to 
our revised view of the apriori. However, this would be to 
dodge, rather than to meet, the problem. Case 1 has to do 
with doubt about the application of a purported apriori 
warrant; and is answered by referring to our refined 
condi tions (3) a) -c'). Cases 2 and 3 , on the other hand, 
illustrate a doubt which centres on the warranting process 
itself, rather than merely on its application. So it is a 
different kind of case. It will require us to examine part 
(2) of Kitcher's definition, for it raises questions concerning 
what it means for a process to be an apriori warrant for a 
belief. 
The objections go: how can a warrant, like an axiom or 
principle, be apriori if it is ever susceptible to doubt in 
the way imagined above (either via a possible revolution 
in rigour (case 2), or via the possible awareness of a 
counterexample to an axiom, during a drug-induced state 
(case 3)? The warrants in cases 2 and 3 depend on the 
concepts involved: on our interpretation and refinement 
of those concepts. Thus, for example, the revolution in 
rigour which accompanied the development of the E.-J limit 
concept occurred partly because it was discovered that our 
concepts of continuity and limit lead to contradictions. 
Kitcher's description of the revolution in rigour is 
L.l.5 
misleading. It is not merely that standards change; and 
so certain warrants which were formerly acceptable are no 
longer acceptable. This is an incorrect picture, making 
the warranting process itself seem a matter of mere convention. 
Rather, given a certain concept of continuity, I (i.e., 
smoothness); plus certain apriori warranting operations, 
~,' .•. ,~~; and the situation where both are embedded in 
some more general theory, I; we were able to arrive at a 
belief P: for example, that a continuous function is every-
where differentiable. Later we came to believe not P: that 
we were mistaken in the view that every continuous function 
has a tangent at every point. The new [- & definition of 
continuity, for example, allowed for the existence of 
continuous curves with no unique tangents at some, or 
indeed all, points. However, this does not mean that we 
have discovered that our warrant was wrong all along - and 
hence, that it could not have been apriori, because false. 
Nor does this indicate a mere change in the standards 
demanded of one warranting procedure. Rather, the refinement 
in the concept of continuity (~,smoothness, being replaced 
by ~*, the (. - J account of the continuity of a real-valued 
function) entailed that the procedures, c{" ••• ,0("" which 
formerly warranted claims employing the concept ~, were 
now abandoned, not because they were discovered to be 
incorrect after all, but because they were no longer 
appropriate - they are inappropriate to the new concept C*. 
Warranting procedures, as envisaged by Kitcher and discussed 
here, are appropriate only relative to the concepts on which 
they are based. Our concept of continuity was refined, and 
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the new concept brought with it new warranting procedures 
appropriate to it. But this in no way impugns the apriority 
of the warranting procedures appropriate to the earlier 
concept C. Since progress in mathematics must involve 
solving new problems, and solving old ones better, it 
involves either creating new domains, or refining existing 
concepts. As Poincar{ put it, 
it was not long before it was recognized 
that exactness cannot be established in 
arguments unless it is first introduced 
into the definitions. 17 
The fact that concepts are refined and revised does not 
show that the warranting procedures appropriate to those 
concepts are not apriori. 
Case 3 above - where Kitcher attempts again to argue 
against the apriority of a part of mathematics by referring 
to a certain way in which a counterexample to an axiom 
might arise - is another instance where the description of 
the example is contentious. Kitcher cites the possibility 
that we can imagine ourselves to be able, only when in a 
drug-induced state, to see counterexamples to a previously 
accepted axiom. And he takes this as a sign that axioms 
could not then be apriori, because we can always imagine 
17 Poincar6, (1889/1908), pp.123-124. 
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giving them up. So, for instance, let us imagine that 
drinking a cup of coffee allows me to think just that 
little bit faster or more clearly so that I can see a 
counterexample to some axiom which I was thinking of 
adopting (like the Axiom of Choice). Further, it is only 
in this drug-induced state - i.e. my caffeine. "high" - that 
I can see and understand this counterexample; although 
I can remember that it is a coherent counterexample when 
I am in a caffeine "low" state, it is not clear ~ until 
I down at least two cups. Kitcher's point is not merely 
that axioms are not certain; although this is part of 
his complaint, since he does link apriority with certainty. 
Rather, the deeper point is that the uncertainty here is 
caused by an aposteriori or empirical fact: my drinking 
a cup of coffee. Hence, he wishes to complain, since 
the imagination of a certain additional aposteriori fact 
can induce doubt about an axiom, an axiom is not knowable 
apriori. 
However, Kitcher is glossing over an important distinction 
here. He is treating the cause of my belief that -~, i.e., 
coffee drinking, as if it is the cause of -Po Coffee 
drinking does not cause or instantiate a possible counter-
example to an axiom. Rather, in the example, coffee 
drinking allows the instantiation, or the "seeing", of the 
counterexample to occur. Kitcher's description of the 
example is prejudiced, for he makes it appear that drinking 
cups of coffee is the warrant for my belief that -Po 
Whereas - it is obvious now - that cannot be the warrant, 
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for it is no warrant at all for -Po If I am asked why 
I reject the axiom P, the answer could not be merely, 
"Because I drank a cup of coffee". Hence, it is not an 
aposteriori fact which impinges on my belief that~; aRd 
so this example does not bear against the apriority of our 
knowledge of mathematical axioms. Although coffee drinking 
may be episodically related to my rejection of an axiom, 
it cannot be an explanation of my rejection, but a mere 
explanation of why, all of a sudden, I can see counter-
examples now, where I could not before. That is, the 
example should be described as another case of further 
analysing certain concepts employed. The ingestion of 
chemicals does not cause mathematical facts; the ingestion 
of chemicals can, however, cause me to ~ certain mathemat-
ical facts. Perhaps drinking coffee enables me to think 
about a concept in a new, more refined, more fruitful way; 
or perhaps I can concentrate better, or think of more 
logical consequences faster, when I am under "the influence". 
But this is only to say that our ability to perform certain 
apriori operations (concentrating, deducing) is enhanced 
(indeed, they can also be tinged, e. g., by alcohol) by 
certain physical, and hence, aposteriori factors. However, 
the ability of aposteriori factors to influence our 
performance of certain warranting processes in no way 
impugns the apriority of those processes. The ability to 
be influenced by aposteriori factors does not indicate 
that the operation~ we are performing are thereby aposteriori. 
It does not inform us at all about the epistemological 
nature of the operations. 
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Our application of apriori warrants does not need to 
be indefeasibly certain in order to be able to capture 
a faithful notion of apriori. Furthermore, our knowledge 
or acceptance of apriori warrants need not be indefeasible 
according to the revised account of apriori warrant. 
There is no direct link between certainty and apriority. 
Wrong results cause us to reject a use of a rule, and not 
its apriority. And seeing a counterexample may lead us 
to reject an axiom not because it is not apriori - that 
which first induced us to accept the axiom was not an 
aposteriori warranting procedure - but because it is not 
true or faithful to our concepts. Neither the possibility 
of misuse of a warrant, nor the possibility of rejecting 
a warrant, necessarily informs us that the warrant could 
not be apriori. Thus it seems to me that none of Kitcher's 
counterexamples succeed in establishing that pure mathem-
atical knowledge is not knowledge apriori. I shall 
therefore conclude that Poincare's thesis of the synthetic 
apriori character of mathematical truth remains intact 
with respect to a certain challenge from the modern 
empiricist. 
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